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Abstract: 
 
The mandatory adoption of IFRS2 and its equivalent FAS123R (Share-Based Payment) 
presented a radical change in financial reporting of Share-Option Based Compensation 
(SOBC). Both IASB and FASB adopted the view that disclosure is not an adequate 
substitute for recognition; consequently, all SOBC transactions ultimately lead to 
expense recognition, measured at the grant-date fair value of SOBC. This thesis identifies 
and evaluates the major financial reporting implications of alternative reporting methods 
of accounting for SOBC across a global context and over different time periods for pre 
and post adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. It explores two key research questions using an 
international sample of US and EU banks over the period (2004-2011). The first research 
question aims to identify, analyse, compare and evaluate the total effect of the 
compulsory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, on selected banks’ performance measures. 
Underpinned by equity valuation and agency theories, the second question aims to assess 
the extent to which the mandatory recognition approach to expensing SOBC provides 
more value relevant information that better reflects the incentive properties of such 
rewards than the disclosure approach. The findings show that the expensing of SOBC has 
resulted in modest and statistically significant negative effects on both US and EU banks’ 
selected financial performance measures with the impact being more likely to be higher 
in the US banking sector. The reported modest impact does not reflect earlier research 
estimations indicating that concerns and criticism of the implementation of 
IFRS2/FAS123R are largely unsubstantiated. The results also indicate that the 
recognition regime to expense SOBC is significantly more value relevant and better 
reflects the intangible value attributable to such rewards, relative to the disclosure regime. 
The influence of the differences in the financial reporting contexts on the intangible value 
attributable to SOBC is less burdensome after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 A background to Share-Option Based Compensation and its accounting 
regulations: 
Offering Share-Option Based Compensation (hereafter SOBC) as a component of 
employees’ and executives’ remuneration packages has become more popular among US 
public companies since the late 1990s1 (Core et al., 2002, Street and Cereola, 2004; 
Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009), and since the early 2000s in the EU2 (Pendleton et al., 
2002; European Commission, 2003). In a SOBC arrangement, a company issues equity 
instruments to its employees at many levels of employment as a component of their 
incentives packages. The issued equity instrument gives the employee the right but not 
the obligation “to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified “exercise” price for a pre-
specified term” (Hall and Murphy, 2003, p. 2; Sacho and Oberholster, 2005). SOBC 
packages commonly include share options, in addition to other similar equity awards, 
such as share purchase plans, as well as cash-settled awards where the cash payment 
depends on the share price as in the case of share-appreciation rights.  
The widespread use of SOBC, as incentives schemes, was influenced by many factors; 
but mainly by companies’ desire to attract and retain highly talented executives and 
employees (Kedia and Mozumdar, 2002), to motivate and compensate them for enhanced 
future performance (Core and Guay, 2001), and to conserve cash outlays (Yermack, 
1995; Core and Guay, 2001). Another key reason for the significant growth of SOBC was 
                                                          
1 The National Centre for Employee Ownership estimated that almost 3 million employees received options as part of 
compensation in 2000, up from less than a million in 1990 and that about 10 million employees held stock options in 
that year. A survey conducted by William M. Mercer in 1999 found that the percentage of granted stock options in 
large US firms to at least half of their employees increased steadily from 17% in 1993 to 39% in 1999 (cited in Core 
and Guay, 2001). 
2 Stock options have been used in France and the UK for somewhat longer (For further details, see European 
Commission, 2003) 
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that no compensation expense had to be recognised in the income statement for most 
SOBC plans prior to the introduction of the international accounting standard IFRS2 and 
its US equivalent FAS123R (Share-Based Payments) in 20043 (Matsunaga, 1995; 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2001).  
The mandatory recognition approach to accounting for SOBC was first proposed in 1993 
when the US Financial Accounting Standard Board (hereafter FASB) issued an exposure 
draft of Financials Accounting Statement FAS123 (Accounting for stock-based 
compensation). This draft raised one of the most prolonged and controversial debates 
over the history of the standard setters, particularly the FASB as it proposed “one of the 
most radical changes in accounting rules” (Hagopian, 2006, p.146; Farber, et al., 2007). 
In 1995 and due to political pressure from Congress and the business community4, the 
original draft of the mandatory adoption of the recognition approach to account for SOBC 
was amended. Companies were only recommended to elect the recognition approach 
under FAS123. Alternatively, if FAS123 was not voluntarily adopted, SOBC expense by 
way of pro-forma disclosure within the footnote of the financial statements was required 
(i.e. if FAS123 would have been in use). However, the majority of US companies chose 
the second alternative of the pro forma disclosure, because it was perceived that the cost 
of the recognition would be higher than the cost of the other available choice (Botosan 
and Plumlee, 2001). 
The recognition approach would primarily reduce the amount of the reported earnings 
and ultimately cause deterioration in a variety of performance measures. This argument 
                                                          
3 IFRS 2 was first applied to accounting period starting on 01st Jan 2005. FAS 123R was first applied to accounting 
periods ending in 2006 
4 Farber, et al. (2007) pointed out that there was such strong political pressure opposing this draft that a robust 
congressional intervention was required to prevent the FASB from moving ahead with mandating the proposed 
standard. Furthermore, only one month after issuing the Exposure Draft, 1,700 comment letters had been sent to the 
FASB, 1,000 of these letters were from employees of companies more likely to be considerably affected by the passing 
of this draft. 
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was supported by a number of studies that estimated the impact on the reported earning 
prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, using pre-adoption data from the 
pro-forma disclosure, and that looked at companies position in different countries (e.g. 
Botosan and Plumlee, 2001, Street & Cereola, 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Saiz, 
2003; Apostolou and Crumbley, 2005). Additionally, the recognition approach to 
expense SOBC might affect companies’ use of SOBC, as companies are likely to 
discontinue share option programs if they were forced to include the value in net income 
(Ratliff, 2005, p.39). 
Opponents of the recognition approach to account for SOBC also believed that mandating 
this approach would be unnecessary (see e.g., Rouse and Barton, 1993; Derieux, 1994; 
Ratliff, 2005 and Aboody et al., 2004a). Firms were already disclosing the dilutive effect 
of SOBC grants on the earning within the footnotes of the financial reports using the pro-
forma disclosure. The recognition approach would, therefore, neither significantly 
influence how market participants perceive the cost associated with SOBC grants, nor 
affect investor’s perception to the incentives derived from these grants that aim to attract 
and motivate talented employees. That is, there should be no difference between the 
information content of recognised SOBC expense and that of the disclosed SOBC 
expense.  
The absence of an accounting standard addressing SOBC in other countries was also of 
particular concern though it was not as contentious as in the US, as the use of this form 
of compensation outside the US had increased substantially in later years. The use of 
SOBC has become popular since the early 2000’s for much of Europe, particularly the 
15 EU countries (See Pendleton et al., 2002; European Commission, 2003; Street and 
Cereola, 2004). One of the main reasons for the widespread use of SOBC in EU countries 
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is the removal or the release of legal restrictions on SOBC, and particularly to enable 
firms competing globally5.  
Financial reporting regulations in much of Europe at that time varied from country to 
country, but generally, they did not require SOBC to be treated as an expense, nor was 
there a pro-forma disclosure requirement. For example, some EU countries such as the 
UK, only recommended firms disclosing details of shares granted to each director in the 
annual reports (Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010). In Italy, the disclosure was only limited 
to quantitative information about the number of SOBC and their variations during the 
year, without any communication regarding their fair value (Corbella and Florio, 2010). 
It seems, in the EU, more emphasis was given to openness and disclosure of information 
than how this would be accounted for. As a result, unlike in the US, not even pro forma 
statements by way of notes to the financial statements were required in the EU. However, 
this did not satisfy the proponents of expensing and the debate continued. 
As SOBC schemes were becoming more popular, the accounting profession and the 
financial community became more concerned about the inconsistency and the inadequacy 
of the disclosure or the “free to grant” approach to account for the cost associated with 
SOBC plans. Warren Buffett, a leading investment fund manager, summed up the issue 
as following:  
“If options aren’t a form of compensation, what are they? If compensation isn’t an expense, 
what is it? And if expenses shouldn’t go in the calculation of earnings, where in the world 
should they go?6”  
                                                          
5 For example, around 90% of FTSE 100 companies granted share options for its top executives after the passage of 
the UK 1984 Finance Act. Furthermore, issuing share options in Germany and Finland, particularly to executives was 
only legal in 1998 (Ratnesar, 2000). Other EU countries such as Belgium, the UK and the Netherlands also revised 
their tax laws to make share options appealing to corporate boards and executives (for more detail see, Ratnesar, 2000; 
Pendleton et al., 2002; European Commission, 2003, Street and Cereola, 2004). The removal or the release in legal 
restrictions on granting SOBC has facilitated the widespread use of SOBC in EU countries. 
6 This is taken from Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc., 1992. 
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Following the Enron, WorldCom and other US financial and accounting debacles7, the 
controversial debate over the accounting for SOBC became heated and attracted 
widespread criticism. Sir David Tweedie (2002)8, former chair of the IASB considered 
that “Enron was brought down by share options… [T]he sheer greed of hidden numbers”.  
By the end of 2004 and after nearly a decade of that controversial and intense debate, 
both the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the US-FASB 
consequently responded to criticisms raised over the disclosure approach. Arguably, the 
disclosure approach resulted in ultimately overstated and distorted reported earnings that 
did not faithfully reflect the underlying economic reality or a ‘true and fair’ view of 
companies’ financial positions. On 19th February 2004, the IASB released IFRS2, which 
was first applied to accounting periods starting 1st January 2005. The standard 
mandatorily required the fair value of share options and other share-based grants, 
measured at the grant-date, to be deducted as an expense from the companies’ income 
statements over the vesting period9. According to the IASB, IFRS2 provided a unique 
opportunity to assume leadership by issuing a high-quality standard that would be a 
benchmark for international convergence (IASB, 2002). Indeed, in December 2004, the 
FASB released SFAS 123R (Share-based payment), as one of earlier international 
accounting standards that have been closely converged by the IASB and the FASB. SFAS 
123R also mandatorily required firms to recognise the grant-date fair value of share-based 
payments as an expense over the vesting period. The standard was first applied to 
accounting periods ending in 2006. 
                                                          
7 Share options lies at the core of the corporate morality of the US-based Enron, WorldCom, among others. These 
debacles had been linked directly to excessive risk taking along with excessive share price fixation; both arguably 
resulted in increasing stock option grants. These companies have also attracted public concern on problems associated 
with other accounting practices. 
8 Speech by Sir David Tweddie, Sydney, Thursday, 15 August 2002. Available at 
http://www.frc.gov.au/speeches/tweedie_speech.asp. 
9 The standard required companies to prepare comparator figures for the earlier year. Further, all option grants awarded 
after November 2002 with first vesting after 1st January 2005 were required to be included in the charge to profits. 
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1.2 Research Objective 
The introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R presented an exogenous shock that radically 
changed accounting for share-based payment10 on an international level. The view 
adopted by both the IASB and FASB that all SOBC transactions ultimately lead to 
expense recognition came after an extraordinarily controversial and prolonged debate on 
the accounting treatment for SOBC. Yet the financial reporting implications surrounding 
the recognition versus the disclosure approach to the cost associated with SOBC in the 
financial statements remains a subject of widespread discussion internationally, even 
after the mandatory adoption of the new accounting standards pertaining to SOBC by two 
major accounting standard-setters. The main argument of both the IASB and FASB to 
support mandating the standards is that non-recognition of the cost associated with SOBC 
in the income statement will obscure the information contained in the financial reporting 
and undermine its reliability, value relevance, and comparability (FASB, 2004, IASB, 
2004).  
“Recognizing compensation cost incurred as a result of receiving employee services in 
exchange for valuable equity instruments issued by the employer will help achieve that 
objective by providing more relevant and reliable information about the costs incurred by the 
employer to obtain employee services in the marketplace”. FASB (2004: v) 
Converging the accounting treatment of SOBC transactions between IASB and FASB was 
also another explicit objective of mandating IFRS2 and FAS123R. The convergence 
process mainly aims to enhance the international comparability in accounting for SOBC 
transactions. 
 “Converging to a common set of high-quality financial accounting standards for share-based 
payment transactions with employees improves the comparability of financial information 
around the world and makes the accounting requirements for entities that report financial 
statements under both U.S. GAAP and international accounting standards less burdensome”. 
FASB (2004: ii) 
                                                          
10 IFRS 2 and FAS123R covers accounting for all types of share-based transactions in which the entity receives goods 
or services either as consideration for its equity instruments or by incurring liabilities for amounts based on the price 
of the entity's shares or other equity instruments of the entity. In this study we examine only share-based payments to 
directors and employees as the most common beneficiaries of share-based payments. 
7 
 
Expanded disclosures and reporting practices prior to IFRS2/FAS123R, and mandatory 
expensing of SOBC after IFRS2/FAS123R provide a sound setting for comparing the 
benefits and costs of alternative reporting methods along with their valuation implications 
on a wider international context.  
This thesis aims to identify and evaluate the major financial reporting implications and 
the economic consequences of alternative reporting methods of accounting for SOBC by 
utilising pre and post adoption data of IFRS2/FAS123R as applied to a single industry 
and across a wider global setting, the EU and US banking sectors. The focus on these two 
distinct international markets, the US and the EU, can indeed be informative because it 
puts the impact of adoption of a closely converged international standard into a global 
context and benching two internationally active and peer markets that first adopted 
IFRS2/FAS123R (the reasons for choosing the US and EU banking sectors are further 
discussed in section 1.4). This thesis distinguishes primarily between pre and post 
adoption periods and between US and non-US studies to highlight the gap that US and 
pre-adoption studies dominates the existing literature, whilst non-US and post adoption 
studies, and in particular studies on the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the wider 
international scale are not common. Healy and Palepu (2001, 414) highlight the necessity 
for additional research that evaluate the benefits and costs of alternative reporting 
methods where the findings are likely to provide useful evidence to standard setters. It is 
believed that the findings of such research would broaden the extent of our knowledge 
regarding the international financial reporting implications of alternative reporting 
methods; particularly by investigating whether the implications of different accounting 
practices prior and after an accounting event can noticeably differ or be remarkably 
similar, and across different research sites and periods of investigation. The research 
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objective of this thesis is tackled through two main research inquiries, which are 
discussed along with their motivations in more details in the next sections. 
1.3 Research Motivations  
SOBC has been widely accepted as compensation mechanisms used by companies to 
attract and retain highly talented employees, and to motivate future performance. SOBC 
enhances employees’ efficiency by actively engaging them in the decision-making 
process and ties their interests with those of shareholders (Landau et al., 2007). Cash 
outflow in terms of cash compensation can also be replaced by the use of option grants, 
particularly for start-up firms and those that have liquidity constraints (Core and Guay, 
2001). 
However, an equally important accounting issue, which fostered one of the most 
prolonged and controversial debates in the history of the standard setters, is to evaluate 
not only the benefits of, but also, more importantly, the full extent of the cost associated 
with SOBC. This cost should also be fairly reflected and captured by its accounting 
treatment within the financial statements of companies. The accounting treatment of 
SOBC should also provide market participants with more relevant and reliable 
information that reflects the intangible implications of the incurred cost.  
SOBC expense compared to other operating expenses has a unique characteristic. SOBC 
schemes are usually designed to motivate employees and manager and to drive 
companies’ future performance over the long-term. The role of SOBC in driving 
companies’ future performance over the long-term is associated with an extra market risk 
factor. Market participants are expected to compensate the associated expense of SOBC 
compared to other operating expenses such as salaries or bonuses which are paid based 
on the past services or performance. SOBC is, therefore, expected to be valued as an 
intangible asset that contributes to a better future value of companies. As such, the long-
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term intangible feature of SOBC should be effectively captured by market participants 
through the lenses of the accounting treatment of SOBC. 
This thesis mainly relates to two streams of accounting literature, i) the impact of 
expensing SOBC on a company’s selected financial performance measures and ii) the 
debate over the value relevance and the information content of the recognition versus the 
disclosure approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC. 
1.3.1 The impact of expensing SOBC on selected financial performance measures 
The first stream of literature this study relates to is mainly concerned with the materiality 
of the negative effect of expensing SOBC on a company’s reported earnings and other 
related financial earnings indicators. The mandatory recognition of this expense would 
most likely reduce companies’ reported earning substantially, and to distort companies’ 
accounting performance measures significantly. Financial indicators, such as earning per 
share [EPS], return on assets [ROA], and return on equity [ROE] are widely used in 
different contractual specifications, such as variable compensation contracts11; and also 
in estimating firm’s value and its future cash flows as well as in determining its access to 
capital markets. Standards setters, investors and other interested parties in financial 
accounts and related corporate governance issues must consider the negative effects of 
IFRS2/FAS123R to determine the costs from using SOBC plans.  
The majority of the existing studies had estimated the effect of the mandatorily expensing 
of SOBC mainly by utilising data prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R 
(e.g., Botosan and Plumlee, 2001; Saiz, 2003; Street and Cereola, 2004; Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2005). Furthermore, all these studies reported non-compliance in some aspects 
of their sample with SOBC disclosure requirements. Some studies also assumed that 
                                                          
11 Accounting performance indicators such as ROA, ROE, EPS, are one of the basic motivation aspects used to 
determine the amount of compensation in the variable compensation contracts.  
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SOBC were granted only for directors and the five most senior executives (Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2005). The majority of these studies also assumed that the estimated effect of 
expensing SOBC would increase yearly to be double or triple of the estimated reported 
effect, and the effect would stabilise when the option life cycle is completed12, assuming 
that SOBC is granted at a relatively fixed level. However, Seethamraju and Zach (2004) 
and Ratliff (2005) argue that companies may respond to IFRS2/FAS123R by reducing 
SOBC grants to avoid the effect of the mandatory expensing of SOBC on their financial 
ratios. 
Indeed, the limitations of utilising pre-IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data along with the 
non-compliance necessitate the need for additional research to examine the impact of this 
international standard [IFRS2/FAS123R] utilising a broader international sample and 
time-span, more performance measures, and post implementation data (Buston and 
Plumle, 2001; Street and Cereola, 2004; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005). Later on, only 
two recent studies in responding to this need have sought to identify the effect of 
mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on selected performance measures once it was 
adopted in the US and the UK. These studies were conducted by Schroeder and Schauer 
(2008) and Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) respectively. Yet these studies were 
constrained by utilising one and two year’s post-adoption data respectively, using fewer 
performance measures and focusing on one single context, the US and UK to examine 
the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R.  
Firstly, utilising only a one-year period neglects the impact of option life cycle and 
management discretion, particularly over the options’ life and the vesting period. Pre-
IFRS2/FAS123R adoption literature, such as Chalmers and Godfrey (2005), Buston and 
                                                          
12 Botosan and Plumlee (2001) argue that the option life cycle is usually three years. Therefore, if share options are 
granted yearly at a fixed level, the expense will be double and triple in the second and the third year respectively 
compared to the expense calculated in the first year of issuing share options  
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Plumle (2001, p.325) and Dechow et al. (1996) predicted that the expense of SOBC 
grants for firms issuing these grants at a steady level would increase significantly over 
time and it would stabilise at the end of option life cycle which takes usually three to five 
years. Dhar and De (2011) also suggest that management discretion, particularly over 
expected option life, might be one of the factors that negatively affects the reliability in 
measuring SOBC expense, and consequently contributes to misestimating the impact 
over a given year. Additionally, one warranted factor which is expected to influence the 
effect of expensing SOBC plans is the companies’ incline to curtail their SOBC programs 
in order to reduce the expense required by the mandatorily adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R 
(see Ratliff, 2005).  
That is, covering a longer time-span compared to earlier literature allows this study to 
address factors warranted in the existing literature, such as option life cycle (Buston and 
Plumle, 2001; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010), 
management discretions (Dhar and De, 2011), and the extent of curtailing SOBC 
programs (Ratliff, 2005). It also helps to diminish the random ‘noise’ in the reported 
estimations of earlier studies for the total effect of expensing SOBC given the impact of 
the option life cycle and the shorter life span in much of these studies. 
Secondly, it is believed that the effect of the IFRS adoption in general (Branson and Alia, 
2011; Nobes and Parker, 2013) and IFRS2/FAS123R, in particular (Street and Cereola, 
2004) is more likely to vary, depending on the specific context influenced by different 
institutional factors governing the financial environment. The only study that discussed 
and estimated an initial generalisation across countries was conducted by Street and 
Cereola (2004) using one year pre-IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data for a sample of 
companies listed in the US but domiciled in other countries. Motivated by expanded 
disclosures and reporting practices prior and after IFRS2/FAS123R, the thesis adds to 
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earlier literature by using a pre and post adoption international sample that covers a longer 
time-span, and by controlling for the differences in the institutional reporting settings. It, 
therefore, adds a wider external validity for assessing the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on 
the wider international setting.  
1.3.2 The value relevance and the information content of the recognition versus the 
disclosure approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC 
The widely spread separation of ownership and control in business enterprises has resulted 
in the emergence of two groups, the principles group “without appreciable control, and 
the agents group without appreciable ownership” (Berle and Means, 1932, p121). Agency 
problem arises from the more likely self-interest conflicts of these two groups. Both the 
principle and agent are usually self-interest utility maximizers and more likely to have 
different interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Agency theory that views a business enterprise as a nexus of defined contracts between 
resource holders suggests awarding managers and employees with SOBC as an effective 
incentive instrument that aligns their interests with those of shareholders, and eventually 
mitigates the agency problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Indeed, earlier studies such 
as Core and Guay (2001) found evidence that SOBC is mainly granted by companies to 
attract, retain and motivate talented employees and align their interests with those of 
shareholders. 
More precisely, the role of SOBC in mitigating the agency problem becomes clearer by 
the willingness of those talented managers and employees to be compensated based on 
the long-term future performance and service. The role of SOBC in driving companies’ 
future performance over the long-term is associated with an extra market risk factor. 
Market participants are expected to compensate the associated expense of SOBC 
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compared to other operating expenses such as salaries or bonuses which are paid based 
on the past services or performance. SOBC is expected to be priced by market participants 
as an intangible asset that contributes to a better future value of companies (Rees and Stott, 
2001).  
The accounting measurements and treatments of SOBC are also supposed to assist market 
participants to capture the “intangible” effect of the recognised expense of SOBC, and to 
reflect it in the equity value of the firm as a value-increasing asset. Earlier bodies of 
literature, which mainly used pre IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data to investigate the 
relevance and reliability of the disclosed fair value amount of SOBC found concrete 
evidence that this amount was perceived significantly negative [as expenses] by market 
participants (e.g. Aboody, 1996; Chamberlain and Hsieh, 1999; Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 
2004a). That is, under the disclosure approach, investors assign higher weightings to the 
dilutive associated cost of SOBC versus their incentive effect. This finding might also 
implicitly suggest that the disclosure approach fails to reflect the long-term “intangible” 
effect of SOBC on the financial statements.  
The mandatory recognition regime to expensing the estimated fair value amount of SOBC 
aims to provide “more relevant and reliable information”, to market valuation (FASB, 
2004; IASB, 2004). Revealing more transparent and credible information about the 
aspects and incurred cost of SOBC also implicitly suggests that investors now may be 
able to capture the “intangible” effect of SOBC and reflect it in the equity value of the 
firm as a value-increasing asset 
The overwhelming majority of the existing academic literature that assessed relevance 
and the reliability of the recognition and the disclosure approach to expensing the fair 
value of SOBC is conducted mainly within the context of the US (see, for instance, 
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Aboody, 1996; Rees and Stott, 2001; Bell et al., 2002; Aboody et al., 2004a; Aboody et 
al., 2004b; Balsam et al., 2006), and using pre-IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data. The 
prevailing conclusion of these papers provides mixed evidence on the value relevance and 
the information content of the recognition approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC 
in respect to investors’ valuation relative to the disclosure approach. Yet the need for 
additional research was necessitated to cover the limitations of using pre-IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption footnote disclosure along with short-term data (Rees and Stott, 2001, p. 115). 
Aboody et al. (2004a: 274), for example, maintained that “inference related to the 
perceived reliability of disclosed but unrecognised SFAS123 expense may not be 
generalisable to an expense recognition regime”. 
Furthermore, the convergence process of IFRS2 and FAS123R aims to mitigate the 
international differences in measuring the cost associated with SOBC grants, and thus to 
deliver more reliable and useful information to market participants across all the settings 
that adopted these standards. However, the desired impact and the economic effect of 
accounting practices, including that of SOBC, is more likely to vary internationally 
depending on the specific contextual factors governing the financial environment (Street 
and Cereola, 2004; Ball, 2006). Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) add that accounting 
information quality of banks tends to vary with institutional factors across countries. The 
differences in institutional contexts may also affect the valuation weight placed by market 
participants on the incentive value derived from SOBC. Hung (2001) documented in his 
international study that the nature of the legal system measured by the level of investors’ 
protection in a country improves the value relevance of accounting information under the 
accrual accounting system. Ball et al. (2000:2) concluded “enhanced common law 
disclosure standards reduce the agency costs of monitoring managers, thus countering the 
advantages of closer shareholder-manager contact in code-law countries”. That is, market 
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participants in common law countries should be able to interpret the recognised expense 
of SOBC grants and identify marginally more incentive feature from these grants, where 
these grants are arguably used to reduce agency costs and are more likely to be subject to 
a lower level of management discretion. 
Such an argument questions whether market participants can effectively interpret the fair 
value expense of SOBC recognised in banks that operate in different institutional contexts. 
Lower level of investor protection might imply a higher probability for management 
discretion tendency and to use SOBC opportunistically as a way to reward managers and 
employees (agents) their part of the profit. This implies the level of investor protection 
may significantly influence the value relevance and the information content of SOBC 
expense reported under the fair value approach of IFRS2/FAS123R. The observed market 
valuation of the incurred expense of SOBC under alternative reporting methods and across 
different reporting environment will add to our understanding of the value implications of 
SOBC in the wider international setting. It adds to earlier literature and further develops 
whether the disclosure of SOBC expense is an adequate substitute for recognition in 
diverse jurisdictions. It also provides evidence on the extent to which the findings of the 
US-focus research conducted prior to mandatory adoption of FAS123R is valid using pre 
versus post adoption research design over an extended period (2004-2011), and across 
different settings that have their unique institutional environment and have adopted the 
international converged version IFRS2. 
1.4 Research inquiries: 
This thesis aims to identify and evaluate the major financial reporting implications and 
the economic consequences of alternative reporting methods of accounting for SOBC by 
utilising pre and post adoption data of IFRS2/FAS123R as applied to a single industry 
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and across a wider global setting, the EU and US banking sectors. It mainly considers 
two key research inquiries. 
The first research inquiry of this thesis is 
1) To identify, analyse, compare, and evaluate the total effect of the compulsory 
adoption of IFRS2 and FAS123R on selected performance measures within and 
between two distinct settings: the US and EU banking sectors using pre and post-
adoption data.  
This thesis examines and compares the average extent of the changes in selected financial 
ratios due to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. It also analyses the individual 
yearly behaviour of this impact over an extended period of years (2004-2011). This 
allows a better view on the influence of the option life cycle and the financial crisis, along 
with the scope for management discretion that exists in some accounting requirements of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on the reported impact. The difference in the change (∆) of the selected 
performance measures over the period, 2004-2005 for EU banks and 2005-2006 for US 
banks, due exclusively to the mandatory introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R is also 
evaluated13. The study also provides evidence on the extent to which banks have curtailed 
their SOBC schemes in order to reduce the expense required by the compulsory 
IFRS2/FAS123R. More importantly, further evidence is provided on the structure of 
SOBC expense, particularly the recent gradual movement toward using cash-settled 
based compensation because of its flexible and attractive accounting requirements. 
Finally, the effect of IFRA2/FAS123R is examined and compared within and between 
US and EU banks after controlling for different characteristics of banks and their 
operational structure (e.g. banks size, banks potential growth rate, and the differences in 
                                                          
13 The difference in the studied periods for the EU and the US is due to the effective date of IFRS2 and FAS 123R. 
IFRS 2 was first applied to accounting period starting on 01st Jan 2005. FAS 123R was first applied to accounting 
periods ending in 2006 
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banking activities). As an additional analysis, the impact is also identified, compared and 
evaluated for banks domiciled in codified-law versus common law countries, and after 
controlling for different characteristics of banks. 
The second inquiry of this thesis is: 
2) To assess the extent to which the recognition approach to expensing the fair value of 
SOBC under IFRS2/FAS123R provides more value relevant information that better 
reflects the intangible value of such rewards than the disclosure approach, in an 
international sample of EU and US banks.  
The thesis provides evidence on the extent to which mandating and converging the IFRS2 
and FAS123R has resulted in enhancing the perceived quality of financial reporting 
through “providing more relevant and reliable information” to market participants. It also 
assesses whether the differences in the institutional environment of financial reporting 
significantly influence the value relevance and the intangible value attributable to SOBC 
prior versus after IFRS2/FAS123R adoption. It is argued that the market will regard as 
less relevant fair value estimates of SOBC in banks domiciled in countries with a lower 
level of investor protection where managers have more freedom to manipulate fair value 
estimates. 
A set of continuous and dummy country-level institutional variables is used to partition 
the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) [LT] a 
country’s legal tradition, common law versus code law, based on La Porta et al. (1997) 
and Ball et al. (2000); (2) the US economy versus the remaining countries, (3) [ASD] the 
anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal 
protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation (4) the disclosure 
requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better 
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disclosure rules in the selected sample-countries; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength 
of shareholders protection in a given country from World Economic Forum over the 
period of (2008-2011). 
The study also explores a variety of key bank characteristics that influence market 
valuation of the recognised expense of SOBC, and whether such an influence varies with 
country-specific institutional differences. The characteristics of banks include the size of 
banks, banks’ potential growth rate of investment opportunities and the level of bank risk-
taking measured by stock price volatility. 
Lastly, this thesis covers the period from 2004 to 2011. To alleviate the possible bias in 
the reported findings due to the effect of the 2008 financial crisis, the impact of the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on banks’ selected measures is reported on a 
yearly basis. Furthermore, the change in the magnitude of the recognised expense of 
SOBC is also compared with and without the crisis period. The main adopted value 
relevance models are also run including and excluding the 2008 financial crisis period. 
1.5 US and the EU Banking sectors 
Firstly, there are many reasons for choosing the US and EU markets for the purpose of 
this thesis. As stated earlier in this chapter, the use of SOBC in the US has been widely 
spread and accepted as an instrument to compensate employees at all levels of 
employment since the early 1990s (Murphy, 1999). At the European level, the use of 
SOBC, however, has arrived on the scene slightly later (Pendleton et al., 2002; European 
Commission, 2003). Pendleton et al. (2002) point out that a rapid growth by the early 
2000s in using SOBC has been observed in the majority of the European Member States, 
particularly the 15 EU countries. Another report on SOBC schemes compiled by the 
European Commission in 2003 found that the use of SOBC has also become more 
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widespread towards the beginning of the last decade, particularly across the 15 EU 
countries. Such a wider-scale use of SOBC has been, mainly, promoted as a result of 
several initiatives and financial reforms in order to foster entrepreneurship in the EU 
market as a competitive and dynamic knowledge-based market in the world14. 
Furthermore, the European Commission is currently launching its own impact study on 
IFRS while many in Europe have started questioning the future of IFRS after ten years of 
adoption. Such that, it is a considerable opportunity to participate in the debate by 
covering the EU and US sample. Additionally, the EU and US contexts provide the 
researcher with a sound setting to explore how the economic effects of expensing the fair 
value of SOBC vary with country-specific factors along with benching two internationally 
active and peer markets that first adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. 
Secondly, the banking sectors in the US and EU markets are chosen for the purpose of 
this thesis for many reasons. Chen at al., (2006: 943) reported evidence suggesting that 
the use of SOBC has become more widespread in the banking sector compared to that in 
the industrial sector15. They also reported that the percentage of SOBC relative to total 
compensation has also recently increased in banking industries. As such, SOBC explosion 
in the banking sector has been the central and most controversial issue on the level of 
SOBC offered to top executives and employees. The more complex activities of banking 
sector, has been suggested by Pendleton et al. (2002) as one of the main reason for the 
more frequent use of SOBC in compensation packages of banks.  
More importantly, the use of SOBC inclines to induce excessive risk-taking in the banking 
sector (Chen et al., 2006; Walker 2009). This association between excessive risk-taking 
                                                          
14 For more details, see the European Commission, 2003. http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/business-
environment/employee-stock-options/index_en.htm#h2-1 
15 Chen et al (2006) found that options as a percentage of total compensation in the banking sector experienced a 115% 
increase (from 1993 to 1998) as compared to a 14.71% increase in the industrial sector. 
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and the widespread use of SOBC in banks makes banks very susceptible to systemic 
crises. Indeed, this association has been a central focus of the accounting and banking 
literature (John et al., 2000; Chen at al., 2006; Walker, 2009). Walker (2009), for example, 
who later reviewed corporate governance in UK banks, pointed out that their culture of 
granting share-based incentives is viewed as excessive and it significantly induces risk 
taking. 
Furthermore, Mehran and Rosenberg (2009: 5) also suggest that “the significant secular 
growth in option grants over these two decades” as one of the main reasons for the recent 
capital regulation in banking industry. In the US, for example, the Congressional 
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was established in 2008 to limit financial 
institutions tendency to offer share-based incentives in order to reduce the probability of 
“unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten their equity values. This act, however, 
provides no clear and comprehensive definition of what would entail “unnecessary and 
excessive risk”. Story and Dash (2009) also documented that banks quickly repaid the 
received funds to overcome the Act’s restrictions16, in particular before the 2009 year-end 
bonuses were determined. That is, the Act fell short of gaining its full advantage where 
banks withdrew from participating under the Act’s restrictions. All the above mentioned 
reasons highlight the significance of the use of SOBC in banks. Focusing on the banking 
sector for the purpose of this thesis also responds to the lack of, and the need for additional 
studies on SOBC in the banking sector highlighted by earlier studies, such as Mehran and 
Rosenberg (2009). 
Additionally, the banking industry has its unique characteristics that differ from those of 
other business sectors in terms of regulatory restrictions and their commensurate duties 
                                                          
16 This provision applies only to “financial institutions participating in the Act’s Troubled Assets Relief Program 
(‘TARP’) if (i) the institution has sold assets under TARP in sales that are not solely direct purchases, and (ii) the 
amount sold (including direct purchases) exceeds $300 million in aggregate”.  
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and responsibilities to depositors and investors. The EU banks, for example are subject to 
rules set by regulatory bodies, such as the European Banking Committee and the European 
Banking Authority operated by the European Commission, and professional bodies, such 
as the European Banks Federation among others. These rules and regulations are generally 
attempting to promote the single market particularly in the banking sector. It also 
promotes a free and fair competition among banks in the EU and world markets. Finally, 
this homogeneity implies that a stronger set of controls can be used in this study compared 
with those used in earlier studies that only controlled for industry sectors (e.g. Aboody at 
el., 2004a; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010; Dhar and De, 
2011; Niu and Xu, 2009), or alternatively pooled them together (e.g. Rees and Stott, 
2001).  
1.6 Research Contributions 
The first research question of this thesis is directly related to the literature that addressed 
the negative impact of expensing SOBC on companies’ key financial indicators. A key 
contribution of this study is to identify, analyse, compare, and evaluate the total effect of 
expensing SOBC utilising pre and post adoption data as well as over an extended time-
span (2004-2011), and using a single industry approach over an international sample of 
US and EU banks.  
First, using pre and post adoption data along with covering a longer time-span extends 
the applicability of the existing literature and allows addressing factors that were 
suggested to influence the reported findings of this literature, such as option life cycle 
(Buston and Plumle, 2001; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 
2010), management discretion (Dhar and De, 2011) and the extent of curtailing SOBC 
programs (Ratliff, 2005). It also helps to diminish the random noise in the reported 
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estimations of earlier studies for the total effect of expensing SOBC over the option life 
cycle given the shorter life span in much of these studies. 
More importantly, the findings of this study also extend the general applicability of the 
earlier single-country studies of Botosan and Plumlee (2001); Chalmers and Godfrey, 
(2005); Schroeder and Schauer (2008) and Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010). Although 
Street and Cereola (2004) discussed and estimated an initial international generalisation 
utilising non-domestic companies listed in the US, but domiciled in other countries17, this 
study adds wider external validity for assessing the impact of expensing SOBC rather 
than the more constrained Street and Cereola (2004)’s one year pre-adoption international 
study.  
Another key contribution of this study is that it brings attention to the structure of SOBC 
expense in banking sectors. It highlights the recently gradual movement toward using 
cash-settled based compensation, preferably by bank management, due to some 
advantages from its accounting treatment. One of the possible reasons for this gradual 
movement is the flexibility given to a company to re-estimate the fair value of cash-
settled based compensations at the end of each reporting period and at the settlement date 
compared to the restriction of the grant date estimation for equity-settled share-based 
compensations.  
This thesis also briefly examines the validity of the proposition that companies will 
gradually reduce the effect of accounting requirement of IFRS2/123R through granting 
less SOBC awards to their employees and using different compensation structures. It also 
examines the magnitude in the change of SOBC expenses over the studied period. 
                                                          
17 These countries were: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the U.K. 
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Finally, the study examines the effect on wider range of performance measures to 
effectively capture the overall magnitude of the changes of financial ratios. All 
performance measures utilised in earlier studies [namely (Diluted EPS, Return on Assets 
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) in addition to a widely used performance measure 
in banking industry [Cost-to-income ratio (CIR)], have been employed in this study. The 
well-established CIR have been used recently by academics and practitioners alike as a 
core measure to assess banks’ cost efficiency (See Hess and Francis, 2004, Beccalli et 
al., 2006). According to a survey conducted by the ABA Banking Journal18, publicly 
traded banks and equity analysts consider this ratio as an important benchmark of cost 
efficiency (Cocheo, 2000). Given the intuitive appeal of CIR as a proxy for cost 
efficiency, it is also relevant to examine the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption on this 
ratio. 
The second inquiry of the thesis is examined under the framework of equity valuation 
theory, and it is directly related to studies that investigate the relevance and the reliability 
of the disclosure versus the recognition approach of expensing the fair value amount of 
SOBC to market participants. From a standard-setting perspective and based on prevalent 
implicit assumption in empirical accounting research, recognition and disclosure are 
viewed as alternative accounting treatments (Kothari, 2001). Whether recognition versus 
disclosure of expensing SOBC affect users’ decisions has been an issue of considerable 
interest to standard setters, practicing professionals, and academic researchers. 
Studies which examined this issue in the context of the IFRS2/FAS123R adoption can be 
separated into two lines. The first line of studies investigated the value relevance and the 
reliability of the disclosure or/and the recognition approach for expensing SOBC for 
                                                          
18 The ABA banking journal is an industrial journal published by the American Bankers Association, which is the voice 
of America's $14 trillion banking industry, representing banks of all sizes and charters, from the smallest community 
bank to the largest bank holding companies. http://www.aba.com/Pages/default.aspx. 
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periods prior to the mandatory adoption date of IFRS2/FAS123R, and using a sample of 
early adopter firms (Dechow et al., 1996, Rees and Stott, 2001; Bell et al., 2002; Aboody 
et al., 2004a, Balsam et al., 2006). These studies provide mixed results. Rees and Stott 
(2001, p. 115), however, highlighted the limitations of using pre-adoption footnote 
disclosure along with short-term data which eventually necessitate the need for additional 
research:  
“To determine if the positive relationship between ESO expense and firm 
value… is consistent over multiple periods. If this relationship does hold in 
subsequent periods, then the power of the results would be strengthened” 
Consistently, Aboody et al. (2004a: 274) added that “inference related to the perceived 
reliability of disclosed but unrecognised SFAS123 expense may not be generalisable to 
an expense recognition regime” 
The second line of studies, which are more relevant to this thesis, examines the relevance 
and the reliability of information revealed under the disclosure approach to expensing 
SOBC, in contrast to that revealed under the recognition approach consequent to the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R (e.g. Niu & Xu, 2009). This line of research 
provides some evidence supporting the view that the disclosure approach of expensing 
SOBC is not enough to substitute that under the recognition approach.  
However, both lines of studies examined this question using single country setting, 
particularly the US as SOBC schemes are heavily used by US companies (see Dechow et 
al., 1996, Rees and Stott, 2001; Bell et al., 2002; Aboody et al., 2004a, Balsam et al., 
2006). Although this approach gives an initial general indication on how investors 
perceive the information revealed under the disclosure and the recognition approach to 
expensing SOBC, it does not take explicitly into account the industry and country-
specific characteristics that may have affected these findings. More importantly, the 
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findings of the US focus research may not be similar to those in the case of other 
jurisdictions, such as the European market. The US market is regarded as highly efficient. 
In contrast, most of European markets might be considered less efficient (an exception 
can be the UK market which is an equity-based market). Healy and Palepu (2001) 
highlight the need for future research on standard setting, particularly to examine the 
effectiveness of IFRSs across different settings that adopted these set of standards. The 
second inquiry of this thesis assesses the extent to which the recognition approach to 
expensing the fair value of SOBC under IFRS2/FAS123R provides more value relevant 
information that better reflects the intangible value of such rewards than the disclosure 
approach, in an international sample of EU and US banks. The analysis is provided using 
three different research designs, i.e., Pre IFRS2/FAS123R analysis, pre- versus post-
IFRS2/FAS123R analysis and post- IFRS2/FAS123R analysis. This thesis distinguishes 
mainly between pre and post adoption period and between US and non-US studies to 
highlight the gap that US and pre-adoption studies dominates the existing literature, 
whilst non-US and post adoption studies, and in particular studies on the effect of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on an international scale are not common.  
Finally, the value relevance and the information content of recognised expense of SOBC 
could be contingent on some firms’ characteristics. For example, firm size and firm 
growth potential were found to influence investors’ reaction to the mandatory recognised 
expense of SOBC (Subramaniam and Tsay 2012) or investors’ valuation of the disclosed 
or/and the recognised expense of SOBC (Rees and Stott, 2001; Aboody et al., 2004a; Niu 
and Xu, 2009). It would be useful, therefore, to explore whether the effect of these 
characteristics on market valuation of expensing SOBC holds across various institutional 
contexts that adopted the standard. The focus on the risk-taking factor that is unique to 
SOBC in the banking industry (Chen et al., 2006, Walker, 2009) also extends and 
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develops earlier literature on market valuation to the mandatorily recognised expense of 
SOBC. It extends the limited set of boundary conditions that influences market valuation 
to the mandatory expensing of SOBC.  
Findings of this study extend the extant related literature on the direction, the magnitude, 
and the significance of the relationship between the disclosed versus the recognised 
expense of SOBC and firm value across different institutional settings. Findings of this 
thesis, overall, provide further international insights and input to standard setting 
regulators and other interested parties in comparative issues of international financial 
reporting quality of IFRS2/FAS123R in general and in the measurement issue of SOBC 
on an international scale in particular.  
1.7 Research findings: A summary 
The findings of the first research inquiry show that the compulsory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R has through time resulted in prevalent possibility of modest but 
unnecessarily immaterial changes in selected key financial performance measures of 
banks. This modest and negative reduction in the selected financial performance 
measures is statistically significant in both US and EU banks’ with the impact being more 
likely to be higher in the US banking sector as nearly twice as that in the EU banks. The 
reported modest impact does not reflect earlier research estimations indicating that 
concerns and criticism of the implementation of IFRS2/FS123R are largely 
unsubstantiated. The findings also show a recent gradual movement toward using cash-
settled based compensation and a slightly reduction in the full impact of expensing SOBC 
grants which came to light after the first option cycle in the post-IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption period was over. 
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The findings of the second research inquiry indicate that the recognition regime to 
expense SOBC is significantly more value relevant and better reflects the intangible value 
attributable to such rewards, relative to the disclosure regime. The influence of the 
differences in the financial reporting contexts on the value relevance and the intangible 
value attributable to SOBC is less burdensome after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R. 
 
1.8 Structure of the thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is subsequently structured as follows: 
Chapter 2 explores the institutional background of issuing SOBC. It explains the role of 
SOBC in mitigating the agency gap that arises from the principal-agent conflict, 
particularly by functioning on aligning the interests of managers and employees with 
those of shareholders. It also highlights the financial reporting requirements and 
classifications related to SOBC prior and after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R. The chapter finally highlights and discusses the history and the nature 
of the controversial debate on the financial reporting implications to the disclosure versus 
the recognition approach to account for SOBC, and how this debate remains a subject of 
widespread discussion internationally.  
Chapter 3 critically reviews the extant related studies to this thesis. The first section of 
this chapter reviews the existing literature that used pre and post IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption data to estimate the negative impact of the mandatory expensing of SOBC on 
companies’ key financial indicators. The analysis in this section also distinguishes further 
between US and non-US studies in order to reflect the dominance of US and pre 
IFRS2/FSS123R adoption studies. The analysis also stress that studies on the impact of 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on a wider international scale are not 
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common, given that this impact is more likely to vary according to the institutional and 
the reporting environment of the setting that adopted IFRS2 and FAS123R. The second 
section of this chapter reviews the existing literature that examined the information 
content and the value relevance of expensing SOBC under the disclosure approach 
against that under the recognition approach. The analysis also highlights that given the 
mandatory adoption of two highly converged standards IFRS2 and FAS123R, this stream 
of literature generally assumes that the value relevance of disclosed versus recognised 
information is the same across firms, and that recognition of previously disclosed 
accounting items affects all countries homogenously. However, the extent to which users 
of financial reports understand the disclosed versus recognised expense of SOBC may 
differ across different institutional contexts. Finally, this section further develops the 
related research’s theoretical framework and hypotheses used to operationalize the 
standard setters’ qualitative characteristics of the relevance and reliability of the 
disclosure versus recognition approach on an international basis, and taking into account 
reporting differences between various institutional settings. 
Chapter 4 develops a relevant methodological framework that underpins the research 
inquiries of this thesis. The first section of this chapter briefly discusses the research 
paradigm and its main components. The second section of this chapter demonstrates the 
relevance of the selected research paradigm and the methodological choices on which the 
research design will be built. The third section discusses the research design, methods, 
and samples selected to answer each of the research questions of the current thesis. 
Finally, the chapter provides a self-reflection on the selected methodological choices for 
this thesis to address its few potential limitations and how they are addressed. 
Chapter 5 presents the descriptive statistics, the empirical results and the analysis of the 
negative impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on selected performance 
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measures within and between two distinct settings: the US and EU banking sectors over 
the period 2004-2011.  
Chapter 6 presents the empirical results and the analysis of the value relevance and 
information content of expensing the fair value of SOBC under the disclosure approach 
versus that under the recognition effect. It also presents and discusses the results of the 
extent to which this finding varies across banks that operate in countries that have 
different levels of investor protection. 
 Chapter 7 summarises, draws conclusions and inferences, identifies limitations from the 
thesis’ findings, and suggests areas to be developed further and addressed in future 
research.
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Chapter 2: Institutional background 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a brief description about the agency problem that arises from the 
separation of ownership and control of business and the consequent principal-agent 
conflict where the former delegates the decision-making authority to the latter. It also 
highlights the relationship between the agency problem and SOBC which is mainly 
identified as an effective tool for aligning the interests of the parties involved. The 
background that explains the current financial reporting requirements and classifications 
of SOBC is also briefly explained in this chapter. Finally, the chapter traces the history 
of and the nature of the debate about the financial reporting implications of the disclosure 
versus the recognition approach to account for SOBC, and shows how this debate remains 
a subject of widespread discussion internationally. 
2.2 Agency theory 
Agency theory has been widely used in accounting literature and other related fields of 
interest, such as corporate finance and governance. It is concerned with the ‘ubiquitous 
agency relationship’ (Eisenhardt, 1989, p.58) which arises “between two (or more) 
parties when one, designated as the agent, acts for, on behalf of, or as representative for 
the other, designated the principal, in a particular domain of decision problems” (Ross, 
1973, p. 134). Prominent examples of the agency relationships are illustrated between the 
owners of a company and its manager(s) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and the one 
between shareholder and bondholder (Myers, 1977). This chapter will focus on the 
former example of the agency relationship and its relationship with SOBC. 
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The phenomenon of widely spread separation of ownership and control has resulted in 
emergence of two new groups created out of the former single group: “…the owners 
[group] without appreciable control, and the control [group] without appreciable 
ownership” (Berle and Means, 1932, p.121). The increasing dispersion of shareholding 
away from the founders of the business (principals) accelerated the growth of hiring 
professional managers (agents) at senior levels of management of large companies. Those 
professional managers are usually delegated the task and the authority of operating the 
company, where the number of shareholders are usually too dispersed, and they lack the 
required skills and experience to coordinate this task. However, the separation of 
ownership and control is more likely to result in conflicts as the two groups are usually 
self-interest utility maximizers and more likely to have different interests (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). 
However, in imperfect labour and capital markets, agents usually operate to maximize 
their own self-interest, particularly if they have no personal stake in the shares of the 
company and at the expense of the company’s shareholders. Agents, in this case, are only 
motivated by pecuniary gains derived from their employment, such as salaries and post-
retirement benefits and by non-pecuniary gains such as leisure and perquisites. As such, 
agents’ behavior and interests becomes consequently opposed to those of the principals 
who seek to maximise their own wealth and value. 
Adam Smith, the classical 18th century economist, argued that agents will not devote 
significant effort to creative activities and to maximize the principals’ wealth as they 
would do for their own (cited in Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Holmström (1979) adds 
that devoting significant effort by agents will negatively impact their utility as it may 
require too much effort to learn about and to produce or to invent creative and new 
activities. Yet under the lack of incentives, agents tend to exert a minimum amount of 
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effort. Simultaneously, agents are usually not as diversified in their income generation as 
principals and seem to behave in a risk-neutral way to the detriment of shareholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989).  
However, the principal’s utility will be maximised if an agent is willing to devote the best 
possible significant effort that consequently increases the corporate profit and the 
principal’s wealth. Lambert (2001) argues that agents influence this relationship in two 
ways; through their pecuniary and non-pecuniary gains which negatively influence the 
corporate profit and consequently the principal wealth, and through their exerted effort 
and actions which eventually influence the distribution function of the profits. Harris and 
Raviv (1979) point out that the dispersion of shareholding of businesses also make it 
infeasible to observe and monitor agents’ actions constantly, which eventually results in 
a situation of moral hazard. Shareholders, yet can only observe and monitor the outcomes 
of agents’ actions and effort through corporate profits and share value. Both indicators, 
nonetheless, are to some extent considered as random variables and more likely to be 
affected by various factors besides the manager’s effort and actions (Holmström, 1979). 
Lambert (2001) maintains that principals cannot always draw a clear conclusion about 
the efficiency of the actions and the efforts that have been taken by agents. 
Agency theory attempts to resolve these problems that arise from the agency relationship, 
in particular when a conflict exists between the agent and the principal interests and it is 
difficult for the principal to constantly monitor the agent’ actions and effort. It also seeks 
to resolve the risk-sharing problem, which is also rooted in the agency relationship, where 
the principal and the agent usually have different risk preference which may results in 
different actions taken by agents compared to those preferred by the principal. Agency 
theory uses the metaphor of a contract to describe the relationships between the principle 
and the agent. It focuses on designing the most efficient contract that governs the 
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relationship between the principal and the agent given the assumptions of self-interest 
behavior, information asymmetry and risk-aversion.  
Designing a contract that induces risk-sharing and motivates higher effort by the manager 
will increase the likelihood of positive outcomes and will also increase the likelihood of 
shifting aside of the random variables preferred by the principal (Rees, 1985). Sappington 
(1991) argues that a simple fixed pay contract would not be effective as that of outcome-
based contract as the former offers the agent a de facto insurance against bad outcomes 
that might be a result of non-exerting the required effort by agents to avoid them. Agency 
theory, therefore, attempts to design a contract that induces higher effort and proper 
actions by the agent and simultaneously share the risk inherent in the random variable 
“company value” adequately with the principle. This is also the goal of the commonly 
observed phenomenon of issuing SOBC which will be described in the following section. 
2.3 The role of SOBC in mitigating the principle-agent conflict 
The first best contract proposed by agency theory to address the principal-agent conflict 
is usually defined as choosing “the contract and the actions to maximize the principal’s 
expected utility subject to meeting the agent’s acceptable level of utility” (Lambert, 2001, 
p. 12). If incentives are not part of such a contract assuming that both involved parties 
will work together cooperatively and the agent will exert the best effort without being 
influenced by the self-interest behavior or the risk-aversion attitude, then mitigating the 
principal-agent conflict might be more likely (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 
1989; Lambert, 2001). However, if this assumption is relaxed, it will be less likely to 
mitigate this conflict. Effective incentive mechanisms consequently need to be 
constructed for the purpose of increasing the likelihood of mitigating this conflict, while 
the roles of the agent are to make decisions on the principal’s behalf and to also bear risk.  
34 
 
Conlon and Parks (1990) maintain that the ability of a principal to monitor an agent’s 
contributions to the former wealth would affect the negotiated contract where both the 
principal and the agent would also consider information costs and risks. Agents, under 
the risk-aversion assumption would always prefer the non-contingent forms of 
compensations and such a preference is more likely to be acquiesced by the principals if 
the latter can observe or monitor the efforts of agents at little or no cost. If monitoring, 
however, is not possible, principals will prefer performance-contingent forms of 
incentive to design the contract (Ibid.). 
Holmström (1979, p.74) argues that a complete monitoring of agents’ actions may be 
achieved only in simple situations, in which case a first-best contract to address the 
principal-agent conflict can be tackled by employing a forcing contract that penalizes 
dysfunctional behavior. This is, however, often not the case where behaviour and actions 
taken by the agent are not always fully observable or prohibitively costly, and hence 
cannot be effectively contracted upon. Therefore, most contracts will be designed as 
performance-contingent forms under sub-optimal contracts to address this conflict given 
the information available to the principal and the agent. Bebchuk et al. (2002) maintain 
that such a contract is found to be an optimal when it minimizes all agency costs1.  
The failure of fully observing the agents’ actions will shift the interest toward the use of 
imperfect estimators of actions in contracting. Holmström (1979) points out that those 
imperfect estimators are extensively used in practice to alleviate moral hazard problem, 
yet they do not allow for a completely unambiguous track of the actions taken by the 
agent. One important example of these imperfect performance measures is the set of 
traditional accounting-based indicators, such as annual profit, earnings per share [EPS], 
                                                          
1 Agency costs as defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the total of the bonding and monitoring costs as well as 
the residual loss incurred by the principal whenever the agent’s actions do not maximize the principal’s wealth. 
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return on assets [ROA], or return on equity [ROE]. However, there is an issue with such 
a set of measures given its purpose to deliver the most useful information about the 
managers’ actions to the shareholder (Lambert, 2001). Accounting performance 
measures are derived from accounting figures that are subject to agents’ discretions where 
different methods of allocating costs and revenues might be followed. Thus, they may 
not accurately reflect the accurate present value of a corporation and this ultimately 
affects their ability to convey useful information about the agent’ actions to the principal. 
Another example of an alternative set of imperfect indicators are the market-based 
financial indicators, such as the share price or the total shareholder’s return (TSR), where 
the performance of a corporation is measured by its stock price along with any paid 
dividends. This set of market-based measures is easily observable and not subject to 
accounting influences (Rappaport, 1998). Yet they might not be fully controlled by the 
agent or at least not always influenced by its actions, such as the influence of economic 
recessions on share prices. Ittner et al. (1997) and Lambert (2001) also point out the 
emergence of nonfinancial measures as another complementary set of performance 
indicators that assist in evaluating agents’ actions by placing greater emphasis on non-
financial aspects, such as product quality, customer satisfaction and the attainment of 
strategic objectives. This set is usually used along with accounting-based and market-
based performance measures to compensate the latter mainly dependence on the business’ 
financial aspects (See Ittner et al., 1997; Kaplan and Norton, 1992, 1993).  
A fundamental idea is that principles and agents will agree on a contract which specifies 
a performance evaluation system and using a metric of these imperfect estimators that are 
supposed to signal information about agents’ actions and upon which the agent’s 
compensation will be based. Such a contract is mainly designed to optimally maximize 
both an agent’s and a principal’s utilities which are derived from the income both parties 
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can spend on consumption. This contract trades off the benefits of the additional risk-
sharing imposed on the agent in order to motivate him, for the cost of doing so (i.e., the 
higher expected provision of incentive pay). That is, this contract is believed to closely 
align the agent’s interest with that of the principal, given the problem of the risk-aversion 
and information asymmetry. Justified by these goals, SOBC, particularly employee share 
options as the most common component of these packages, have expanded significantly 
since the early 1990s in the US (Lambert, 2001; Espahbodi et al., 2002; Core et al., 2002; 
Street and Cereola, 2004; Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009), and since the late 1990s for 
much of Europe, particularly the 15 EU countries (See Pendleton et al., 2002; European 
Commission, 2003). The main specifications of SOBC contracts frequently used in 
practice and accounted for under the IFRS2/FAS123R are briefly discussed next.  
2.3.1 Stock grants 
Stock grants are company shares awarded to its employees and very often are common 
stocks. This type of SOBC is usually contingent upon achieving vesting conditions that 
can either be time-based or performance-based or mixed. In all cases, and when the 
vesting conditions are satisfied, stock grants directly transfers ownership from principals 
to agents and consequently further align the interest of the two groups. Many studies have 
reported favourable findings to the notion that employee ownership results in higher 
organizational identification and commitment, along with enhanced productivity and firm 
performance (see Kruse, 2002; Kruse and Blasi, 1997).  
2.3.1.1 Time-based vesting stocks 
Time-vested stock-based compensations use time-based restrictions on shares awarded 
to the agent in order to retain him/her with the issuance firm over a specified period, 
usually three to five years before they are allowed to sell their shares. The main purpose 
of using the time-based restrictions is to ensure that the agent will focus on long-term 
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rather than artificial short-term performance improvements. This type of equity-based 
compensations is commonly referred to as restricted time-vested or non-vested shares. In 
some cases, agents receive the market value of the granted restricted shares at the end of 
the time-vesting period in cash rather than receiving actual shares. This is usually referred 
to as restricted stock units or phantom shares and mainly used to eliminate the ownership 
transfer through actual shares.  
2.2.1.2 Performance-based vesting Stocks 
Performance-based vesting stock grants are an equity-based and long-term incentive that 
can serve as complements or as substitutes for time-vested stock grants and where 
performance vesting criteria can either accelerate or trigger vesting of stock grants. Bettis 
et al. (2013) noticed that the use of performance shares has increased rapidly in recent 
years. A significant change has also been noticed in the design of performance-based 
vesting stocks since its emergence in the US during the 1970s and under what used to be 
called “all-or-nothing” vesting criterion (Bettis et al., 2010). Agents are usually promised 
to receive a certain number of shares at the beginning of the vesting period based on three 
goals set in the contract: target goal, threshold goal and stretch goal. The promised 
performance shares will vest when the set target goal is met. The threshold goal sets a 
lower boundary for the performance goal below which no shares will vest. By contrast, 
the stretch goal sets a cap that lies above the target goal and when it is met, agents will 
receive additional shares on top of the number of promised shares.  
The type of performance measures used in designing the plan of performance-based 
vesting stocks varies among companies (Bettis et al., 2013). Holden and Kim (2013) 
noticed that the two most popular performance measures for performance share plans in 
S&P 500 firms between 2006 and 2012 are total shareholder returns (TSR) and earnings 
per share (EPS) respectively along with other performance measures. Bettis et al. (2013) 
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also found apparent movement toward the use of accounting-based performance 
measures, particularly reported earnings at the expense of market-based performance 
measures in setting the targets of performance-based vesting stocks. 
Using the performance-based vesting provisions has also been found to have a positive 
association with managerial incentives. Larcker (1983) provided early evidence on the 
significant influence of using these instruments on managers’ investment decisions which 
consequently results in increasing shareholder wealth represented by the capital market 
reactions to utilising those compensation instruments. Bettis et al. (2010) and Bettis et al. 
(2013) also documented a strong positive association between market and accounting-
based performance measures and the use of performance-based vesting stocks plans. 
More importantly, Bettis et al. (2010) provide evidence that the use of performance-based 
vesting provisions specify meaningful performance hurdles and provide significant 
incentives for agents, countering the notion that they serve as only mere “window 
dressing”. This argument is also maintained by the findings of De Angelis and Grinstein 
(2015) who found strong evidence supporting the notion that the use of performance-
vested instruments do not constitute a deviation from optimal contracting, and only so 
when shareholder oversight is lacking. 
2.3.2 Stock options 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, equity participation is usually regarded as an integral 
part of a company’s employee reward strategy and of which employee share options 
(ESOs) is the most common form (Core et al., 2002; Hall and Murphy, 2003, Frydman, 
and Jenter, 2010). Hall and Murphy (2003, p. 2) defines employee share options as 
“contracts that give the employee the right to buy a share of stock at a pre-specified 
“exercise” price for a pre-specified term” set at the date of grant. The primary reward 
arising from using share options in compensation contracts is that the possibility of the 
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principal’s and the agent’s gains, arises from upward movements in stock price. This 
feature is considered by the agency theory as providing the basis for a powerful incentives 
tool that align the interests of both the principal and agent where the latter seeks to take 
actions that will eventually maximise shareholder value (Jensen and Mecking, 1979).  
Furthermore, share options are granted under certain restrictions compared to regular 
traded financial options. Employees are not allowed to trade their share options, and are 
not entitled to exercise their awarded options until a specified period of time, known as 
the vesting period, usually three to five years. Vesting of share options is also conditional 
upon an employee remains employed (Hull, 2012). That is, if holders of share options 
that are in the money2 wish to leave the company, they are required to immediately 
exercise their outstanding options. If these options are out of the money or their vesting 
period has not passed yet, employees lose their rights to the options. Furthermore, share 
options plans are usually operated in a company for several years and typically a new 
tranche of share options will be granted on a yearly basis (Botasan and Plumlee, 2001).  
Real and virtual share options are the two main forms of employee share options plans. 
A company will receive a cash inflow upon exercising real share options where 
employees need to pay the agreed upon exercise price in exchange for the underlying 
shares attached to their options. The company, however, has a cash outflow in the case 
of Virtual share options, also known as share appreciation rights (SAR) where instead of 
issuing actual shares to the employee, the intrinsic value (the difference between the 
current market value of the share and the exercise price) is paid.  
Indeed, earlier studies have found that share options have been widely accepted as 
                                                          
2 Stock options are considered in the money when the current stock price is higher than the exercise price. If the current 
stock price is lower or equal to the exercise price, stock options are considered out of the money or at the money 
respectively.  
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compensation mechanisms used by companies at many levels of employment as an 
incentive or motivator for future performance (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Core and 
Guay, 2001). Other related studies have also found that companies grant SOBC generally 
and stock options in particular to attract and retain highly talented employees (Kedia and 
Mozumdar, 2002; Blasi et al., 1996). In addition, employees’ efficiency can also be 
enhanced by actively engaging them in the decision-making process (Landau et al., 
2007). Cash outflow in term of cash compensation can also be replaced by the use of 
option grants; particularly for start-up firms and those that have liquidity constrains 
(Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 2001).  
However, an equally important accounting issue is to evaluate not only the benefit of, but 
also, more importantly, the full extent of the cost of SOBC packages. This cost should be 
fairly reflected and captured by the accounting treatment of such rewards packages within 
the financial statements. The next sections summarise the accounting requirements of 
SOBC, and trace the history and the nature of regulatory development involved in 
mandating the recognition regime to account for SOBC under IFRS2/FAS123. 
 
2.4 Accounting for SOBC 
The accounting standards IFRS 2 and SFAS 123R now mandatorily require companies 
to recognise all forms of SOBC as an expense at their fair value which is determined at 
the grant date, and over the vesting period. The standards also require that the valuation 
itself be disclosed, along with several important input parameters and detailed 
descriptions about the payment plans (FASB, 2004, IASB, 2004). 
The fair value of SOBC instruments is rarely obtained externally from the market where 
it is unusual to find similar or comparable traded instruments, given that those 
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instruments are not traded in the market. Therefore, companies must estimate the fair 
value of SOBC, particularly share options using an option pricing models. Both IFRS 2 
and FAS 123R do not specify a particular option pricing model used to calculate the fair 
value, but they recommend using the Black-Scholes or the Binominal models3 as 
acceptable methods companies can utilise to calculate the fair value of share options. 
IFRS2/FAS12R, though, requires companies to disclose the six input parameters used in 
the selected option pricing model in their financial reporting footnotes. Those inputs are: 
exercise price, current share price, expected volatility, expected life of the option, 
expected dividend yield and risk-free interest rate. The first two inputs are objectively 
determinable, whereas the rest of the inputs are subjective and based on assumptions that 
generally require significant analysis and judgement. 
The general principle of the accounting treatment of SOBC is that companies debit their 
income statements with the incurred expense with the credit entry recognised either in 
equity or as a liability. The criteria for the credit entry depends on the classification of 
SOBC as equity-settled or cash-settled based compensation respectively. Equity-settled 
share-based compensation arises in transactions where a company receives services from 
its employees and as consideration for equity instruments of the company as in the case 
of the grant of shares or shares options to employee. Cash-settled share-based 
compensations, also known as liability awards, arise in transactions where a company 
receives services from its employees and incurs a liability to transfer cash based on the 
                                                          
3 Although the IASB and the FASB do not prescribe a specific formula or model to be used for option valuation, most 
companies prefer to use the Black-Scholes model since it is the easiest to implement in a company, particularly if a 
company lacks data or resources for a more accurate valuation (Landsberg, 2004). ). The Black-Scholes (B-S) model 
calculates a theoretical call price (ignoring dividends paid during the life of the option) using the five key determinants 
of an option’s price: the current market price of the share that underlies stock option at grant date, the exercise price of 
the option, the expected volatility of the share price, time to expiration, and short-term (risk free) interest rate. Merton 
(1973) adjusted BS model for dividends expected to be paid on the shares. The binomial model provides discrete 
approximations to the continuous process underlying the Black-Scholes model. It mainly breaks down the time to 
expiration into potentially a very large number of time intervals, or steps, particularly to consider the possibility of 
early exercise as in the case of American option. 
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value of the company shares as consideration. An example of a liability award is the 
granting of share appreciation rights (SARs) to employees which entitle them to future 
cash payments based on the increase in the company’s share price. The two classifications 
of SOBC have the same principle of using the fair value approach to estimate the incurred 
expense. Yet unlike the grant date model for equity-settled share-based compensations, a 
company re-estimates the fair value of cash-settled based compensations at the end of 
each reporting period and at the settlement date. Consequently, a company can frequently 
adjust the incurred expense and sometimes reverse the expense where the ultimate cost 
of cash-settled rewards is the amount of cash paid to its employees which is the fair value 
at the settlement date. 
2.5 Evaluation of the history of the debate to the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R 
Mandating the expensing regime to SOBC under IFRS 2 and FAS 123R was the outcome 
of an increasing pressure and a long debate on the need for transparency over SOBC 
packages (Guay et al., 2003; Hall and Murphy, 2003; Farber, et al., 2007; Ferri and 
Sandino, 2009). It radically changed the accounting treatment for these reward packages 
by requiring all forms of SOBC, particularly employee share option schemes, to be 
recognised as an expense at their fair value which is determined at the grant date and over 
the vesting period (Hagopian, 2006). The use of SOBC has a longer history in the US 
than the EU. SOBC have expanded significantly since the early 1990s in the US 
(Lambert, 2001; Espahbodi et al., 2002; Core et al., 2002; Street and Cereola, 2004; 
Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009), and since the late 1990s for much of Europe, particularly 
the 15 EU countries (See Pendleton et al., 2002; European Commission, 2003). 
Therefore, the issue of accounting treatment for SOBC was addressed earlier and more 
directly in the US compared to other settings. Nonetheless, such a controversial issue or 
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debate was especially, but not solely in the US. Apostolou and Crumbley (2005, p. 1) 
point out that the mandatory expensing of share options was “the most controversial 
topics in accounting during the last decade”. The historical background of to this debate 
is presented in this section. 
Prior to the introduction of FAS123R, share options were accounted for by the majority 
of US companies using the ‘intrinsic value approach’ of APB Opinion No. 25 which was 
issued in 1972 by the FASB’s predecessor, the Accounting Principles Board. Under this 
approach, companies were not required to recognise any expense in their income 
statement, if the market value of the underlying shares was equal or above the exercise 
price of option grants on the grant date. Footnote disclosure for issuing option grants was 
the sole accounting requirement.  
In 1993, the US-FASB released an exposure draft under which companies would be 
required to deduct the grant-date fair value of option awards from their income statements 
over the vesting period. The proposed draft proved controversial, eliciting the strongest 
continuous opposition over the history of FASB, particularly from the high-tech industry, 
the U.S. Congress, and major accounting firms (Farber, et al., 2007; Harter and 
Harikumar, 2002; Schwimmer, 2004). Farber, et al. (2007) pointed out that there was 
such strong political pressure opposing this draft that a robust congressional intervention 
was required to prevent the FASB from moving ahead with mandating the proposed 
standard because of its socio-economic implications. Some concerns, for example, were 
directed about the possibility that the attention focused on earnings determined by the 
expensing of share options might “have detrimental effects on competitiveness and 
innovation” (Ratliff, 2005, p. 38) as a result of the possible decreases in net income and 
its related financial indicators. Furthermore, only one month after issuing the Exposure 
Draft, 1,700 comment letters had been sent to the FASB, 1,000 of these letters were from 
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employees of companies more likely to be considerably affected by the passing of this 
draft. This concern reflected employees’ fears that companies would discontinue share 
option programs if they were forced to include the value in net income (Ratliff, 2005, 
p.39). 
The FASB, eventually, retreated from the original proposal and issued SFAS 123 
(Accounting for Share-Based Compensation) in 1995 that encouraged but did not require 
recognition of compensation cost for the fair value of share options. Companies were 
allowed to choose between the intrinsic-value method prescribed by APB No.25 
(Accounting Principles Board 1972) with pro forma disclosure or recognition under the 
fair value method. That is, companies might choose to use APB No. 25, but also they 
must disclose by way of footnote pro-forma net income, and basic and diluted earnings 
per share if the fair value method had been used for all option grants (SFAS123, para. 
11). The other alternative was to use the fair value method for recognition purposes and 
once a firm chooses this method it is not allowed to reverse the decision (SFAS123, para. 
14). 
However, under this constraint, the majority of companies chose to adopt the first 
alternative (i.e. APB 25 with pro forma disclosure) because it was perceived that the cost 
of the recognition would be higher than the cost of the other available choices (Apostolou 
and Crumbley, 2001; 2005). Option grants, therefore, remained frequently issued ‘at 
money’ such that the share price at the grant date was equal to the exercise price, resulting 
in no expense being deducted from the reported earnings. That is, option grants were only 
disclosed in the footnotes, but not recognised in the income statement, and often resulted 
in ultimately overstated profit. Apostolou and Crumbley (2005, p. 34) claim that since 
the intrinsic approach was a common practice among the majority of companies, share 
options were considered ‘stealth compensation deductible for tax purposes without 
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diluting reported financial earnings’. Exercising option grants often helped companies to 
avoid paying taxes. When these grants were exercised, US companies, for example, 
claimed a tax deduction equal to the difference between the exercise price and the 
underlying share price at the exercise date (Hall and Murphy, 2003; Babenko and 
Tserlukevic, 2009). Subsequently, reported earnings, under such an accounting and 
favourable tax treatment, were being distorted and often did not faithfully represent the 
underlying economic reality or a ‘true and fair’ view of companies’ financial positions.  
Following the Enron, WorldCom and other financial and accounting debacles, the 
controversial debate over option expensing continued to attract widespread criticism. The 
FASB (2004) started to reconsider the issue, and the debate resumed (see Mock, 2005; 
Ratliff, 2005), especially but not solely in the US. Sir David Tweedie (2002)4, former 
chair of the IASB for example pointedly considered that ‘Enron was brought down by 
share options. [T]he sheer greed of hidden numbers’. The controversial debate was 
centered on choosing between the disclosure and the recognition approaches to account 
for the cost of SOBC and on the subsequent impacts of the selected accounting treatment. 
Eventually, both the FASB and IASB acknowledged that disclosure is not an adequate 
substitute for recognition of compensation cost for the fair value of SOBC. Non-
recognition of the cost associated with SOBC in the income statement obscures the 
information contained in reported earnings and undermine the transparency, reliability 
and value relevance of financial reports (FASB, 2004, IASB, 2004). Indeed. by late 2002, 
supported mainly by this argument and responding to the pressing need of the investment 
community for more transparent accounting for option grants, the IASB released an 
exposure draft ED2 (Share-based Payments). The draft was finalised on 19th February 
                                                          
4 Speech by Sir David Tweddie, Sydney, Thursday, 15 August 2002. Available at 
http://www.frc.gov.au/speeches/tweedie_speech.asp. 
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2004 and first applied to accounting periods starting 1st January 2005. The standard 
requires companies to recognise the fair value of option awards at the grant date as an 
expense over the vesting period5.  
The introduction of IFRS2 presented an exogenous shock that radically changed 
accounting for equity based compensation, particularly by adopting the view that all 
SOBC transactions ultimately lead to expense recognition. By December 2004, the FASB 
also released the final standard SFAS 123R (Share-based payments) requiring firms to 
recognise the grant-date fair value of share-based payments as an expense over the 
vesting period. The standard was first applied to accounting periods ending in 2006.  
Nearly a decade has passed since the mandatory implementation of IFRS2/FAS123R that 
have mainly adopted the recognition over the disclosure approach to account for SOBC. 
Yet the financial reporting implications surrounding the recognition versus the disclosure 
approach to the cost associated with SOBC in financial statements remains a subject of 
widespread discussion internationally. The next section addresses this controversial issue 
in more detail. 
2.6 Disclosure versus recognition approach of SOBC and equity valuation theory: 
One of the primary focuses of equity valuation theory is to estimate the value of 
company’s shares. The finance literature has introduced many models that attempt to 
estimate asset’s or security’s value. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is one of 
the most common used models6. This model values an asset based on its expected cash 
flows and the expected rate of return the market requires for the risk of those cash flows.  
Market based accounting studies have also been influenced by the development of equity 
                                                          
5 The standard required companies to prepare comparator figures for the earlier year. Further, all option grants awarded 
after November 2002 with first vesting after 1st January 2005 were required to be included in the charge to profits. 
6 The market value of a firm under the CAPM can be written as the discounted present value of future flows of the 
firm. ( for derivation see Brealey and Myers, 1984) 
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valuation models in the existing finance literature, in particular the CAPM. This stream 
of accounting studies tests the ability of accounting information to convey useful 
information for the purpose of equity valuation7 given that the financial reporting is one 
of the main available sources of information about the firm.  
Based on the CAPM, market based accounting literature views the market value of a firm 
as a function of the firm’s expected future cash flows and the associated risk. Accounting 
earnings are usually viewed by accounting researcher as a surrogate for cash flows. To 
investigate whether accounting information is useful for decision making, researchers use 
different common and competing assumptions underlying the relationship between each 
of accounting information and the change in accounting procedures and firm’s equity 
valuation. An example of such hypotheses is the Efficient Market Hypothesis [EMH]. By 
utilising the CAPM along with the assumption of perfect financial market under which 
the cost of transactions, contracting and information is zero, the EMH predicts that stock 
price changes are not associated with certain voluntary changes in accounting procedures. 
By contrast to the EMH, the “mechanistic” is a competing hypothesis that posits a 
mechanical relationship between accounting earnings and stock price. Watt and 
Zimmerman (1986) point out that market based accounting studies that adopt the 
mechanistic hypothesis stress that the market is systematically misled by accounting 
procedures particularly those procedures whose effect on earnings is publicly known.    
Furthermore, while accounting standards require certain information to be recognised in 
the body of financial statements using double entry accounting, they require other 
information to be only disclosed. Recognition of an item on the face of financial 
statements includes ‘depiction of this item in both words and numbers, with the amount 
                                                          
7 As earnings could be used as a surrogate for cash flows, accounting information would provide information on both 
the expected cash flow and the expected rate of return where the latter depends on the risk of the asset which is likely 
to be empirically associated with accounting number (See Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 27) 
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included in the totals of financial statements’ (SFAC No.5 FASB, 1984: para.6). 
Disclosure of an item includes information depiction about this item and usually within 
the annual report, with the amount not recognised in the financial statements. Indeed, 
income statement recognition versus footnote disclosure has been a fundamental issue in 
accounting literature (e.g. Bernard and Schipper 1994; Barth et al., 2003; Davis-Friday et 
al., 2004; Libby et al., 2006). Theoretically, and based on the EMH, there is a generally 
accepted belief that the accounting treatment of SOBC (i.e., recognition versus disclosure) 
would not matter as long as market participants value substance over the form (Kothari, 
2001, Ahmed et al, 2006). That is, unless the changes in accounting treatment do not 
present significant information in calculating value, they should not affect firm value. This 
is because changing the information location in the financial reports does not have any 
impact on the fundamental cash flow underlying the firm’s value. Yet if there are costs of 
processing information (Barth et al., 2003), systematic bias in how investors process 
information, such as limited attention (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003) or differences in the 
perceived reliability of recognised versus disclosed items (Bernard and Schipper 1994; 
Ahmed et al., 2006), this choice can matter to users. 
Opponents of mandating IFRS2/FAS123R believed that it would not significantly 
influence how market participants perceive the cost associated with SOBC grants versus 
their incentive effect as tools to attract talented employees and drive future performance 
(see e.g., Ratliff, 2005; Bodie et al., 2003; Sahlman, 2002; Doerr and Smith, 2002; 
Derieux, 1994 and Rouse and Barton, 1993). Firms were already disclosing the dilutive 
effect of share option grants on earnings within the footnotes of the financial reports using 
the pro-forma disclosure (i.e. if the fair value had been in used). Therefore, mandating 
IFRS2/FAS123R would not release any fundamentally new information in calculating 
value. It may only reveal greater transparency by shifting the disclosed information 
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concerning options grants from the footnotes to recognition in the financial statements. 
Sahlman, (2002, p92) went further and claimed that ‘expensing options may lead to an 
even more distorted picture of a company’s economic condition and cash flows than 
financial statements currently paint’. He added that investors and analysts who wish to 
adjust income figures according to the cost of options can find all the necessary 
information in the footnotes and that the importance of the useful information disclosed 
in the footnotes might be lost if share option grants were expensed.  
These claims against the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R were mainly built and 
based upon EMH to emphasis that there should be no cash flow implications, and 
therefore no difference in the information content of recognised versus disclosed expense. 
As such, shifting the disclosed amount from the footnote and recognising it as an expense 
in the financial statements should not influence how market participants perceive these 
compensation grants and the extent to which they assess their incentive effect versus their 
dilutive associated cost.  
However, some market participants appear to hold beliefs contrary to the prediction of 
the EMH. Based on the many comments in letters to the FASB during the discussion 
period prior to the issuance of SFAS 123, Dechow et al. (1996) suggest that there may 
be differences in the pricing effect between the disclosure and recognition approach to 
expensing the fair value of SOBC. On the one hand, investors’ perceptions of future cash 
flows might be revised as a result of earnings reduction under the recognition of share 
option expense in the income statement. This in turn might cause stock prices to fall. On 
the other hand, SOBC aims to drive companies’ future performance over the long-term 
and it is associated with extra market risk factor. Market participants are expected to 
compensate the risk factor associated with SOBC expense in comparison to other 
operating expenses such as salaries or bonuses which are paid based on the past services 
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or performance. Unlike if it is disclosed in the footnote, the recognised expense of SOBC 
would also be under further scrutiny of external auditors. As such, investor’ perception 
to future cash flow might be revised upward where SOBC expense is viewed as an 
intangible asset that contributes to better future firm’s value.  
The controversial debate over the recognition versus the disclosure approach has 
emphasised the ability of the selected accounting treatment to provide more value 
relevant and reliable information for investor valuations (See for example Davis-Friday 
et al., 1999; Cotter and Zimmer 2003; Ahmed et al., 2006). More importantly, the 
mandatory expensing of SOBC has been adopted by two major accounting standard-
setters (i.e. IASB and FASB). The convergence process of IFRS2 and FAS123R aims to 
mitigate the international differences in measuring the cost associated with the SOBC 
grants, and thus to deliver more reliable and useful information to market participants 
across all the settings that adopted these standards. The differences in the institutional 
contexts are expected to affect market participants’ decisions to assign the appropriate 
weights to the incentive derived from SOBC grants. For example, a lower level of 
investor protection might imply a higher probability for management discretion tendency 
to use SOBC opportunistically as a way to pay reward managers and employees agent 
their part of the profit.  
That is, the debate over the recognition versus the disclosure approach to account for 
SOBC remains a subject of widespread discussion internationally.  Evidence on how 
investors on an international basis perceive the information revealed under the disclosure 
versus the recognition approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC is needed. The effect 
of country-specific characteristics on this relationship may imply that the findings in a 
specific context such as the US is not generalisable to other jurisdictions, such as the 
European market which is usually classified as debt-based markets (an exception can be 
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the UK and the Irish market which are equity-based markets). Based on a score of five 
institutional characteristics8, Lee et al. (2010) provide evidence that equity-based 
markets, such as the US, UK and Ireland have higher financial reporting incentives than 
those of other EU countries, such as Portugal and Greece which are usually classified as 
debt-based markets. Thus, the impact of, and the benefit from the adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS12R are expected to be more apparent in high efficient equity-based markets 
such the US.  
Healy and Palepu (2001) highlight the need for future research on standard setting, 
particularly to examine the effectiveness of IFRSs across different settings that adopted 
these set of standards. This thesis provides the opportunity to examine the extent to which 
the mandatory expensing of SOBC provides more value relevant information that better 
reflects the intangible value of such long-term rewards across wider international settings 
that have their own unique institutional environment but have adopted the international 
standards IFRS2/FAS123R.  
2.7 Summary 
The aim of this chapter is to present a brief description about the agency problem that 
underlies the principal-agent conflict arising from the separation of ownership and control 
of business. The chapter then highlights the role of SOBC in mitigating the agency 
problem by functioning on aligning the interests of managers and employees with those 
of shareholders. The main types of contractual specifications of SOBC usually used to tie 
the interests of the principle and the agent are addressed in this chapter. The role and the 
aim of each time and performance vesting stock grants and stock options in eliminating 
the agency problem are particularly highlighted. The main accounting classification of 
                                                          
8 The five key institutional characteristic indicators used in Lee et al (2010) are outsider rights, the importance of the 
equity market, ownership concentration, disclosure quality, and earnings management 
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SOBC expense to cash-settled and to equity-settled expense is also addressed in this 
chapter. The former arises in transactions where a company receives services from its 
employees and incurs a liability to transfer cash based on the value of the company shares 
as consideration. By contrast, the latter classification arises in transactions where a 
company receives services from its employees and in consideration provides equity 
instruments of the company to the employees. The main difference of their accounting 
treatment as required by IFRS2/FAS123R is also briefly discussed in this chapter. The 
flexibility given to a company to re-estimate the fair value of cash-settled based 
compensations at the end of each reporting period and at the settlement date compared to 
the restriction of the grant date estimation for equity-settled share-based compensations 
is highlighted as well. The history and the nature of the debate about the financial 
reporting implications of the recognition versus the disclosure approach to account for 
the cost of SOBC are illustrated in this chapter. Finally, the chapter demonstrates how 
this debate remains a subject of widespread discussion internationally. 
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Chapter 3: Literature review and Hypotheses 
3.1 Introduction 
Earlier studies on financial reporting implications and valuation issues of the mandatory 
adoption of expensing the fair value of SOBC, have discussed and adopted numerous 
approaches to do so and by predominantly utilising US data. One specific line of research 
investigated the effect of the political pressure and the extensive lobbying behaviour prior 
to the mandatory imposition of the US-FAS123R on the decision to allow the choice of 
the disclosure rather than recognition approach to account for SOBC. Botasan and 
Plumlee (2001, p. 311) claim that SFAS 123 (Accounting for stock-based compensation) 
issued in 1995, was ‘one of the most controversial accounting standards ever issued by 
the Financial Accounting Standards Board’. The political pressure, reflected by 
congressional intervention (Farber et al., 2007) along with the support from the 
accounting profession (see Dechow, et al., 1996) and business community (Hagopian, 
2006) succeeded in preventing the FASB from mandating the recognition regime under 
FAS 123. This line of research also emphasised the concerns regarding high SOBC, 
particularly those paid to executives, which appeared to motivate lobbying behaviour 
(Dechow et al., 1996; Hill et al., 2002). 
Another line of research was directed at the social implication of the mandatory 
expensing of SOBC. Ratliff (2005, p. 38), for example, highlighted that the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R might “have detrimental effects on competitiveness and 
innovation” as a result of the possible decreases in net income and other related financial 
performance indicators. Ratliff (2005, p.39) also raised a concern about employees’ fears 
that companies would discontinue SOBC programs if they were forced to include the 
value in net income. Indeed, following the transition from the voluntary to the mandatory 
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approach for expensing SOBC under FAS12R, US firms reduced the proportion of stock 
options to executives’ total compensation (Brown and Lee, 2008), and the number of 
options granted across all levels of rank and file employees (Choudhary, 2008). Yet given 
that SFAS 123R eliminated accounting advantage of SOBC but not their motivational 
benefits, Brown and Lee (2011) stressed that firms only had incentives to reduce the 
portion of SOBC that was accounting-motivated and was not justified by real economic 
benefits in response to the issuance of SFAS 123R. 
The financial reporting implications and valuation issues of expensing SOBC are also 
examined by market-based accounting research. For example, stock market reactions to 
voluntary announcements of expensing SOBC made by US firms are examined by this 
this one specific line of research (e.g. Ferri et al., 2005; Balsam et al., 2006; Bartov and 
Hayn, 2006; Carter et al., 2008). Recent studies (e.g. Balsam et al., 2008; Choudhary et 
al., 2009) examined the market reaction to firms that accelerated the vesting of some or 
all of their employee SOBC in advance of adopting FAS123R.  
This chapter first highlights the lack of studies that focused on the financial reporting 
implications within the banking service given the widespread of using SOBC in this 
sector and the sensitivity of this sector to the risk induced by SOBC schemes. The chapter 
then critically reviews the existing literature on the economic consequences, the value 
relevance and the information content of the disclosed versus the recognised expense of 
SOBC. In more details, the third section of this chapter reviews the existing literature that 
used pre and post adoption data to estimate the negative impact of the mandatory adoption 
of expensing SOBC on companies’ key financial indicators. The analysis distinguishes 
further between US and non-US studies. It highlights that US and pre-adoption studies 
dominates the existing literature. Yet given that the effect may differ across countries 
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according to their institutional contexts, non-US and post adoption studies, particularly 
studies on the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on a wider national scale are not common.  
The fourth section of this chapter reviews the existing literature and concentrates on 
examining the information content and the value relevance of expensing SOBC under the 
disclosure approach against that under the recognition approach. The analysis also 
highlights that given the mandatory adoption of two highly converged standards IFRS2 
and FAS123R, this stream of literature generally assumes that the value relevance of 
disclosed versus recognised information is the same across firms, and that recognition of 
previously disclosed accounting items affects all firms homogenously. However, the 
extent to which users of financial reports understand disclosed versus recognised 
information may differ across different institutional contexts. Finally, the chapter further 
develops the related research’s theoretical framework and hypotheses used to 
operationalize the standard setters’ qualitative characteristics of the relevance and 
reliability of the disclosure versus recognition approach on an international basis, and 
taking into account reporting differences between various institutional settings. 
3.2 Banking studies on the financial reporting implication of IFRS2/FAS13R: 
Earlier studies that evaluated the financial reporting implications of IFRS2/FAS123 either 
controlled for industry sectors including the banking sector (e.g. Aboody at el., 2004a; 
Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010; Dhar and De, 2011; Niu 
and Xu, 2009), or alternatively pooled them together (e.g. Rees and Stott, 2001). Findings 
of studies that controlled for industry sectors, however, pointed out that the results in the 
banking sector is quite distinct compared to other sectors. For example, Dhar and De 
(2011) found that the reduction in the selected performance measures within the banking 
sector due to the adoption of IFRS2 was higher than the average reduction in those 
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measures for all sectors combined together1 (see next section for further details). 
Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) observed that the financial service sector granted more 
options than any other over the period 2004-20062. Chen at al., (2006: 943) reported 
evidence suggesting that the use of SOBC has become more widespread in the banking 
industry compared to that in industrial firms3.  
The banking sector has its unique characteristics that differ from those of other business 
sectors in terms of regulatory restrictions and their commensurate duties and 
responsibilities to depositors and investors. Given that the use of SOBC inclines to induce 
excessive risk-taking, SOBC explosion in the banking sector has been the central and most 
controversial issue on the level of SOBC offered to top executives and employees (Chen 
et al., 2006). Walker (2009) who later reviewed corporate governance in UK banks, 
pointed out that their culture of granting share-based incentives is viewed as excessive 
and it significantly induces risk taking. The association between excessive risk-taking and 
the widespread use of SOBC in banks makes them very susceptible to systemic crises 
which subsequently affect the whole economy. 
All the above mentioned reasons highlight the significance of the use of SOBC in banks 
and necessitate the need to focus on the banking sector for the purpose of evaluating the 
major financial reporting implications of IFRS2. Focusing on the banking sector for the 
purpose of this thesis, indeed, responds to the lack of, and the need for additional studies 
on SOBC in the banking sector highlighted by earlier studies, such as Mehran and 
Rosenberg (2009). 
                                                          
1 Dhar and De (2011) found that the mean (median) reduction in diluted EPS in banking services sector would have 
been material amounting to 6.26% (0.43%) and 7.70% (6.03%) in 2007 and 2008 respectively 
2 Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) reported that the average option expense in the financial sector was 40.92m, 28.85m, 
20.46m for the period 2006, 2005, 2004, respectively.  
3 Chen et al (2006) found that options as a percentage of total compensation for the banking industry experienced a 
115% increase (from 1993 to 1998) as compared to a 14.71% increase for the industrial counterparts. 
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3.3 Prior studies on the economic consequences of expensing SOBC 
The compulsory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R has played a key role in company financial 
reporting and its related financial performance indicators by radically changing the 
accounting treatment for SOBC schemes. Expensing the fair value of SOBC was often 
considered to reduce companies’ reported earnings and other related accounting 
performance measures. Indeed, Sir David Tweedie (2002), the first chair of the IASB, 
estimated that the average reduction in the reported earnings of the top 500 US companies 
would be between 8% and 12%, if IFRS2 had been adopted in 20024. Apostolou and 
Crumbley (2005) estimated that the expensing of SOBC in some companies such as 
Yahoo and Adobe would negatively affect their diluted earnings per share (EPS) reported 
in 2003 by 86% and 70% respectively. Identifying and evaluating the extent of the 
changes in firm earnings and other related financial indicators under IFRS2/FAS123 and 
across different intuitional settings is a matter of importance for financial reporting users 
particularly concerned with the economic consequences of expensing SOBC. Reported 
earnings and other related financial performance indicators are widely used in different 
contractual specifications, such as variable compensation contracts5. They also are used 
in estimating the firm’s value and its ability to access capital markets. The following two 
subsections evaluate the outcome of pre and post-adoption existing studies on the impact 
of expensing SOBC on companies reported earnings and other related financial 
indicators. 
3.3.1 Estimation using the pre- IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data 
Empirical studies which were mainly conducted before the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R 
provide evidence that if SOBC were treated as expenses, many financial performance 
                                                          
4 CBA scraps options for transparency, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 22/08/2002 by the reporter: Mark 
Westfield, available at: http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2002/s656444.htm 
5 Accounting performance indicators such as ROA, ROE, EPS, are one of the basic motivation aspects used to 
determine the amount of compensation in the variable compensation contracts.  
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indicators would be substantially affected. More specifically, the earliest systematic 
attempt to estimate the effect of option expensing on firms’ performance indicators was 
conducted by Botosan and Plumlee (2001), utilising two widely used performance 
measures, diluted earnings per share [DEPS] and return on assets [ROA]. Their sample 
covered 100 US companies6 that had over $50 million for both their revenues and market 
values as well as a high growth rate of more than 30% in both total revenues and EPS 
over the last three years. Botosan and Plumlee justified their sample selection by arguing 
that this set of companies uses option grants more than other firms. Therefore, if the 
impact of expensing options is immaterial for this set, it will be immaterial for others. 
Utilising the 5% materiality threshold, their results indicated that the mandatory 
expensing of stock options would substantively influence both the diluted EPS and the 
ROA. Botosan and Plumlee reported that the mean (median) reduction in diluted EPS 
and ROA due to share options expensing would be 22.9% (14%) and 22.8% (13.6%) 
respectively. They also predicted the doubling of the magnitude of this effect over the 
next three to five years. However, it is important to highlight that their results cannot be 
generalised to other countries or other sectors, particularly where they focused only on 
highest and fastest earning growth US companies. These companies use share options 
extensively to compensate their employees, while other companies in different sectors or 
countries might use share options moderately and therefore they will be less affected by 
the standard. Furthermore, 12% of the selected companies did not totally comply with the 
requirements of FAS 123. 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) examined the impact of option expensing on selected 
financial performance indicators of 159 companies based in Australia and across various 
                                                          
6 The selected companies were ranked by Fortune's September 1999 magazine as “America’s Fastest Growing 
Companies”. 
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business sectors and with various earning growth levels. Their analysis is mainly based 
on examining the impact of expensing the options granted only to directors and five 
senior executives in 2002 on three key earnings financial ratios [ROA, ROE and diluted 
EPS]. They assumed that the vesting period of granted options is three years and the 
options are granted for the first time on 1st January 2002. Furthermore, they assumed that 
share options are granted at a relatively fixed level, such that the expense will increase 
yearly and stabilise after three years when the option cycle is completed. Chalmers and 
Godfrey (2005) reported that the initial (first year) mean (median) reduction in ROA, 
ROE and diluted EPS, if firms started to recognise share options as an expense in 2002, 
was 3.76 % (0.34%), 13.63% (0.41 %) and 13.67% (0.40%) respectively. However, once 
the option cycle was completed and the expense had stabilised after three years, the mean 
(median) reduction in ROA, ROE and diluted EPS was 11.29% (1.01%), 40.89% (1.22%) 
and 41% (1.21%) respectively. Furthermore, using the 5% threshold of materiality, the 
reduction in the performance ratios due to share option expense was material only for 
20% of their sample. Finally, Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) utilised two growth 
measures, the 3 year EPS growth and the market price to book ratio to determine if the 
impact of option expense significantly varies between high and low growth firms. Using 
the 3 year EPS growth as a growth proxy, they found that the materiality of option 
expense is larger for high EPS growth firms. By contrast, under the alternative growth 
proxy (price to book value) the impact of option expense does not vary significantly 
between high and low growth firms.  
It is significant to note that Chalmers and Godfrey’s (2005) study assumed that firms 
would continue to grant options at a steady level if IFRS2 had been mandatory. By 
contrast, Seethamraju and Zach (2004) and Ratliff (2005) argue that companies may 
respond to IFRS2 by reducing the options grants to avoid the effect of options expense 
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recognition on their financial ratios. Such a deficiency can be eliminated by using pre and 
post adoption data for a longer period (2004-2011). The findings of Chalmers and 
Godfrey (2005) also suffered from a systematic bias in terms of underestimating the 
impact. That is, whilst the requirements of IFRS2/FAS123R apply to all elements of 
SOBC, granted to all employees, they reported the effect based on options granted only 
for directors and the five most senior executives. 
Saiz (2003) studied the potential effect of expensing share options granted to executives 
from July 1996 through to June 2002 on diluted EPS. The study also focused on two 
Australian companies from the healthcare industry. The findings reveal a significant 
effect on diluted EPS for one company and insignificant for the other. For the first 
company, the study shows a substantial reduction in diluted EPS, particularly over the 
last three years (i.e. 2000, 2001 and 2002) where the reduction was 21.1%, 11.77% and 
26.2% respectively. However, the reduction in diluted EPS due to the options expense 
for the second company was found not to be significant. 
In a different context, Dhar and De (2011) studied the potential impact of IFRS2 adoption 
on diluted EPS, ROA, and ROE of Indian firms that were required to apply IFRSs from 
the 1st April 2011. Their analysis is based on data drawn from 69 listed Indian companies 
in 2007 and 120 companies in 2008. Their findings suggest that expensing of share 
options would have a material effect on the selected performance indicators utilising the 
5% materiality threshold for at least 22% of their sample. 
However, they reported that the impact was more moderate compared to the earlier 
mentioned studies. They found that the mean (median) reduction in the diluted EPS, 
ROA, and ROE, as if IFRS2 had been implemented in 2007, would have been 4.7% 
(2.56%), 3.70% (1.36%) and 5.47% (2.5%) respectively. The corresponding reduction in 
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the mean (median) of diluted EPS, ROA, and ROE for the year ended 2008 would be 
5.43% (1.64%), 3.77% (0.86%) and 6.06% (1.25%) respectively. More significantly, 
their results show that the mean (median) reduction in diluted EPS in banking service 
sector would have been material amounting to 6.26% (0.43%) and 7.70% (6.03%) in 
2007 and 2008 respectively. Finally, Dhar and De (2011) found that the differences in 
ROE, ROA, and diluted EPS did not vary significantly between high and low growth 
companies measured by price to book ratio. Overall they argue that the Indian companies 
would experience a less sensitive impact in comparison to that of the US or Australia. 
They justified their argument by the fact that the use of stock options in India is less 
compared with many other countries. 
However, one may argue that the more moderate impact reported in Dhar and De’s study 
compared with that of different studies can be due to other factors. One important 
explanation is that they consider only share options granted to firms’ directors and 
neglecting grants to other employees and other types of SOBC, such as share appreciation 
rights. Dhar and De (2011) reported also that 37% of their sample that uses option grants 
had been excluded from the analysis due to the non-availability of disclosure required to 
conduct the analysis. Such exclusion might affect their estimations had these companies 
disclosed data concerning the SOBC and included within the analysis. The time period 
covered in their study also make their findings subject to a systematic bias. Firms might 
grant options on a yearly or even on a longer basis whether at a steady or unsteady level. 
The magnitude of the effect needs at least three to five years to be clarified when the 
option cycle is complete. Therefore, covering a longer period, considering pre and post 
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adoption data, and considering all types of SOBC7 will eliminate any systematic bias 
related to those issues.  
Street and Cereola (2004) was the earliest attempt to estimate the likely effect of 
expensing options grants on diluted EPS and opening stockholders’ equity (book value), 
at an international level for the year ended December 31, 2000. Their sample includes 
291 non-domestic companies domiciled in other seven countries8, yet listed in the US. 
Their findings reveal that the mean (median) reduction in diluted EPS if option grants 
were expensed, would be 41.19% (6.29%) and it is material using the 5% threshold level 
for the majority of their sample. They also report that the average pro-forma options 
expense expressed as a percentage of opening stockholder’s equity is 14.96% and it is 
material for the majority of their sample. They also found evidence that the average 
reduction in net income due to option grants expensing is 38.95% in 2000. In more detail, 
their results show that the average impact of option expenses on [DEPS] is more than 
40% for companies situated in France, Ireland, Germany Canada, and the U.K. However, 
for firms situated in Australia and Japan the results show that the impact is around the 
5% materiality level. Notably, for some of their sample, Street and Cereola reported a 
decrease in diluted EPS of more than 100%. Consistently, the average effect of option 
expenses as a percentage of opening equity was substantially material in companies 
located in all the countries except for those located in Australia and Japan. The results 
finally suggest that the effect of the mandatory expensing of SOBC on diluted EPS and 
opening stockholder’s equity varies significantly by country. 
The study of Street and Cereola (2004) discussed and estimated an initial international 
generalisation utilising one year pre-adoption data of non-domestic companies but listed 
                                                          
7 Share based payments includes share options and other similar equity awards, such as share purchase plans, as well 
as cash-settled awards where the cash payment depends on the share price as in the case of share-appreciation rights. 
8 These countries were: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, and the U.K. 
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in the US. Yet their results might not be representative of all companies domiciled in the 
selected countries and by using post adoption data. Street and Cereola (2004, p. 36) 
therefore called for additional research ‘to ascertain the impact of expense recognition on 
a broader range of firms and for more performance indicators’ as data becomes available 
under IFRS2/FAS123R.  
3.3.2 Evidence of impact of expensing SOBC using post IFRS2/FAS123R adoption 
data 
Subsequent to the adoption of the IFRS2/FAS123R in 2004, there have been only two 
major studies that examined the post-adoption effect of IFRS2/FAS123R. The first study 
was conducted by Schroeder and Schauer (2008) in the US context. They examined the 
actual effect of SOBC expensing for a sample of 90 companies listed in the Russell 3000 
index9, with a reporting fiscal year-end of 30th June, 2006. They utilised 0.5% of revenue 
and 5% of pre-tax net income (loss) to assess the materiality of the impact. Their findings 
suggest that mandatory adoption of FAS123R had a material effect on all companies, 
irrespective to their size. These findings contradict the argument that the effect would be 
more likely to be material only for larger companies that tend to use SOBC packages less 
than smaller companies (See Barrier, 1994; El-Gazzar and Finn, 1998). More specifically, 
the results reveal that SOBC expensing did not result in a material effect on companies’ 
total revenues. However, consistent with earlier estimations, the weighted average effect 
on net income (loss) due to option expensing was material 15.91% (33.55%). Pointedly, 
they claim that the effect of SFAS123R tended to be more material for smaller sized 
companies than it was for their larger counterparts. Although their results are different 
                                                          
9 The Russell 3000 index is a stock market index of the 3,000 largest US companies based on their total market 
capitalization and it is reconstituted each May 15. This index represents approximately 98% of the entire US market. 
64 
 
from earlier predictions, they concluded that the effect of FAS 123R is still controversial 
and more research is needed to ascertain its economic consequences over longer period.  
However, despite the significance of Schroeder and Schauer’s findings, it is still subject 
to some weaknesses. The lack of information about the nature of firms in their sample is 
one important factor that might lead to obtaining such significant results that differ from 
earlier predictions. In fact, there is no evidence about the nature of the sectors these firms 
belong to, where earlier studies predict the effect might vary extensively from one 
business sector to another (Street and Cereola, 2004, p. 33; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005, 
p. 166).  
Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) examined the impact of IFRS2 adoption on selected 
measures from a sample of 266 UK companies included in the FTSE 350 index. Their 
study utilised four main performance indicators (ROA, ROE, EPS and SOBC as a 
percentage of opening stockholders’ equity) over the period 2004 to 2006, where 2004 
falls before the adoption and 2005 and 2006 fall afterwards. Out of line with earlier 
estimations, their findings reveal that the effect of IFRS2 in the UK is modest. They 
reported that in 2004 the mean (median) reduction in ROA, ROE, and EPS due to SOBC 
expensing was not material at the 5% significance level.  
However, in 2005 and 2006, the reduction in the selected performance measures due to 
IFRS2 adoption was slightly above 5% implying a modest impact. In particular, 
Shiwakoti and Rutherford (ibid.) reported that the impact varies between sectors; and it 
is slightly higher for the larger sized and more rapidly growing companies, being highly 
material in certain individual instances. Finally, Shiwakoti and Rutherford (ibid.) point 
out that mandatory adoption of IFRS2 might have reduced the growth rate of SOBC 
grants in some individual instances. Yet the expected decrease in using SOBC grants does 
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not appear to have taken place. The average option expense in absolute value was 
$17.84m, $15.16m and $13.17m over the period 2006, 2005 and 2004 respectively. 
However the differences in the recognised share option expense over the period 2004 to 
2006 were not statistically significant. 
 Although the reported effect in their study was modest, the reduction in the selected 
performance measures, due to SOBC expensing, increases significantly over the studied 
period (only two years post-adoption data). Essentially, in the last year 2006, the mean 
reduction in diluted EPS, ROA, and ROE was 24.55%, 13.30% and 13.47% suggesting a 
substantial impact and not modest as previously reported. The justification for such an 
increase might be due to the option cycle conditions, the increased use of SOBC, or the 
decrease in firms’ reported earnings or other factors. Therefore, to alleviate any 
speculation related to this issue, this thesis covers a longer period (2004-2011) in order 
to identify and evaluate the longer-term effect.  
More importantly, while the few post adoption existing literature provides evidence on 
the effect of IFRS2/FAS123 only on a single context, it is silent on the effect of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on an international level. As discussed earlier in the previous section, 
the study of Street and Cereola (2004) discussed and estimated an initial international 
generalisation, by utilising one year pre-adoption data of non-domestic companies listed 
in the US. Their results, yet, might not be representative of all companies domiciled in 
the selected countries and using post adoption data. Considering the differences in the 
institutional reporting settings and using a pre and post adoption international sample that 
covers a longer time-span, consequently, will add a wider external validity for assessing 
the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on the wider international setting rather than the more 
constrained Street and Cereola (2004) study. (i.e. one year pre-adoption data of non-
domiciled companies but listed in the US) 
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3.4 The value relevance and the information content of the voluntary versus the 
mandatory expensing of SOBC. 
Although “usefulness” is not a well-defined concept in accounting research (Barth et al., 
2000), the usefulness of accounting information is defined by standard setters as 
depending on information that is relevant and reliable (see SFAC No. 2, FASB [1980]). 
An accounting amount is relevant if it is capable of making a difference to financial 
statement users’ decisions (see SFAC No. 2, FASB [1980]). The reliability of a specific 
measure as suggested by the FASB depends on “the faithfulness with which it represents 
what it purports to represent, coupled with an assurance for the user, which comes through 
verification, that it has that representational quality” (SFAC No. 2, FASB [1980, para. 
59]).  
Relevance and reliability are also the two primary criteria the FASB uses for choosing 
among accounting alternatives, as specified in its Conceptual Framework. Determining 
informational location in financial reporting has been one of the controversial issues 
faced by standard setters, particularly whether to recognise the estimated amounts within 
the financial statements or disclose them in the way of footnotes. Since Johnson (1992), 
such an issue has attracted a large body of research that has sought to operationalise the 
relevance and reliability criteria in examining whether the usefulness of information 
disclosed in the footnotes is distinct from that recognised on the face of the financial 
statements. Topics that have been the subject of this line of research and for which the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has debated the information location 
include accounting for SOBC expense, post-retirement benefits, and others.  
A few earlier accounting studies build their argument on the semi-strong form efficient 
market hypothesis to show that recognition versus disclosure of accounting information 
should make no difference as long as the information is publicly available. Dhaliwal 
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(1986) and Imhoff et al. (1993, p.362), for example, provide empirical support for the 
‘‘no difference’’ view on disclosure versus recognition of unfunded vested pension and 
lease obligation respectively. Yet more recent accounting research generally finds that 
recognition is different from disclosure in terms of value relevance (e.g., Ahmed et al., 
2006) and contracting costs (e.g., Espahbodi et al., 2002). 
Prior literature suggests a few reasons that might explain why primary users of financial 
statements may perceive disclosed information distinctly from that of recognised 
information. One specific line of research proposes some information-processing-related 
factors as one of the potential reasons to the differential treatment of disclosed versus 
recognised information (e.g., Barth et al., 2003; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). The lack of 
competence to understand disclosure (e.g., Dearman and Shields, 2005), paying limited 
attention to disclosure (Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003), and the effect of cognitive biases 
unrelated to user competence when processing disclosed information (e.g., Koonce et al., 
2005; Hobson and Kachelmeier 2005) are examples of these factors. Consistent with this 
view, experimental studies provide evidence that users discount or ignore disclosed 
information, but not recognised information. For example, users are more likely to 
understand information recognised in the income statement more than information 
disclosed in the statement of changes in equity or disclosed in the footnotes (e.g., Maines 
and McDaniel 2000; Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Hirst et al., 2004). 
Although this line of research that generally focused on one group of experimental 
subjects has provided rich insights into the differences between recognition and 
disclosure, the reported evidence may not generalise to the association between stock 
prices and disclosed versus recognised items. As such, another stream of literature has 
emerged and proposed reliability as one of the possible reasons that can determine 
information location. Davis-Friday et al. (2004) find that the market perceives disclosed 
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post-retirement benefits (PRB) liabilities as less reliable than recognised PRB liabilities. 
Libby et al. (2006) find that auditors tolerate less misstatement of recognised items than 
disclosed items. Johnson and Storey (1982) argue that one rationale for relegating 
amounts to the footnotes is that the information is less reliable due to significant 
uncertainty associated with measurement of the amount. For example, opponents to 
expensing SOBC often argue that the estimates arising from the fair-value method under 
IFRS2/FAS123R are unreliable (Malkiel and Baumol, 2002). Frederickson et al. (2006) 
find that mandatory income statement recognition of SOBC expense leads to user 
assessments of reliability being higher than either voluntary income statement 
recognition or voluntary footnote disclosure. 
The information content of the fair value of SOBC expenses either recognised in the 
financial statements, or disclosed under the predominant alternative choice of pro-forma 
disclosure of FAS123 has also been a subject of specific line of research. This line of 
literature attempts to operationalize the standard setters’ qualitative characteristics of 
relevance and reliability by using empirical models underpinned by the equity valuation 
theory (Barth et al., 2001). The evidence from this specific line of research, however, is 
mixed. Aboody (1996) and Chamberlain and Hsieh (1999), for example, documented a 
significantly negative relationship between share price and fair value of option grants, 
calculated based on assumed inputs to the utilised valuation models. Aboody et al. 
(2004a) examined whether SOBC expense disclosed under pro forma net income, as 
allowed by FAS 123, is perceived sufficiently reliable for investors’ valuation 
assessments. They used pooled regression using Ohlson’s (1995) model on selected US 
firms across many industries that use SOBC substantially and listed in S&P Composite 
1500 from 1996 to 1998. They documented a negative relationship between stock returns 
and disclosed SOBC. Their results suggest that disclosed SOBC expense is perceived as 
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relevant expense by investors and sufficiently reliable to be reflected in their valuation 
assessments. Similarly, Li (2003) found a negative association between share prices and 
both outstanding employee share options and expected share option expense, and that 
FAS123 disclosures provide useful information to investors for estimating the effects of 
employee share options on equity value. 
By contrast, Rees and Stott (2001) examined the relationship between annual stock 
returns and pro forma footnote disclosure for stock options expenses based on 756 US 
listed firms at the 1996 fiscal year end. They found a positive relationship between option 
expenses, as disclosed under the pro-forma company footnotes, and annual stock returns. 
This suggests that investors perceived disclosed fair value of stock option expenses in the 
footnotes, as a relevant and reliable measure that reflects a value-increasing asset to the 
firm value. That is, the positive relationship between annual stock returns and disclosed 
options expenses imply that incentive benefits in share-based payments dominate their 
dilutive effects and increase the firm value. Hanlon et al. (2003) also reported a 
significant positive relationship between future operating earnings and stock option 
expense for top five executives calculated using the Black-Scholes model10. Rees and 
Stott (2001) also documented that growth opportunities, proxied by firm size (MV), 
Tobin’s Q-ratio11, and dividend policy, were found to significantly moderate relationship 
between market value and the fair value of stock options. That is, investors assign 
                                                          
10 The IASB and the FASB do not prescribe a specific formula or model to be used for option valuation. Yet most 
companies prefer to use the Black-Scholes model since it is the easiest to implement in a company, particularly if a 
company lacks data or resources for a more accurate valuation (Landsberg, 2004). The Black-Scholes (B-S) model 
calculates a theoretical call price (ignoring dividends paid during the life of the option) using the five key determinants 
of an option’s price: the current market price of the share that underlies stock option at grant date, the exercise price of 
the option, the expected volatility of the share price, time to expiration, and short-term (risk free) interest rate. Merton 
(1973) adjusted BS model for dividends expected to be paid on the shares. 
11 Tobin’s Q-ratio is usually used in finance literature to measure growth prospect. It is calculated as following: (Market 
value of equity+ book value of debt + book value of preferred stock) / book value of total assets. The higher is the 
ratio, the higher is the growth rate. 
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significantly higher weight for disclosed options expenses when valuing firms with high 
growth opportunities.  
The rational logic standing behind their argument is that small companies usually have 
greater potential for growth opportunities. Granting stock options extensively plays a key 
role in increasing growth opportunities in small companies, given their higher demand 
for cash in the short-term. Therefore, companies with high growth opportunity (small 
companies) benefit more from disclosing information about stock option expenses in their 
footnotes. Such that, investors perceive the fact that employees agree to have their stock 
options compensations in a longer term (exercise date) as a positive signal in valuing 
firms’ equities. 
Bell et al. (2002) also examined the relationship between SOBC as reported in the pro 
forma disclosure and annual share returns. They documented a significant positive 
relation between the disclosed expense of SOBC and market returns. Yet they 
acknowledge that their finding has limited generalisability because the selected sample 
is restricted only to profitable computer software firms over the period 1996-1998. Brown 
and Yew (2002) also examined the association between price and employee stock options 
using a sample of 121 public Australian firms over the period 1997-2000. They found a 
positive relationship indicating that the market prices the disclosed expense of SOBC as 
an intangible asset. 
Niu and Xu (2009) also studied whether the value relevance and reliability of SOBC 
expenses to investors’ valuation are enhanced after mandating the recognition regime on 
a sample of Canadian firms. Their sample consists of Canadian companies listed on 
Toronto Stock Exchange for the years 2003-2005 where 2003 falls before mandating the 
recognition approach whereas 2004 and 2005, fall after. Niu and Xu (2009) documented 
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a significant positive relationship between mandatorily (but not voluntarily) recognised 
SOBC and stock returns. Their results suggest that investors perceived recognised SOBC 
expense as a relevant and reliable amount (asset) that contributes to firm value. They also 
investigated whether some accounting and market prospects, such as firms’ growth 
represented by market to book value, firm size measured by the logarithm of total assets 
and industry classification (high tech and financial institution versus other firms), 
contribute to more incremental information content related to recognised SOBC expense. 
Their results suggest that the value relevance and reliability of recognised SOBC expense 
do not change significantly with industry affiliation and growth prospects. That is, 
investors perceive the recognised expense of SOBC as value relevant and reliable 
measure for firm valuation across all industry sectors. The same finding is also applicable 
to firms with low or high growth opportunities. However, the firm size prospect was 
found to be significant suggesting that the value relevance and reliability of SOBC 
expense seem to be more apparent in larger firms. It is important to highlight that these 
three prospects are included in the model only by interacting them with recognised SOBC 
expenses. Yet these prospects are not included by themselves in the model. This is in fact 
a straightforward case of variables omission that may bias their reported results (See 
Greene, 2003; Hayes, 2013).  
Indeed, the extant literature provides mixed evidence of the direction and the significance 
of the reported relationship between SOBC expenses and firm value. This could be due 
to the absence of the absolutely explicit pro-forma disclosure for SOBC grants prior to 
the introduction of FAS123R/IFRS2 (Skinner, 1996). Earlier studies that employed pro-
form disclosure (e.g. Aboody, 1996; Hanlon et al., 2003; Aboody et al., 2004a,b) 
exercised some discretion or assumptions in setting up inputs of an option valuation 
model. More importantly, the general evidence available from the majority of previous 
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pre-adoption studies suggests a negative relationship between the disclosed amounts of 
SOBC expense and share price (Aboody, 1996; Chamberlain and Hsieh, 1999; Li, 2003; 
Aboody et al., 2004a; Balsam et al., 2006). This negative relationship also implicitly 
suggests that disclosure approach fails to reflect the long-term “intangible” effect of 
SOBC on the financial statements. Aboody et al. (2004a) highlighted that results of 
research concerning the value relevance and reliability of disclosed expense of SOBC 
might not be the same of those obtained using the recognition but not the disclosure 
approach. They conclude that the direction, the magnitude, and the significance of the 
reported relationship between SOBC and firm value after the mandatorily adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R is still vague and needs additional research. Furthermore, SOBC are 
granted to all employees in different levels. This implies that the focus on only top five 
executives is more likely to impact the reported coefficients that reflect the relationship 
between SOBC expense and its market valuation. 
More importantly, prior studies (e.g. Rees and Stott, 2001; Chamberlain and Hsieh, 1999; 
Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 2004a) on the value relevance of recognition versus disclosure 
assume that the value relevance and reliability of disclosed versus recognised information, 
is the same across countries and that recognition of previously disclosed accounting items 
affects all the reporting settings homogenously. However, the extent to which users of 
financial reports understand disclosed versus recognised expense of SOBC may differ 
significantly across firms that operate in different institutional settings. 
Overall, while the majority of previous studies focused on the information content, value 
relevance and reliability of the disclosure, or the recognition approach to account for 
SOBC using pre-adoption data, only a few studies focused on the position after the 
introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R. Yet the extant literature of this line of research is silent 
on, or provides limited insight into the information content, value relevance and reliability 
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of the recognition versus disclosure regime on an international scale. Expanded 
disclosures and accounting practices prior to IFRS2/FAS123R, and mandatory expensing 
of SOBC after IFRS2, provides a natural setting for comparing the valuation implications 
of the disclosure versus the recognition approach to account for SOBC on an international 
scope. This thesis, therefore, provides further evidence from an international perspective 
into the recognition, measurement, and comparability issues related to the accounting for 
SOBC in the banking industry. The next section further develops the related research’s 
theoretical framework and hypotheses used to operationalize the standard setters’ 
qualitative characteristics of the relevance and reliability of the disclosure versus 
recognition approach to account for SOBC on an international basis taking into account 
reporting differences between various institutional settings. 
3.4.1 Theoretical framework 
The value relevance and the reliability of the disclosure approach to expensing the fair 
value of SOBC, particularly prior to the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, has been a subject 
of interest for prior studies. The evidence from these studies generally shows that the 
disclosed amount is perceived by investors as an expense (negative), and is value relevant 
and reliable to be incorporated into firms’ equity market valuation. However, important 
factors suggest that the impact of SOBC on a firm’s value could be different compared to 
that of other operating expenses. 
Firstly, SOBC schemes can be very effective in motivating corporate managers and 
employees. Agency theory suggests that SOBC are mainly granted to motivate employees 
in general and managers in particular, and to align their interests with those of 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Yet the general evidence available from 
previous pre-adoption studies indicates that the disclosed fair value amounts of these 
compensations are perceived as expenses (negative) by market participants (e.g Aboody, 
74 
 
1996; Chamberlain and Hsieh, 1999; Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 2004a; Balsam et al., 2006). 
This implicitly suggests that the disclosure approach fails to reflect the long-term 
“intangible” effect of SOBC as value-increasing assets on the financial statements. 
Disclosure, however, is not a sufficient substitute for recognition. The mandatory 
recognition approach under IFRS2/FAS123R arguably aims to mitigate the international 
differences in measuring the cost associated with the SOBC grants, and thus to deliver 
“more relevant and reliable information” to market valuation cross all the settings that 
adopted these standards (FASB, 2004; IASB, 2004). This argument may also implicitly 
suggest that investors would effectively capture the “intangible” effect of the recognised 
SOBC expense as a value-increasing asset and reflect it in the equity value of the firm.  
Secondly, the desired impact and the economic effect of the IFRSs is more likely to vary 
internationally depending on the specific contextual factors governing the financial 
environment (Nobes and Parker, 2013; Branson and Alia, 2011; Street and Cereola, 2004). 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2014) emphasise that accounting information quality of banks tends 
to vary with institutional factors across countries. Hung (2001) documented in his 
international study that the nature of the legal system measured by the level of investors’ 
protection in a given country improves the value relevance of accounting information 
which mainly depends on the accrual accounting system. Ball et al. (2000; 2003) and Ball 
(2006) also pointed out that the desirable properties of accounting income is more likely 
to vary among different contexts according to their legal traditions. For example, under 
the shareholders’ governance model, which is typical in common-law countries, 
shareholders alone elect members of the governing board. Pay-outs such as SOBC 
packages are also less closely linked to current-period accounting income and more 
related to future income. Consequently, public disclosure is a more likely solution for the 
information asymmetry problem in common law countries. By contrast, the demand for 
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accounting income in codified law countries is influenced more by the pay-out preferences 
of agents for labour, capital and government, and less by the demand for public disclosure 
(ibid.). Such an argument implicitly suggests that the incentive benefits of SOBC 
packages is expected to be more effective in reducing the agency cost across common law 
countries than that of code-law countries where it is influenced by pay-out preferences of 
agents. That is, market participants in common law countries are expected to assign more 
weightings to the incentive features of SOBC as motivating tools to reduce the agency 
cost and to perceive the associated cost as an increasing-value asset more than that in 
code-law countries. 
Furthermore, previous research indicates that the accounting treatment of SOBC under 
the fair value approach provides scope for managers to exercise their discretion and 
eventually manage the earnings of firms. For example, Aboody et al. (2006) reported 
evidence that managers manipulate SOBC expenses disclosed under SFAS 123 in order 
to avoid political costs associated with executive compensation. The recognition of an 
item using the fair value approach in the financial statements, also, introduces the 
measurement issue. Opponents to mandatory recognition (see Aboody et al., 2004b) argue 
that fair values of SOBC may not be reliably measured under the available valuation 
models that involve management discretions. If the market anticipates this discretion, this 
will be negatively reflected on weightings placed on the SOBC expenses. The level of 
management opportunism in a given context might, therefore, have an offsetting impact 
on the extent to which market participants perceive the recognised expenses under 
IFRS2/FAS123R as reliable and relevant accounting information. 
The weighting on the incentive benefits derived from SOBC is also more likely to be 
higher in countries that are less likely to be subject to earnings manipulations. La. Porta 
et al. (1997) argue that the level of management opportunism is more likely to be higher 
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in an environment characterised by a lower level of investors’ protection. As such, re-
examining the observed market pricing of the disclosed versus the voluntarily recognised 
SOBC expense prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R is expected to add to 
our understanding of the value implications across different institutional contexts. More 
importantly, to investigate whether the mandatory recognition adds value, the information 
content, the value relevance and reliability of expensing SOBC after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R to market participants is also examined and compared across 
different institutional contexts. If the market is efficient, in theory there should be no 
difference between the information content of recognised information and that of 
disclosed information (Dhaliwal, 1986; Imhoff et al., 1993; Kothari, 2001). That is, 
market participants value substance over form and hence, where the information is 
presented would not matter. However, Bernard and Schipper (1994) argue that if market 
participants view footnote disclosures as being less reliable or are not sophisticated 
enough to make appropriate adjustments, they will likely assign more importance to 
recognised financial statement items and this will manifest itself in greater value 
relevance.  
Indeed, researchers have provided supporting evidence that the method of presentation in 
the financial statements does matter (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2006; Espahbodi et al., 2002), 
and depending on who uses the financial statements and how naive they are in interpreting 
footnote disclosures (Imhoff et al., 1993, 1995). However, this stream of literature 
generally assumes that the value relevance of disclosed versus recognised information is 
the same across firms and that recognition of previously disclosed accounting items 
affects all the firms homogenously. Different institutional contexts arguably affect market 
participants’ decisions to assign the appropriate weightings to the incentive derived from 
SOBC. That is, the extent to which users of financial reports understand disclosed versus 
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recognised information may differ across different institutional contexts. Consequently, it 
is an empirical question as to whether the market perceives the recognition of SOBC 
expenses as incrementally useful and better reflects the intangible value attributable to 
SOBC, consistently across different contexts that adopted the IFRS2/FAS123R.  
3.4.2 Hypotheses development 
Prior to the mandatory expensing of share options, firms had a choice to choose between 
the pro-forma disclosures in the financial statements’ footnotes, and the voluntary 
recognition in the income statement. In an efficient market, the decision to recognise a 
disclosed amount conveys no new information. That is, the recognition decision should 
not have any equity valuation effect (Aboody et al, 2004b). The available evidence from 
US studies suggested that market participants incorporate the disclosed expense of SOBC 
into price negatively as in the case of other operating expenses, such as salaries. (Aboody, 
1996; Chamberlain and Hsieh, 1999; Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 2004a; Balsam et al., 2006). 
However, for US firms that voluntarily adopted the recognition regime of expensing 
SOBC, Aboody et al. (2004b) argue that these firms chose to recognize SFAS 123 
expense because the benefits exceed the costs. Firms are capital rationed and seek to fund 
future operating activities by borrowing from competitive creditors. Hughes and Levine 
(2003) argue that firms that publicly commit to conservative accounting choices credibly 
convey favorable private information about future cash flows by signaling that they 
expect to meet earnings-based thresholds. 
Voluntarily recognition of SOBC expense is a conservative accounting choice consistent 
with that modeled in Hughes and Levine (2003) because it is more likely to lower net 
income relative to the disclosure-only alternative. SFAS 123 also states that the FASB 
regards recognition as preferable to disclosure. Thus, firms with more favorable future 
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prospects can use SFAS 123 expense recognition to differentiate themselves from firms 
with less favorable.  
Furthermore, unlike if it is disclosed in the footnote, the recognised expense of SOBC 
would also be under further scrutiny of external auditors. As such, investors’ perceptions 
of future cash flow might be revised upward to reflect the intangible feature of SOBC. 
SOBC aims to mitigate the agency problem giving the willingness of those talented 
managers and employees to be compensated based on the long-term future performance 
and service. Being compensated with a condition to better drive companies’ future 
performance over the long-term is associated with an extra market risk factor. Market 
participants are expected to compensate the risk factor associated with SOBC expense 
compared to other operating expenses such as salaries or bonuses which are paid based 
on the past services or performance. Aboody et al. (2004b) reported a positive and 
significant announcement returns for earlier announcing firms, particularly those stating 
that increased earnings transparency motivates their decision. The previous discussion 
leads to the following empirical prediction: 
𝐻1: Prior to the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, investors incorporate the disclosed 
expense of SOBC into price negatively, whereas they incorporate the voluntary 
recognised expense into price positively.  
IFRS2/FAS123R requires SOBC to be recognised as an expense measured at the grant-
date fair value over the vesting period. The accounting treatment of SOBC is mainly based 
on the accrual accounting system. It particularly matches the incurred expenses with the 
services received from employees in exchange for valuable equity instruments issued by 
the employer over the option’ expected vesting period. The level of investors’ protection 
(Hung, 2001), and the nature of the legal system (Ball et al., 2000; 2003) in a given 
reporting context or country found to significantly influence the value relevance and 
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reliability of accrual accounting information. Ball et al. (2000:2) concluded that 
“enhanced common law disclosure standards reduce the agency costs of monitoring 
managers, thus countering the advantages of closer shareholder-manager contact in code-
law countries”. Furthermore, a lower level of investor protection might imply a higher 
probability for management discretion tendency and to use SOBC opportunistically as a 
way to reward managers and employees (agents) for their part of the profit. That is, the 
variation in the country-level institutional and legal variables is also expected to influence 
investor valuation for the disclosed expense of SOBC. The relationship between the 
disclosed expense of SOBC grants and equity valuation should be more pronounced in 
common law countries where these grants are arguably used to reduce agency costs and 
are more likely to be subject to a lower level of management discretion. Based on this 
discussion, the second tested hypothesis is: 
𝐻2: The degree to which investors incorporate the disclosed expense of SOBC into 
price negatively is likely to higher in banks that operate in countries with a legal system 
classified as common law.  
Disclosure is not a sufficient substitute for recognition. However, the recognised SOBC 
expense is believed to provide more relevant and reliable information to market 
participants concerning the costs incurred by the employer and the derived incentive 
benefits from granting SOBC to employees (FASB, 2004, IASB, 2004). SOBC aims to 
drive companies’ future performance over the long-term and is associated with extra 
market risk factor. Market participants are expected to compensate the risk associated 
with SOBC expense compared to other operating expenses such as salaries or bonuses 
which are paid based on the past services or performance. In addition, unlike if it is 
disclosed in the footnotes, the recognised expense of SOBC would also be under further 
scrutiny of external auditors. As such, investors’ perception of future cash flows might 
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be revised upwards. Since investors are normally expected to favorably appreciate the 
incentive impact of SOBC on the issuance firm performance, they will therefore react 
positively to the incurred expense under the recognition regime. The third tested 
hypothesis, therefore, is: 
𝐻3: The mandatory expensing of SOBC is value relevant to market participants on an 
international scale and better reflects the intangible feature of SOBC. 
Both the IASB and the FASB claim that the mandatory recognition approach to SOBC 
under IFRS2/FAS123R aims to improve the comparability of financial information 
around the world. It also makes the accounting requirements for entities that report 
financial statements under both US GAAP and international accounting standards less 
burdensome. As such, the effect of variations in the level of investor protection and the 
type of the legal tradition in a given reporting system on the reliability and relevance of 
the recognised SOBC expense is expected to be mitigated or diminished under the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. Based on this discussion, the fourth tested 
hypothesis is: 
𝐻4: The effect of the variation in the levels of investor protection among nations, on 
investors pricing to SOBC expense is likely to mitigated after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. 
Earlier literature has suggested that characteristics of firms, such as size, potential growth, 
and industry classification (high-tech and financial institutions versus other firms) 
moderate the value relevance and the reliability of the disclosed (Rees and Stott, 2001; 
Aboody et al., 2004a) and the recognised expense of SOBC (Niu and Xu, 2009). 
Rees and Stott (2001) argue that firm’ size and growth opportunities significantly 
moderate the relationship between market return and the disclosed expense of SOBC. 
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They suggest that investors assign significantly higher weightings for disclosed SOBC 
expenses when valuating equity of smaller/higher growth opportunities firms. The rational 
logic standing behind the size/growth opportunities’ argument is that small companies 
usually have higher investment opportunities. Granting SOBC extensively plays a key 
role in increasing growth opportunities in small companies, given their higher demand for 
cash in the short-term. Therefore, companies with high growth opportunity (small 
companies) benefit more from disclosing information about SOBC expenses in their 
footnotes. Investors perceive the fact that employees agree to have their compensation 
rewards (SOBC) in longer term (exercise date) as a positive signal in valuing 
smaller/higher growth firms’ equities. Based on the aforementioned argument the next 
tested hypothesis is that: 
𝐻5: The intangible feature of the recognised amount of SOBC is more pronounced 
in smaller banks and in banks with higher growth opportunities. 
A considerable body of theory posits that SOBC offers incentives to risk-averse managers 
to invest in high-risk high-return projects on behalf of risk-neutral shareholders (e.g., 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Lambert et al., 1991; Murphy, 1999; Hemmer et al., 1999). 
Chen et al. (2006); Smith and Watts (1992) and Mayers and Smith (1992) highlighted that 
the specific nature of the business and regulatory environment under which banks operate 
compared to nonbank counterparts can affect the incentives benefits derived from SOBC 
contracts. In particular, SOBC schemes were found to induce excessive risk taking in the 
banking industry. Chen et al. (2006) argue that inducing an excessive risk taking is one of 
the unique influences of using stock option compensations in the banking industry. 
Stockholders usually seek to transfer wealth from bondholders by increasing the risk of 
the firm. Within the banking sector, Saunders et al. (1990) argue that since depositors 
cannot effectively monitor shareholders’ actions, they are susceptible to this wealth 
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transfer effect. Thus, shareholders can increase the value of their equity by increasing 
bank risk. SOBC represents a chance for managers and executives to increase their future 
stock ownership and ultimately their wealth. As the use of SOBC schemes substantially 
increases in the banking sector, managers and executives have the same incentives as 
stockholders to pursue strategies that increase bank risk. As such, recent calls to monitor 
banks’ use of SOBC due to their tendency to induce risk taking incentives have attracted 
a great deal of attention (Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009). Walker (2009), for example, 
reviewed corporate governance in UK banks, and pointed out that their culture of granting 
SOBC incentives is viewed as excessive and it significantly induces short-term risk taking. 
In the US, the Congressional Emergency Economic Stabilization Act was established in 
2008 to limit financial institutions tendency to offer SOBC incentives to reduce the 
probability of “unnecessary and excessive risks” that threaten their equity values. Based 
on the above discussion, the following sixth tested hypothesis is: 
𝐻6: The intangible feature of the recognised expense of SOBC is more pronounced 
in high risk-taking banks.  
Finally, to extend the limited boundary of the earlier highlighted banks characteristics that 
impact how market participants perceive the recognised SOBC expense, the chapter 
examines whether the effect of these factors prevails across all the sample contexts that 
adopted this international standards IFRS2/FAS123R. The majority of the available 
evidence regarding the effect of firms characteristics on the information content of 
expensing SOBC is drawn from US research focus (Rees and Stott, 2001; Aboody et al., 
2004a,b; Chen et al., 2006) or from a similar context such as Canada (Niu and Xu, 2009). 
The inferences are, therefore, more likely to be apparent across countries characterised by 
high level of investor protection and higher demand for disclosure. Based on this 
argument, the seventh tested hypothesis is: 
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𝐻7: The effect of the firms’ characteristics (size, growth opportunity and risk-taking) 
on pricing the recognised amount of SOBC is more pronounced in markets 
characterised by relatively high levels of investor protection. 
3.5 Summary  
The aim of the chapter was to review the extant related studies on the economic 
consequences of expensing SOBC, and on the information content and the value 
relevance of the mandatory expensing of the estimated fair value of SOBC. More 
specifically, the first section of this chapter reviewed the existing literature that used pre 
and post adoption data to estimate the negative impact of the mandatory adoption of 
expensing SOBC on companies’ key financial indicators. The analysis distinguishes 
further between US and non-US studies. These distinctions were made to highlight that 
lack of international and post adoption studies on the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R given 
that the effect may differ across countries according to their institutional contexts.  
The second section of this chapter reviewed the existing literature that examined the 
information content and the value relevance of expensing SOBC under the disclosure 
approach against that under the recognition approach. The analysis also highlights that 
given the mandatory adoption of two highly converged standards IFRS2 and FAS123R, 
this stream of literature focuses solely on a single context study. It also generally assumes 
that the value relevance of disclosed versus recognised information is the same across 
firms and that recognition of previously disclosed accounting items affects all the firms 
homogenously. However, the extent to which users of financial reports understand 
disclosed versus recognised information may differ across firms that operate in different 
institutional contexts. Finally, this section further developed the related research’s 
theoretical framework and the hypotheses that are used to operationalize the standard 
setters’ qualitative characteristics of the relevance and reliability of the disclosed versus 
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the recognised expense of SOBC on an international basis and taking into account 
reporting differences between various institutional settings. 
Overall, most of the existing studies on the economic consequences of expensing SOBC, 
and on the usefulness and the information content of the mandatory expensing of the 
estimated fair value of SOBC relate to a single context, the US. However, studies on the 
IFRS and specifically, on a wider international scale, do not exist. Taking advantage of 
this gap in the literature, the aim of this thesis is to provide further evidence on the 
economic consequences of expensing SOBC, and on the usefulness and the information 
content of the disclosure versus recognition approach to the estimated fair value of SOBC 
under SFAS123R and IFRS2. 
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Chapter 4: Research methodology and design 
4.1. Introduction 
Research methodology is a key aspect that needs to be established in any research seeking 
to constitute knowledge claims and demystify social processes. It refers to, logically 
justifies, and directs the overall approach of the conducted research, and eventually 
enhances the chances to obtain valid findings and inferences (Kothari, 2004). Blessing 
and Chakrabarti, (2009) claim that choosing the appropriate methodology from the 
available alternatives is a primary step that ultimately constitutes the procedural 
framework within which the research is conducted systematically and scientifically. This 
chapter aims to develop a relevant methodological framework that underpins the research 
inquiries of this thesis. The thesis aims to examine the financial reporting implications of 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, in particular by analysing the interrelation 
between expensing SOBC and each of market and accounting variables, across various 
financial reporting contexts, and over an extended period of investigation. It is believed 
that the selected methodology for this thesis would help in realising “a better planned and 
smoother research process” (Blessing and Chakrabarti, 2009, p.13). The first section of 
this chapter briefly discusses the research paradigm and its main components. The next 
section of this chapter demonstrates the relevance of the selected research paradigm and 
the methodological choices on which the research design will be built. The third section 
discusses the research design and methods selected to answer each of the research 
questions of the current thesis. The fourth section of this chapter provides a self-reflection 
on the selected methodological choices for this thesis to address its few potential 
limitations and how they are addressed. The last section concludes. 
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4.2 Research paradigm  
Each research question faces a choice of the research paradigm that is believed to have 
its influence over the strategy and methods used to conduct and answer this question 
(Saunders et al., 2009). A paradigm is a very wide concept composed of not only theories 
but also assumptions, methods, instruments, principles, standards, values and even 
instincts. It is a framework that fundamentally governs how a researcher perceives, thinks 
and acts, and ultimately the position taken regarding the subject of the research. Although 
there is no established convention for the definition of the paradigm, the more cited one 
which most authors would probably consent to is that of Thomas Kuhn (1996, p. 175). 
He defines the paradigm as “one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-
solutions, which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis 
for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science”. In this sense, the paradigm 
is seen as underlying assumptions and intellectual structure that constitute the key corners 
for research and development in any field of study. Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.24) 
maintain that “to be located in a particular paradigm is to view the world in a particular 
way”. As such, the paradigm provides a conceptual framework for viewing and making 
sense of the social world.  
The term “paradigm” is usually identified in social and organizational theories through a 
combination of philosophy of science, logic of inquiry, and the methods and techniques 
(Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Hallebone and Priest, 2009). Saunders et al. (2009) define 
the philosophy of science (the research philosophy) as essential sets of assumptions that 
influence the way under which researchers recognise the world and the way how it works. 
These assumptions are independent, and used to distinguish among different types of 
social science research paradigms (Burrell and Morgan, 1979; Saunders et al., 2009; 
Hallebone and Priest, 2009). Burrell and Morgan (1979, viii) claim that these ‘meta-
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theoretical assumptions’ are concerned with ‘the nature of social science and the nature 
of society’ respectively. 
The first set of these assumptions which underpins the nature of social science involves 
ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). 
Ontology is concerned with the very essence of reality, is it given or a product of the 
mind? Conceived or perceived by one’s mind? Epistemology is concerned with the 
grounds of knowledge, how we know it and how it can be transmitted to other people; 
whether knowledge is something which can be acquired or is something which has to be 
personally experienced? It defines the way knowledge about a particular view or reality 
is generated, represented, understood, and used. Human nature is concerned with the 
relationship between humans and their environment, determinism versus voluntarism. 
Are humans determined by their environment, or do they have ‘free will’ to create their 
environment? Finally, methodology refers to the process of investigating and obtaining 
the knowledge about the social world. This set of assumptions which is described by 
(Burrell and Morgan, p.4) as ‘the subjective-objective dimension’, has been identified as 
pertinent to understanding social science. Furthermore, these assumptions are 
consequential to each other. The view of ontology affects the selected epistemological 
persuasion which, in turn, affects the view of human nature. The choice of methodology 
also logically follows the assumptions a researcher has already made.  
The second set of assumptions, which is described by (Burrell and Morgan, p.16) as the 
‘regulation and radical change dimension’, relates to the nature of society. This set 
involves both “regulation” (concerning the explanation about the unity and cohesiveness 
of society) and “radical change” (concerning with explaining the social conflict, the need 
for the emancipation from development’ burdens and the seeking for better alternatives 
rather than acceptance the status quo) (ibid., p.17).  
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The relationship between these two key dimensions has identified various contiguous but 
mutually exclusive paradigms. Positivist, interpretive, and critical are the most three 
important and prevailing paradigms noticeably constructing social and organizational 
research (Hopper and Powell, 1985). Burrell and Morgan (1979, p.23) define these 
paradigms as “very basic meta-theoretical assumptions, which underwrite the frame of 
reference, mode of theorising and modus operandi of the social theorists who operate 
within them”. These paradigms aim at helping researchers to identify their assumptions 
about their view of the nature of science and of society; to offer a useful way of 
understanding other researchers’ approaches; and to help them on their own route to 
understand where it is possible to go and where they are going (See Saunders et al., 2009). 
While producing competing modes of inquiry, these philosophies take distinctively 
different ontological and epistemological positions regarding theoretical foundations, 
assumptions, and purposes (Kim, 2003).  
The positivistic approach is built on the claim that there is a world of objective reality 
that exists independently of human beings and that has a determinate nature or essence 
that is knowable (Chua, 1986). The distinction between the subject and the object is very 
closely allied with positivists’ belief about realism. Positivists believe that what is "out 
there" an object is presumed to be independent of the knower (subject). Positivists also 
believe that knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors and "discovers" this 
objective reality. As such this approach often seeks to identify measure and evaluate any 
phenomena and to provide a rational explanation for it. This explanation will attempt to 
establish links and relationships between the different elements of the subject and relate 
them to a particular theory or practice.  
The interpretive approach is concerned with understanding the world as it is, to 
understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective 
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experience (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It provides explanation within the realm of 
individual consciousness and subjectivity. The interpretive approach emphasises 
essentially the subjective nature of the social world and attempts to understand it 
primarily from the frame of reference of those being studied (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
The ontology of the interpretive approach assumes that reality is created by continues 
humans interactions. As such, norms and meanings become objectively (intersubjective) 
real, and eventually form a given comprehensive social reality (Chua, 1986). A theory in 
this sense attempts only to explain action and to understand how the given social order is 
produced and reproduced. Scientific explanations of human intention are sought through 
different means such as case studies, and participant observation in their everyday life. 
The criteria of logical consistency, subjective interpretation, and agreement with actor’ 
common-sense interpretations are also used to assess the adequacy of the scientific 
explanations (ibid.). Finally, as opposed to positivism, the interpretive approach is more 
qualitative and based on interpreting reality through people’s thoughts and purposes (Lee, 
1991). 
Both positive and interpretive theory do not seek to provide a social critique or promote 
radical change. As such critical theory emerged as a brand of social philosophy that 
attempts to do so and to operate simultaneously at a philosophical, theoretical and 
practical level (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). It started as an intellectual movement which 
sought to critique the effects of society and technology on human development (Easterby-
Smith el al, 2008). Critical researchers aim at revealing the domination within studied 
society by criticizing its various phenomena. In terms of ontology, critical philosophers 
believe that social reality is both subjectively created and objectively real (Chua 1986). 
Reality as a whole as well as each particular part is understood as developing out of an 
earlier stage of its existence and evolving into something else. In term on epistemology, 
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critical philosophers accept that the criteria for judging the adequacy of theories and 
scientific explanations are temporal and context-bound. Chua (1986, p.620) claim that 
“the truth is very much in the process of being hammered out and is grounded in social 
and historical practice”. Therefore, there is no theory-independent fact that can 
conclusively prove or disprove a theory. In terms of methodology, neither does critical 
theory utilise statistical models, nor does it use quantitative methods in analyzing and 
collecting research data. Instead, historical, ethnographic research and case studies are 
more commonly used. It emphasises detailed long-term historical analysis explanations 
and ethnographic studies of organizational structures and processes that show their 
societal linkage (ibid.). The focus on the historical analysis serves as the critical function 
of exposing rigidities and apparently ahistorical relations that restrict human 
potentialities.  
The second part of the paradigm is the logic of inquiry. Hallebone and Priest (2009: 27) 
defines the logic of inquiry as “the major form of reasoning to be used in answering the 
research question with the use of empirical data, and the particular logics on which such 
reasoning is to be based”. That is, the logic of inquiries identifies the way under which a 
researcher looks for answers to the research question. The induction, deduction, or the 
mix of both are the common used logic of reasoning on which to base arguing for and 
answering the research question. The inductive approach is a formulation of general 
theories from specific observations, as opposed to the deductive approach, which is the 
derivation of a new logical truth from existing facts (Saunders et al., 2009). In more 
detail, the deductive approach derives logical results from prior theories, states them in 
hypothesis structure, examines them in an empirical data, and after that presents the finals 
findings based on verification or falsification from stated hypothesis (Blaikie, 2010). By 
contrast, in the inductive approach, observations about the world results in emerging 
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propositions which are generalized in a theoretical form. The combination of both 
inductive and deductive approaches is usually referred to as the abduction approach 
(Svennevig, 2001). It can be viewed as a reciprocal action between theory and empiricism 
in order to acquire a complete picture of what is researched. 
Finally, Bryman and Bell (2007) point out that the role of the research logic of inquiry is 
to link the philosophy of science and research method. The research method is “a set of 
tactics and supporting steps that operationalise the chosen philosophy of science and logic 
of inquiry” (Hallebone and Priest, 2009: 28). It includes the sample, data collection and 
analysis. The next section discuss the relevance of the selected research approach, logical 
reasoning and methods to the nature of inquires raised in this thesis.  
4.3 The research paradigm and methodological choices of the thesis 
4.3.1 Positivist approach 
Positivism in social science started in the United States by the French philosopher 
“Auguste Comte” in 1853 (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). It became the dominant research 
approach during the (1960s and 1970s) as there has been increasing demand for 
‘objective’ research that emphasizes the principal of empirical certainty (Neuman, 2003, 
p.82). Auguste Comte sought to introduce a balanced mix of rationalism and empiricism, 
by constructing a new method allowing for “absolute descriptions of the empirical world 
to be made distinct from any observer bias and clearly separated from any attitude 
concerning the need for change in the observable referent” (Laughlin, 1995, p.73). 
Positivist philosophy is built on many assumptions. Chua (1986) claims that the 
positivism is dominated by a belief that there is a world of objective reality which exists 
independently of human beings. That is, the world is external and objective and people 
do not have any influence on the social reality. The role of the positivist researcher is to 
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discover these general laws that affect human life. These laws can be manipulated to 
predict the future as well as to improve human relations (Neuman, 2003; Willis, 2007). 
Additionally, positivist philosophy assumes that people respond to external factors in 
systematic ways where researchers seek to understand these responses without concern 
about the internal forces that drive them (Neuman, 2003). This assumption is the 
positivist basis of the cause-effect relationship between variables. According to Saunders 
et al. (2009), positivism is based on observable reality, which is grounded in facts rather 
than impressions in order to drive generalizable laws and causal relationships. Positivists 
often start from observations and existing theory to draw a hypothesis to be tested. As 
such results of the test will either support or refute the selected theory. Eventually, a set 
of theories that can be retested by other researchers will be developed. In short, the 
positivist ontology of positivism sees reality as existing independently from and outside 
human existence, while positivist epistemology looks at observable events in order to 
obtain the data necessary to form general laws that are based on cause-effect 
relationships.  
In this context, there are many advantages and disadvantages to adopt the positive 
approach to examine and analyse the interrelation between the disclosure versus the 
recognition approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC, and each of market and 
accounting selected variables, across various financial reporting settings, and over two 
consequent periods of investigation (pre versus post). In terms of advantages that 
positivist approach may have, the assumption that reality already exists out there and can 
be noticed and observed from objective viewpoint increases the possibility of researcher 
neutrality or independence. Following such an approach will result in a relatively low 
intervention with the phenomena being studied. As such, compared with other 
approaches, objectivity and independence are considered to be the main attractive 
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features of positivist research (Rayan et al., 1992; Saunders et al., 2009). Another key 
characteristic of positivism is the dependence on highly structured methodologies in 
conducting research which helps in replicating the study and testing its results in future 
research (Saunders et al., 2009). That is, scientific explanations of the studied phenomena 
or of the cause-effect relationship should be replicated to ensure that the created 
knowledge is true. Neuman (2003: 74) claims that “positivists see science as a special, 
distinctive part of society that is free of personal, political, or religious values”. Indeed, 
the objectivity, neutrality and the scientific nature of the highly structured methodologies 
make positivist research closer to natural science (Saunders et al., 2009).  
Some, however, may argue that the social science researcher should aim to understand 
the perception of phenomena rather than considering people as objects. Chua (1986), for 
example, lists three criticisms of positive accounting research: 1) positivist accounting 
researchers do not study an institutional structure, which could be considered a biased 
position of researcher; 2) researchers neglect that organisation could be a reflexive of 
conflicts between different groups having different interests; and 3) positivist accounting 
research usually does not pay attention to the controversies within the philosophy of 
science which have questioned the realism and testability of theories by empirical data. 
Despite these criticisms attributed to positivism, there are many factors encouraging the 
current thesis to adopt the positivist approach in answering the research questions. First 
of all, the researcher believes that reality exists outside of the individuals. As such, the 
best way to acquire knowledge about reality is by observing it in a way that is 
independent, effectively structured and consistent with the research objective. The main 
objective of this thesis is to identify and highlight the major financial reporting 
implications of alternative reporting methods of accounting for SOBC using pre and 
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extended post IFRS2/FAS123R adoption period and across wider global settings, the EU 
and US banking sectors. 
This influence can be measured and observed through the interrelation between the 
disclosed versus the recognised fair-value expense of SOBC, and each of market and 
accounting selected variables, across various financial reporting settings, and over two 
consequent periods of investigation. In other words, as the research question is concerned 
with the possibility of the differences in the financial reporting implications across banks 
that operate in various financial reporting settings prior and after the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS2/FAS123R, the thesis seeks to quantify this relationship based on accounting 
and market measures rather than on belief. 
In addition, the study emphasises the importance of the researcher’s objectivity to enable 
replication and predictions as well as comparison with previous studies. Specifically, the 
growing body of literature about the mandatory adoption of the recognition approach to 
expensing SOBC has adopted a quantitative positivist approach. It is believed that 
measurement is the strong point of quantitative research. Its advantages bring dependency 
and consistency to the carried out research which is influenced neither by the timing of 
its administration nor by the person who administers it. Furthermore, conducting 
quantitative research focusing on the impact of expensing SOBC on banks’ financial 
indicators, along with highlighting the relevance and reliability of the disclosure versus 
the recognition regime under IFRS2/FAS123R, and on a wider global context is 
necessary to allow comparison with previous results, which were mainly concerned with 
a single market. In summary, the use of quantitative data allows for a structured 
methodology, which increases the ability to replicate and to generalise the findings and, 
consequently, to compare them with those of other studies. Finally, the time and cost 
constraints of this study encourage the implementation of quantitative positivist research. 
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In this context, the positivist approach is considered less time and cost consuming than 
other paradigms which usually demand the collection of primary data regarding the 
phenomena being studied. 
4.3.2 Deductive reasoning 
This thesis adopts deductive logic to highlight the financial reporting implications of 
expensing SOBC across banks that operate in various financial reporting settings prior 
and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. The adoption of the deductive 
logic in this thesis conforms to the approach used by growing body of studies conducted 
in the same field (see for instance Rees and Stott, 2001; Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 2004a; 
Niu and Xu, 2009). Many researchers believe that deductive reasoning is consistent with 
positivism (See Saunders et al., 2009). Chua (1986: 608) supports this belief, contending 
that “[T]he use of the hypothetico-deductive model of scientific explanation is the most 
consistent characteristic of extant accounting research”. 
Deductive reasoning starts from a general theory or universal law to draw a hypothesis 
or hypotheses that could be tested by analysing the observations. Based on the results of 
examining the validity of the hypothesis or hypotheses, the validity of the original theory 
is determined (Welman et al., 2005). This logical approach seeks mainly to investigate 
universal laws or principles from which lower-level hypotheses may be deduced (Chua, 
1986). Hypotheses are usually drawn to explain a phenomenon based on causal 
relationships between two or more variables. As the researcher starts from a general law 
to deduce the hypotheses, the variables are well-defined, which makes this a powerful 
approach. 
Additionally, deductive reasoning, which is based on structured methodologies, allows 
the control of testing hypotheses to ensure that the variance in dependent variables are 
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caused by changes in the independent variables not by any other variable. Another main 
feature of deductive logic in accounting research is that it generally depends on the 
empirical testing of hypotheses. Finally, deductive studies, by identifying the reasons of 
a certain phenomenon, can predict the behavior in future and consequently give the 
advantages to manipulate these reasons to achieve the required changes. The above 
illustration shows how the deductive approach is consistent with positivist research. 
Therefore, the thesis is conducted based on deductive reasoning consistent with the 
positivist approach which is selected to underpin this research. This aspect is illustrated 
further below. 
4.4 Research Design and Methods  
The data used to answer these questions is numerical in nature. Therefore, the quantitative 
method is believed to be more relevant to the positive approach in general and hence to 
answer the given research questions. Quantitative methods of data analysis and collection 
are favored because these methods allow for replications and for generalizations to be 
made. They also allow the researcher to answer the research questions in an independent 
way. Quantitative methods relates to the collection and analysis of numerical data 
whereby results are collated, presented and tested statistically using scale, range, 
frequency etc. These include surveys, experimental studies and cross-sectional studies. 
The following two sections develop the empirical experiment and model used in this 
thesis. They also briefly discuss the selected statistical measurements and the sample 
selection for each of the thesis’ two research questions.  
4.4.1 Economic consequences of expensing SOBC 
The first research question aims to identify, analyse, compare, and evaluate the total 
effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2 and FAS123R, on selected performance 
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measures within and between two distinct settings: the US and EU banking sectors using 
pre and post-adoption data. This question is relatively more descriptive and analytical in 
nature. Descriptive research is usually used to identify and classify elements or 
characteristics of the subject. Analytical research often extends the descriptive approach 
to suggest or explain why or how something is happening. The effect of the 
IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance indicators is assessed by utilising both 
traditional materiality thresholds, used by earlier literature, and statistical tests. 
Differentiating between statistical and practical significance is a matter of importance 
such that small numerical differences measured in percentage terms can be regarded as 
statistically significant. All performance measures utilised in earlier studies, [ROE] 
(Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005), [ROA, Diluted EPS] (Botosan and Plumlee, 2001), 
[SOBC expense relative to opening shareholders’ equity] (Street and Cereola, 2004), 
[profit (loss) before tax] (Schroeder and Schauer, 2008) in addition to a widely used 
performance measure in banking industry (cost to income ratio [CIR]), have been 
employed in this research.  
All selected performance measures are calculated with and without SOBC expense. The 
effect in percentage terms on the selected performance indicators is calculated as follows: 
ratios adjusted for SOBC expense minus reported ratio and the difference is divided by 
the reported ratio. In some cases, observations in a case of banks reported losses over the 
sample period under examination have been omitted. Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) and 
Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010) also follow the same methodology. The reason is being 
that such losses result in nonsensical percentages owing to the negative denominators. 
This follows Barber and Lyon (1996, p 394) who commented that: 
‘...if ROA is negative in either year over which the percentage change is calculated, 
the results is nonsensical. Consequently, researchers are forced to discard firms that 
experience losses over the sample period under consideration’. 
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Utilising an appropriate ‘cut-off’ for testing the traditional materiality threshold is a 
subjective undertaking and ranging from approximately 0.5% to 50% (Vance, 2011). 
Pattillo (1976) reported that in practice a “rule of thumb” of 5 to10 percent of net income 
is commonly used as a materiality criterion (cited in Botosan and Plumlee, 2001). 
Therefore, and following earlier literature, the 5% materiality thresholds is applied to 
assess the impact on ROA, ROE, DEPS, while the 0.5% materiality level is applied in 
respect to opening shareholders’ equity. A 1% materiality threshold will be employed to 
assess the materiality of the impact on cost to income ratio.  
To investigate the significance of the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected 
performance measures statistically, and whether the median and the mean of this effect 
significantly varies between EU and US banks and within each block separately, a non-
parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (U) test/Wilcoxon signed-rank test are used along 
with their comparable parametric T test for robustness check. A set of control variables 
is used to complement the analysis after controlling for the possible difference in some 
banks’ characteristics and operational structure within and between the EU and US banks. 
Kruskal–Wallis test along with one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) for robustness 
check are used to examine the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance 
measures within each sample after controlling for banks’ characteristics. As an additional 
analysis, the findings are also reported after controlling for the difference in institutional 
environment under which the sample-banks operate. All figures are reported in US 
currency ($) using the exchange rate at each closing period.  
4.4.1.1 Sampling and data collection 
The data set related to the expense of SOBC in EU and US commercial banking sectors 
is hand-collected from published annual reports of their listed Commercial Banks (CBs) 
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and Bank-holding Companies (BHCs)1. CBs and BHCs are the mainly dominant structure 
of commercial banking industry in both sides of the Atlantic (Avraham, et al., 2012; ECB, 
2013). The distinction between CBs and BHCs is expected to further enhance the analysis 
of the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption in the banking sector given that the first inquiry 
of this thesis is relatively more descriptive and analytical in nature. The BankScope 
database2 is used to identify banks classification into CBs and BHCs. The other data 
related to the selected performance indicators and the controls variables are withdrawn 
from the DataStream (Thomson Reuters) database3. Furthermore, to exclude BHCs that 
are mainly engaged in non-banking activities, banks should have more than 25% net loan 
to total assets in average over the studied period. Banks included in the data set are also 
required to satisfy a number of criteria. Firstly, to avoid any systematic bias in 
interpreting trends in levels of expensing SOBC, and to ensure stabilising the expense, 
banks should have incorporated the expensing of SOBC in their annual reports for at least 
three years over the studied period.  
Table (1) summarises the final sample of 145 banks (1,010 bank-year observations) 
selected for this research question that is tested in chapter five. Banks included in the data 
set are also required to satisfy a number of criteria. Firstly, to avoid any systematic bias 
in interpreting trends in levels of expensing SOBC, and to ensure stabilising the expense, 
banks should have incorporated the expensing of SOBC in their annual reports for at least 
three years over the studied period. SOBC usually need three years to complete their 
                                                          
1 BHC is simply a corporation that owns, or has controlling interest in, one or more banks. BHC usually owns a number 
of domestic bank subsidiaries engaged in lending, deposit-taking, and other activities, as well as nonbanking and 
foreign subsidiaries engaged in a broader range of business activities, which may include securities dealing and 
underwriting, insurance, real estate, private equity, leasing and trust services, asset management, and so on. By contrast, 
a CB is a financial institution that is owned by stockholders. CB mainly operates for a profit by engaging in various 
lending activities. 
2 BankScope database by the Bureau van Dijk, a major publisher of company information and business intelligence, 
includes data on 30,000 banks world-wide.  
3 Datastream is a global financial and macroeconomic database covering equities, stock market indices, currencies, 
fixed income securities and key economic indicators for 175 countries and 60 markets. 
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cycle and to stabilise in banks that grant SOBC on a yearly or a longer basis whether in 
a steady or unsteady level. 
Table 1: Sample selection, countries and observations for the economic 
consequences of expensing SOBC. 
Panel A: Sample selection 
Description 
US EU 
Commercial BHCs Commercial BHCs 
Initial Sample 20 90 58 28 
Banks that do not publish annual reports in English 0 0 5 0 
Banks with missing accounting data and market valuations 1 0 1 0 
Banks that do not report SOBC expense over 3 years 4 0 22 1 
BHCs with less than 25% net loan to total assets  0 3 0 14 
The final sample 15 87 30 13 
Panel B: Countries and observations in the final sample 
Country Commercial BHCs Total Banks Years-observations 
US 15 87 102 702 
EU 30 13 43 308 
UNITED KINGDOM 0 5 5 40 
ITALY 6 0 6 45 
GERMANY 4 0 4 27 
GREECE 4 0 4 19 
SPAIN 4 0 4 22 
FRANCE 3 0 3 24 
NETHERLANDS 1 2 3 24 
AUSTRIA 1 1 2 16 
BELGIUM 0 2 2 15 
DENMARK 2 0 2 15 
IRELAND 2 0 2 13 
PORTUGAL 1 1 2 16 
SWEDEN 1 1 2 16 
LUXEMBOURG 0 1 1 8 
FINLAND 1 0 1 8 
Total 45 100 145 1010 
Secondly, for EU listed banks, they should also have published annual reports in the 
English language for years between 2004 and 20114. Thirdly, banks should have no 
missing data in any of the accounting statements or market valuations. The EU sample 
consists of 43 banks (13 bank holding companies and 30 commercial banks) out of 86 
banks that operate in 15 EU countries during the studied period. Finally, for US banks, 
the data is drawn from two segments. The first one includes 88 banks (87 bank holding 
companies and 1 commercial bank) out of 91 that entered the 2011 S&P Composite 1500 
which includes three leading indices, the S&P 500, the S&P MidCap 400, and the S&P 
SmallCap 600. The limited number of US commercial banks in this segment of the 
                                                          
4 IFRS2 requires that all equity-settled payments awarded after 7th November 2002 and vested after the effective date 
of IFRS2 should be accounted for using the fair value method; therefore data concerning shares granted after 7th 
November 2002 as well as not vested at the beginning of 2005 were collected as well. 
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sample necessitates the need for a second segment that includes 14 commercial banks 
out of 19 banks that use options for at least three years over the studied period, and have 
average total assets over $500 million during the studied period5.  
4.4.2 The value relevance and the information content of the recognition versus the 
disclosure approach for expensing the fair value of SOBC 
The second research question that is tested in chapter six aims to investigate the value 
relevance and the information content of the recognition versus the disclosure approach 
for expensing the fair value of SOBC using a wider international setting. It also highlights 
the magnitude of the perceived reliability of the adopted accounting treatment and 
measurement to the cost associated with SOBC grants compared to their intangible effect 
(as value increasing assets) by market participants, and across different institutional 
settings. The financial implication of disclosure versus recognition approach to the cost 
associated with SOBC may differ from one setting to another due to the variation in the 
country-specific institutional differences, such as the level of investor protection. The 
majority of previous studies that investigated the value relevance and reliability of the 
disclosure approach to expensing SOBC against the recognition approach, mainly 
adopted the empirical accounting-based valuation model developed by Ohlson (1995). 
This model is based on the idea that accounting information is considered value relevant 
when it has a statistical association with equity market value or return (Barth el al., 2001). 
The model, in the spirit of the level specification, relates balance sheet amounts to the 
market value of the firm (e,g., Aboody et al., 2004a) or, in the spirit of a changes 
                                                          
5 Setting the threshold of $500 million in average total assets for US commercial banks is based on four main reasons: 
1) to ensure that the size of selected commercial banks fall over the $500 m threshold of U.S. BHCs that are required 
to fill the FR Y-9C report, the most widely requested and reviewed report at the holding company level. 2) to be in the 
same range with the smallest total average assets of EU banks; 3) to avoid including smaller banks in the final sample 
which might have a material impact on the final results; 4) annual reports of selected banks are more likely to provide 
data for this research. 
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specification, stock returns to the (deflated) levels and changes in earnings (e,g Niu and 
Xu, 2009). 
Using the pooled cross-section and time-series regression analysis is an inalienable 
instrument for the development of the comparative studies. Using a pooled cross-section 
and time-series regression of firm/year observations for all countries allows for formal 
tests of differences among countries or other used classifications (Ball et al., 2000). Such 
that implies that results interpretation for the main model is based on the assumption that 
price formation is roughly the same across countries. Holthausen and Watts (2001) argue 
that researchers should exclusively opt for the returns model. Coefficients of the level 
market value model may be biased due to size effects, omitted variables, measurement 
errors, and cross-sectional differences in valuation parameters (Easton and Sommers, 
2003). Moreover, standard errors might be biased due to heteroskedasticity6 (White, 
1980; Brown et al., 1999). The changes model, however, addresses the potential bias in 
coefficients numbers of the level-based model caused by the potential omission of 
unobserved variables (Kothary and Zimmerman, 1995). The level model will be exposed 
to a higher potential bias given the number of unobserved variables is expected to be 
higher in a sample that includes banks which operate in various institutional contexts. 
Therefore, as a base model, Ohlson’s model (1995) on the spirit of a changes specification 
is adopted.  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2∆𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡:The annual buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed after three month of a bank’s fiscal year-end
7. The 
analysis is also repeated using the annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends as a robustness check in all used models.  
                                                          
6 Heteroskedasticity arises most often with cross-sectional data, and it refers to a situation under which the variance of 
the error terms differs across observations. 
7 The reason for choosing the window of three months is justified in Veith and Werner (2014, 307) who states that ‘An 
obvious choice would be the fiscal year, but annual financial reports will not be available at FYE, and thus cannot 
immediately be reflected insecurity prices at that date. Moreover, it will take some time until capital markets have fully 
processed the accounting information after publication. Addressing both problems, researchers tend to shift or extend 
the yearly return window so that it ends at some predefined point after FYE’. Barth et al. (2008), Aboody et al. (2004a) 
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𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: Net incomes before extraordinary items per share over the fiscal year. 
∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share. 
𝑒𝑖𝑡: Error term. 
i, and t refer to banks and years respectively 
The change model initially correlates annual stock returns to the (deflated) components 
of net earnings. Ohlson (1995), Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Francis et al. (2004) 
suggest that earnings growth might also have an impact on the value of firms. Therefore, 
earnings growth is used as a control variable to the relationship between components of 
net earnings and stock returns. Furthermore, following the approach of other studies (e.g. 
Aboody et al., 2004a; Niu and Xu, 2009; Schiemann and Guenther, 2013), SOBC 
expense is separated from the rest of net earnings’ components as to examine their main 
impact is the main concern for this study. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼2∆𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡+ 𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  (2)  
𝑅𝑖𝑡:The annual buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed after three month of a bank’s fiscal year-end.  
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: Net incomes before extraordinary items per share over the fiscal year adjusted for the recognised share-based compensation 
expenses per share. 
𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡: refers to the voluntarily or mandatorily recognised share-option based compensations expense per share.  
∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in net incomes. 
𝑒𝑖𝑡: Error term. 
i, and t refer to banks and years respectively 
 
The pooled cross-section and time-series regression is run using the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) method. The misspecification, that is peculiar of pooled data, is the 
assumption of homogeneity of level of dependent variable across units and times. To 
address this issue, the vast value relevance literature uses Ohlson’s model per share 
amounts to reduce the presence of size-related heteroscedastic disturbances (Barth et al., 
1992). In addition, all regressions are based on robust standard errors using White-
adjusted t-statistics. To take into consideration the year and country effect that is not 
                                                          
and Niu and Xu (2009), for example, opt for 12-month return windows ending three months after financial year end. 
Therefore, the most common return window has been used that seems to be a 15-month window ending three months 
after FYE. 
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captured by the dependent variables, the used models allow the intercept to vary across 
years and countries. A set of continuous and dummy country-level institutional variables 
is also used to partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor 
protections: (1) [LT] a country’s legal tradition, common law versus code law, based on 
La Porta et al. (1997) and Ball et al. (2000); (2) the US economy versus the remaining 
countries, (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for 
the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation (4) the 
disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect 
better disclosure rules in the selected sample-countries; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the 
strength of shareholders protection in a given country from World Economic Forum over 
the period of (2008-2011). Finally, all raw values are translated into US$ using the 
respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. The three main research designs 
(i.e., Pre IFRS2/FAS123R analysis, pre- versus post-IFRS2/FAS123R analysis and post- 
IFRS2/FAS123R analysis), and the sample of selected banks used to investigate the value 
relevance and the information content of the disclosure versus the recognition approach 
to SOBC are discussed in the next sub sections.  
4.4.2.1 Pre- IFRS2/FAS123R analysis 
Equation (3) tests the information content of both the disclosure approach to expensing 
SOBC and the voluntary recognition approach, using both pre IFRS2 and FAS123R 
adoption periods. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼6𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡  𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 … … … …(3) 
𝑅𝑖𝑡:The twelve months buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends ending three months after the bank’s fiscal year-end.  
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year adjusted for the voluntarily recognised 
share-based compensation expenses. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the 
number of common shares outstanding. 
∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
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𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡: The voluntarily recognised SOBC expense scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡: The disclosed SOBC expense scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
𝑒𝑖𝑡: Error term. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡: A set of continuous and dummy country-level institutional variables used to proxy the level of investor protections(1) a 
country’s legal tradition, common law versus code law (2) the US economy versus the remaining countries; (3) the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation; (4) 
the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules in the selected 
sample-countries; (5) The average of the strength of shareholders protection in a given country from World Economic Forum. 
t, j, and i refer to years, countries and banks respectively. ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 : a dummy variables identify the country of the accounting 
standards used for each bank/year, ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 : a dummy variables identify the year. 
The voluntarily recognised expense of SOBC is entered in this model as one of the 
earnings components. If banks did not voluntarily recognise any SOBC expense, a zero 
value is assigned. Furthermore, the disclosed expense of SOBC is entered into this model 
as a negative value (expense). This initial model will be run first. More complete estimates 
of equation 3, then, will be run to allow the coefficient of expensing SOBC under the 
disclosure approach to vary across the different selected proxies for the level of investors’ 
protection under which sample-banks operate8. 
4.4.2.2 Pre versus post IFRS2/FAS123R analysis 
The following model (4) allows the examination of the value-relevance and information 
content of SOBC, whose fair value is disclosed prior to the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R 
and recognised subsequent to the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R.  
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼5(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡) +
𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼7 (𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡) +  𝛼8(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡) + 𝛼9(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡) +
 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (4)  
𝑅𝑖𝑡:The twelve months’ buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends ending three months after the bank’s fiscal year-end.  
𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year adjusted for the recognised SOBC 
expenses. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding. 
∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
                                                          
8 Over the pre-adoption period, only a few US banks selected expensing stock options under the voluntary recognition 
regime, Therefore, the coefficient on the expensing of stock options under the voluntary regime is not interacted with 
the proxies used to the level of investor protection under which the sample-banks operate. 
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𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡: Share-option based compensations expenses scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the pre- 
IFRS2/FAS123R period, SOBC expense entered into the regression as a negative value (expense) if it is disclosed in the footnote.  
Post: a dummy variable equal to (1) over the post-adoption period and equal to (0) over the pre-adoption period. 
𝑒𝑖𝑡: Error term. 
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡: A set of continuous and dummy country-level institutional variables used to proxy the level of investor protections (1) a 
country’s legal tradition, common law versus code law (2) the US economy versus the remaining countries; (3) the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation; (4) 
the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules in the selected 
sample-countries; (5) The average of the strength of shareholders protection in a given country from World Economic Forum. 
t, j, and i refer to years, countries and banks respectively. ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 : a dummy variables identify the country of the accounting 
standards used for each bank/year, ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 : a dummy variables identify the year. 
This model has two important considerations. Firstly, the model includes both recognised 
and disclosed expenses of SOBC as independent variables. It includes the disclosed 
expense of SOBC in the pre-IFRS2/FAS123R period entered into the regression as a 
negative value; otherwise it includes the recognised expense of SOBC in the pre and post-
IFRS2/FAS123R period. Secondly, the coefﬁcients on the explanatory variable 
[𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] are permitted to differ across the IFRS2/FAS123R periods [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡]. Thirdly, the 
coefﬁcient that tests the information content and the value relevance of expensing the fair 
value of SOBC in the post adoption period compared to that in the pre-adoption period 
[(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] is permitted to differ across different levels of investor protection 
[𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡]. The main coefficients of interest in these models are [𝛼5(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡], and [𝛼9𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡]. Significance and signs of these 
coefficients indicate the value relevance and the information content of using the 
disclosure versus the recognition approach expensing the fair value of SOBC consequent 
to the mandatorily adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, and the degree to which this inference 
changes in banks that operate across different institutional settings, respectively. 
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4.4.2.3 Post-IFRS2/FAS123R analysis 
The following model (5) tests the influence of the variation in the institutional reporting 
settings on the magnitude of the information content and the value relevance of the 
recognised expense of SOBC after the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡(5) 
-𝑅𝑖𝑡:The twelve months’ buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends ending three months after the bank’s fiscal year-end.  
-𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year adjusted for the recognised SOBC 
expense. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding. 
-∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
-𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡: Recognised share-option based compensations expenses scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
𝑒𝑖𝑡: Error term. 
-𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡: A set of continuous and dummy country-level institutional variables used to proxy the level of investor protections (1) a 
country’s legal tradition, common law versus code law (2) the US economy versus the remaining countries; (3) the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation; (4) 
the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules in the selected 
sample-countries; (5) The average of the strength of shareholders protection in a given country from World Economic Forum. 
- t, j, and i refer to years, countries and banks respectively. ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 : a dummy variables identify the country of the accounting 
standards used for each bank/year, ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 : a dummy variables identify the year. 
The main coefficients of interest in this model are 𝑎3 and 𝑎5 . The signs of these 
coefficients and their statistical significance show market valuation to the recognised 
expense of SOBC in a given context, and whether this inference significantly varies across 
banks that operate in different contexts.  
4.4.2.4 The effects of characteristics of banks 
The following model investigates whether selected banks’ characteristics affect the 
information content and the value relevance of the recognised expense of SOBC 
consequent to the mandatorily adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6) 
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-𝑅𝑖𝑡:The twelve months’ buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends ending three months after the bank’s fiscal year-end.  
-𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year adjusted for the recognised SOBC 
expenses. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares 
outstanding. 
-∆ 𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
-𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡: Recognised SOBC expenses scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
𝑒𝑖𝑡: Error term. 
-𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘_𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑐𝑡:banks’ size, banks potential growth rate and banks risk taking 
-𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡: A set of continuous and dummy country-level institutional variables used to proxy the level of investor protections (1) a 
country’s legal tradition, common law versus code law (2) the US economy versus the remaining countries; (3) the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation; (4) 
the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules in the selected 
sample-countries; (5) The average of the strength of shareholders protection in a given country from World Economic Forum. 
- t, j, and i refer to years, countries and banks respectively. ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 : a dummy variables identify the country of the accounting 
standards used for each bank/year, ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 : a dummy variables identify the year. 
The coefficient on the recognised expense of SOBC in this equation is first allowed to 
vary according to each of banks’ size, banks potential growth rate and banks risk taking. 
A complete estimate of Model (6), then highlights whether the effect of banks’ 
characteristics is greater in banks operate within a context characterised by a higher level 
of investor protection such the US context, or it similarly prevails over all the sample 
settings. 
Banks’ size is measured by their market values, where it is =1 if average market value 
[total assets] of a bank> median of the sample market value [total assets], 0= otherwise) 
[the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ size as robustness check to the median 
criterion]. Banks’ potential growth oppurtunity is represented by their market to book ratio 
where it is =1 if average [M/B] of a bank> median of the sample M/B ratio, 0= otherwise) 
[the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ potential growth as robustness check 
to the median criterion]. Finally, bank risk taking is measured by the market risk 
calculated using monthly volatility of bank stock price [daily and annual volatility are also 
used as a robustness check]. Bank risk taking is given the value = 1 if the average monthly 
volatility of stock prices in a given bank> median of the sample, 0= otherwise) [the mean 
criterion is also used to partition banks’ risk as robustness check to the median criterion]. 
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4.4.2.5 Sample selection and Data collection 
Table 2: Sample selection, countries and observations for the value relevance and 
the information content of SOBC. 
Table (2) summarises the final sample of 131 banks9 (915 bank-year observations) 
selected for the second research question that is tested in chapter six. The selected sample 
of US and EU listed banks has to meet a number of selection criteria, to be included in 
the final sample. For the EU sample, all EU listed banks have been selected with the 
criteria to have published annual reports in English, over all the study period10.  
The US banks include the large-mid and small-cap banks that are listed in the 2011 S&P 
Composite 1500 that cover 90% of the market capitalization of U.S. stocks. All banks 
should report the fair value of SOBC at least for three years11. Meeting this criterion will 
capture the wider picture of investor valuation to the reported expense of SOBC over the 
option cycle life.  
The reported expense of SOBC is manually collected from banks’ annual reports. The 
pre- adoption data are collected from the comparative figures of 2005 for EU sample, and 
the pro forma disclosure for the US sample. Other markets and accounting data are 
extracted from DataStream. Banks should have all accounting and market numbers 
required for our study variables. 
Furthermore, to exclude banks that are mainly engaged in non-banking activities, banks 
should have more than 25% net loan to total assets in average over the studied period. 
Finally, these selection procedure yields a final sample of 131 banks, of these, 43 EU 
banks.  
                                                          
9 The number of US banks for the selected sample of the second research question (tested in chapter 6) is lower than 
that selected for the first research question (tested in chapter five) because the second research question uses a sample 
of US banks only listed in S&P 1500. Due to the descriptive nature of the first research question, a sample of US 
commercial banks that are not listed in S&P 1500 were was also added to it the overall sample.  
10 IFRS2 requires that all equity-settled payments awarded after 7th November 2002 and vested after the effective date 
of IFRS2 should be accounted for using the fair value method; therefore data concerning shares granted after 7th 
November 2002 as well as not vested at the beginning of 2005 were collected as well. 
11 Stock options usually need three years to complete their cycle and to stabilise in banks that grant options on a yearly 
or a longer basis whether in a steady or unsteady level. 
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Panel A: Sample selection 
Description US Banks EU Banks 
Initial Sample 91 86 
Banks that do not publish annual reports in English 0 5 
Banks with missing accounting data and market valuations 0 1 
Banks that do not report SOBC expense over 3 years 0 23 
BHCs with less than 25% net loan to total assets  3 14 
The final sample 88 43 
Panel B: Countries and observations in the final sample 
Country Banks Years-observations 
US 88 609 
EU 43 306 
UNITED KINGDOM 5 40 
ITALY 6 44 
GERMANY 4 27 
GREECE 4 19 
SPAIN 4 22 
FRANCE 3 24 
NETHERLANDS 3 24 
AUSTRIA 2 15 
BELGIUM 2 15 
DENMARK 2 15 
IRELAND 2 13 
PORTUGAL 2 16 
SWEDEN 2 16 
LUXEMBOURG 1 8 
FINLAND 1 8 
Total 131 915 
 
 
4.5 Self-reflection on the selected methodological choices 
The selected methodological choices for this thesis are subject to potential limitations. 
The methodology of the value relevance and information content of the disclosed versus 
the recognised expense of SOBC adopts the investor point of view as the objective of 
financial reporting. Financial reporting serves different objectives and users of financial 
statements beyond assisting investors in their equity investment decisions. Financial 
statements have a variety of applications such as those for the purpose of contracting and 
monitoring (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) and for other social aspects. For example, 
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financial reporting, particularly accounting information such as ROA, ROE and EPS is 
used in identifying management compensation and debt contracts. The focus on the value 
relevance in one part of this thesis, is in no way diminishes the importance of the findings 
of this thesis to other users of financial statements. 
In more detail, the first research question of this thesis mainly focuses on the materiality 
of the reduction in the reported earnings and other selected performance measures 
consequent to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123. The materiality and the extent 
of the reduction in these accounting performance indicators are also a potential interest 
for users concerned with contracting and monitoring aspects of financial reporting. The 
selected performance indicators are one of the basic contracting aspects used in different 
contractual specifications such as variable compensation contracts and estimating the 
firm’s value. Furthermore, the long-term reaction of both investors and managers to the 
mandatory expensing of SOBC may be of interest to users concerned with the 
motivational, structural and social aspects of SOBC contracts and other related corporate 
governance issues. 
Secondly, the value relevance model of Ohson (1995) is criticized for being based on a 
linear, rather than nonlinear, valuation model (Holthausen and Watts, 2001). To alleviate 
the effect of linearity, the adopted value relevance model in this thesis incorporate 
potential effects of nonlinearities in the particular setting being examined. It permits 
coefficients on SOBC expense to vary cross-sectionally with different institutional 
settings and bank characteristics. As such, the adopted model relaxes the linearity 
assumption in a particular way, and maintains linearity within each partitioning. 
Furthermore, coefficients and the standard errors of the Ohlson (1995) model may be 
biased due to omitted variables and heteroskedasticity respectively (White, 1980; Brown 
et al., 1999). To addresses these issues given the international sample of this thesis, the 
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Ohlson’s model (1995) on the spirit of a changes specification and using per share 
amounts along with robust standard errors using White-adjusted t-statistics is adopted in 
this thesis.  
This thesis is also limited by the nature of the sample requirements. The sample only 
considers publicly listed US and EU banks. The homogeneity of banking sectors implies 
that a stronger set of controls can be used in this international study. However, the 
conclusion of this thesis may not be reflective of the situation that might prevail in some 
other sectors or other countries. As other countries and sectors adopted IFRS2 or its 
equivalent FAS123R, the opportunity to increase and diverse the sample still exist. 
 Lastly, this thesis covers the period from 2004 to 2011. One may argue that the results 
may be driven by the effect of 2008 financial crisis. To alleviate this possible bias in the 
reported findings, the thesis also controls for the effect of 2008 the financial crisis. The 
effect of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on banks’ selected measures is 
reported on a yearly basis. The change in the magnitude of the recognised expense of 
SOBC is also compared with and without the crisis period. The main analysis of the value 
relevance models are also run including and excluding the 2008 financial crisis period. 
4.6 Summary  
The aim of the chapter was to choose the relevant research paradigm and to develop the 
related methodological choices that underpin this thesis. The positive approach is adopted 
to examine and analyse the interrelation between the disclosure versus the recognition 
approach to expensing the estimated fair value of SOBC, and each of market and 
accounting selected variables, across various financial reporting settings, and over two 
consequent periods of investigation. The greater degree of objectivity, independence and 
the scientific nature of the highly structured methodologies make the positivist approach 
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more appropriate to answer the research questions of this thesis. Using the positivist 
approach to underpin this thesis also increases the ability to replicate and generalise the 
findings as well as compare them with previous studies. Furthermore, the time, cost, and 
access constraints of this study encourage the implementation of the quantitative 
positivist approach. 
 The thesis also adopts the deductive reasoning as the most consistent characteristic of 
the extant positive research conducted on this field (see for instance Rees and Stott, 2001; 
Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 2004a; Niu and Xu, 2009). The quantitative methods are also 
believed to be more relevant to the positive approach in general and hence to answer the 
given research questions. The first research question that identifies and analyses, 
compares, and evaluates the impact of expensing SOBC on banks’ financial indicators is 
tested using experimental designs which are standard research approaches in the existing 
literature (e.g. Botosan and Plumlee, 2001; Street and Cereola, 2004; Chalmers and 
Godfrey, 2005; Schroeder and Schauer, 2008; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010). Both 
traditional materiality thresholds used by earlier literature, and statistical tests are mainly 
used to assess the effect on a sample of publicly listed EU and US banks over the period 
2004-2011. The non-parametric Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (U) test/Wilcoxon signed-
rank test will be used along with their comparable parametric T tests for robustness check 
to investigate the significance of the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected 
performance measures statistically, and whether this effect significantly varies between 
EU and US banks and within each block separately. 
A set of control variables is used to complement the analysis after controlling for the 
possible difference in some banks’ characteristics (banks’ size and banks’ growth 
opportunity), and operational structure (commercial banks and bank-holding companies) 
within and between the EU and US banks. Kruskal–Wallis test along with one-way 
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analysis of variance (ANOVA) for robustness check are used to examine the effect of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance measures within each sample after 
controlling for banks’ characteristics. 
With respect to the value relevance and information content of the recognition versus the 
disclosure approach to the fair value of SOBC, the thesis utilises the return model of 
Ohlson (1996). This model is based on the idea that accounting information is considered 
value relevant and reliable when it has a statistical association with equity returns or 
market value (Barth el al., 2001). Furthermore, following Ball et al., (2000), the study 
also utilises the two-way and three-way moderation technique (difference in differences) 
to test whether the coefficient estimates of expensing SOBC vary across different levels 
of comparisons used in the analysis. 
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Chapter 5: Findings on the impact of expensing SOBC on selected banks’ 
performance measures 
5.1 Introduction 
The first research question of this thesis aims to identify, analyse, compare, and evaluate 
the total effect of mandatory expensing of SOBC on selected performance measures of 
banks that operate across a wider international setting and different periods of 
investigation. This chapter presents and discusses the empirical results of this research 
question. The next section of this chapter presents the descriptive statistics. The third 
section starts with identifying the percentage of the recognised expense of SOBC in 
accordance with IFRS2/FAS123R relative to different accounting performance measures. 
It also present the distribution of this percentage within each of the US and EU banking 
sectors separately, and further distinguishes between that in their BHCs and CBs. The 
fourth section of this chapter presents the findings of evaluating the effect of SOBC 
expensing on ROA, ROE, Diluted EPS, and CIR over the time period of this study (2004-
2011) using the traditional materiality threshold utilised by the earlier literature. The 
impact is reported based on the average for post implementation years and based on 
individual years to investigate the extent in the effect change over the pre and post 
implementation period. The fifth section explores the significance of the effect of 
IFRS2/FAS123R using statistical tests instead of utilising the materiality thresholds used 
in earlier literature As an additional and supplementary analysis, the difference in the 
change (∆) of the selected performance measures over the period, 2004-2005 for EU 
banks and 2005-2006 for US banks, due exclusively to the mandatory introduction of 
IFRS2/FAS123R is also reported in this section. This section also presents the findings 
of investigating whether the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R has reduced the recognised 
expense of SOBC over the studied period. A comparison between the pre-adoption and 
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post-adoption period, the pre-crisis and pre-adoption period, and over the three phases of 
the post-adoption period has been also conducted to enhance the analysis and to control 
for the effect financial crisis in 2008. Finally, this section provides and discusses the 
results of the statistical impact of recognising SOBC expenses on the selected financial 
performance indicators after controlling for different characteristics of banks such as, 
size, earning growth opportunity, operational structure and the variation in their activities. 
The impact is provided for the full sample, and separately, i) for banks that operate in the US 
versus those that operate in the EU, and ii) for banks domiciled in codified-law countries 
versus common law countries. Section 6 of this chapter concludes. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics  
Table (3) identifies the descriptive characteristics of the sampled banks. The banks 
included in the sample vary in size.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistic a 
Item/ $m 
EU (274 Observations) US (609 Observations) Total (883 Observations) 
Mean  Median S.D Mean  Median S.D Mean  Median S.D 
Total Assets 686,449.5 249,891.1 936,023.9 93,207.9 8,225.3 343,925.7 277,294.2 13,615.1 654,316.8 
Net Interest Income 8,260.2 3,847.3 12,268.2 2,397.7 256.8 8,283.3 4,216.9 402.6 10,062.2 
Net Profit  2,474.8 845.9 6,440.5 523.45 57.34 2,767.79 1,128.96 82.11 4,351.54 
Operating Income  18,087.5 8,227.7 22,394.9 4,524.1 343.2 15,824.7 8,732.9 583.8 19,164.5 
Pre-tax Profit 3,280.0 979.3 7,298.7 709.61 77.47 4,071.32 1,507.23 114.56 5,415.76 
Opening Shareholders Equity (BV)  22,716.8 10,386.9 29,304.9 7,070.5 784.7 24,859.6 11,925.6 1,211.4 27,281.4 
Market Capitalization 27,400.1 12,467.1 37,722.7 8,830.6 1,163.7 28,766.5 14,592.8 1,614.8 32,935.9 
Employee No  55,017.0 23,916.0 67,263.6 15,190.3 1,638.0 50,523.2 27,548.8 2,600.0 59,159.7 
SOBC Expense 166.1 13.9 378.3 87.1 3.7 418.2 111.7 4.9 407.7 
SOBC Exp/ Staff Exp b % 1.89 1.26 2.12 4.52 3.18 4.62 3.70 2.53 4.19 
α All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined and in US currency ($) using the exchange rate at each closing period. 
b Staff expense represents wages and benefits paid to employees and officers of the company. It includes all employee wages, fixed and 
variable compensations and other benefits such as health insurance and contributions to pension plans.  
The average mean market capitalisation over the studied period is $14.6 billion ($27.4 
billion and $8.8 billion for EU and US banks respectively). Table (3) also highlights 
various proxies of size, such as total assets, opening value of shareholders’ equity and 
employee numbers. This result indicates that the EU banking sample is the larger than its 
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US counterparts. The average market value of banks in the sample is also relatively large 
compared with those of earlier studies, such as Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010), 
Chalmers and Godfrey (2005), Street and Cereola (2004) and Botosan and Plumlee 
(2001). 
The average expense of SOBC within the sample over the studied period is $111.7 
million. The average SOBC expense is $166.1 million and $87.1 million for EU and US 
banks respectively. These absolute averages indicate that the recognised expense of 
SOBC in the EU banks is larger than that of US counterparts over the studied period. 
However, because of the size difference, the larger absolute SOBC expense in the EU 
banks does not necessarily mean that they use SOBC more than US banks. The ratio of 
SOBC expenses relative to staff costs indicates that US banks use options more than their 
EU counter-parts. The mean (median) of option expenses relative to staff costs over the 
studied period is 4.5% (3.2%) in US banks compared to 1.9% (1.3%) in EU banks. This 
suggests that US banking sector uses SOBC grants in employees’ compensation packages 
more than twice than its EU counterpart. The following sections clarify this issue in more 
detail. 
5.3 Impact of expense recognition on key performance indicators: 
Table (4) identifies the percentage of SOBC expense recognised in accordance with 
IFRS2/FAS123R in respect to several variables used in prior studies (Shiwakoti and 
Rutherford, 2010; Schroeder and Schauer, 2008; Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Street and 
Cereola, 2004; Botosan and Plumlee, 2001). 
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Table 4: SOBC expense recognition relative to key variables for the studied period 
combined a 
Item 
EU % US % Total % 
Obvs Mean  Median S.D Obvs Mean  Median S.D Obvs Mean  Median S.D 
SOBC Exp Relative to Total Assets 274 0.02 0.01 0.02 609 0.06 0.04 0.06 883 0.05 0.03 0.05 
SOBC Exp Relative to Net Interest Income 274 1.41 0.73 2.17 609 2.01 1.40 2.16 883 1.82 1.18 2.18 
SOBC Exp Relative to Operating Income 274 0.57 0.28 0.90 609 1.40 0.96 1.76 883 1.14 0.74 1.59 
SOBC Exp Relative to Adjusted Pre-tax Profit 244 3.02 1.52 4.77 519 6.12 3.50 8.08 763 5.13 2.76 7.33 
SOBC Exp Relative to Adjusted Pre-tax Loss  30 6.22 0.92 9.90 90 8.57 3.87 9.69 120 7.98 3.36 9.76 
SOBC Exp Relative to Opening Shareholders’ equity 274 0.51 0.23 0.75 609 0.66 0.49 0.64 883 0.61 0.42 0.68 
SOBC Exp Relative to Market Capitalization 274 0.43 0.17 0.81 609 0.76 0.34 3.69 883 0.66 0.29 3.10 
α All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined and in US currency ($) using the exchange rate at each closing period. 
All the reported figures are also winsorised at 2%.  
 
5.3.1 SOBC expense recognition in respect of total assets  
Table (4) shows that the mean (median) of recognised expense of SOBC represents on 
average 0.05% (0.03%) of banks total assets; and 0.02% (0.01%) and 0.06% (0.04%) for 
EU and US banks respectively. This result suggests that the US banking sector uses 
SOBC more, compared with their EU counterpart relative to their total assets. The result 
also shows immaterial impact on total assets using the materiality threshold of 0.5% used 
in earlier studies (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2005; Shiwakoti and Rutherford, 2010). Table 
5 (A) presents the distribution of the recognised expense of SOBC relative to total assets 
over the sample, suggesting that the impact is immaterial in all groups apart from one US 
BHC using the 0.5% threshold.  
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Table 5 Panel (A): Distribution of SOBC expenses relative to different accounting measures. 
Description α 
EU US Total 
N 
Total Percent 
N 
Total 
Percent 
N 
Total 
Percent 
CBs BHCs CBs BHCs CBs BHCs 
Distribution of SOBC expenses relative to total assets 
0≥0.5% 184 90 274 100 89 519 608 99.84 273 609 882 99.89 
0.5%≥5% 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.16 0 1 1 0.11 
5%+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 184 90 274 100 89 520 609 100 273 610 883 100 
Distribution of SOBC expenses relative to adjusted pre-tax profit 
0≥5% 145 59 204 83.60 32 305 337 64.93 177 364 541 70.90 
5%≥10% 14 11 25 10.25 11 90 101 19.46 25 101 126 16.51 
10%+ 9 6 15 6.15 16 65 81 15.61 25 71 96 12.59 
Total 168 76 244 100 59 460 519 100 227 536 763 100 
Distribution of SOBC expenses relative to adjusted pre-tax loss 
0≥5% 14 7 21 70.00 13 37 50 55.56 27 44 71 59.17 
5%≥10% 0 3 3 10.00 4 9 13 14.44 4 12 16 13.33 
10%+ 2 4 6 20.00 13 14 27 30.00 15 18 33 27.50 
Total 16 14 30 100 30 60 90 100 46 74 120 100 
Distribution of SOBC expenses relative to opening shareholders’ equity 
0≥0.5% 144 53 197 71.90 40 271 311 51.07 184 324 508 57.53 
0.5%≥5% 40 37 77 28.10 49 248 297 48.77 89 285 374 42.36 
5%+ 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0.16 0 1 1 0.11 
Total 184 90 274 100 89 520 609 100 273 610 883 100 
Table 5 Panel (B): Distribution of SOBC expenses relative to ROA, ROE, DEPS and CIR. 
Description 
EU US Total 
N 
Total Percent 
N 
Total 
Percent 
N 
Total 
Percent 
CBs BHCs CBs BHCs CBs BHCs 
Distribution of SOBC expensing effect on ROA 
0≥5% 142 57 199 80.89 23 235 258 49.71 165 292 457 59.74 
5%≥10% 9 9 18 7.32 16 127 143 27.55 25 136 161 21.05 
10%+ 20 9 29 11.79 21 97 118 22.74 41 106 147 19.22 
Total 171 75 246 100 60 459 519 100 231 534 765 100 
Distribution of SOBC expensing effect on ROE 
0≥5% 142 57 199 80.89 23 235 258 49.71 165 292 457 59.74 
5%≥10% 9 9 18 7.32 16 127 143 27.55 25 136 161 21.05 
10%+ 20 9 29 11.79 21 97 118 22.74 41 106 147 19.22 
Total 171 75 246 100 60 459 519 100 231 534 765 100 
Distribution of SOBC expensing effect on EPS (Diluted) 
0≥5% 136 53 189 77.46 20 224 244 48.03 156 277 433 57.58 
5%≥10% 10 12 22 9.02 17 119 136 26.77 27 131 158 21.01 
10%+ 24 9 33 13.52 22 106 128 25.20 46 115 161 21.41 
Total 170 74 244 100 59 449 508 100 229 523 751 100 
Distribution of SOBC expensing effect on CIR 
0≥5% 178 87 265 96.72 74 474 548 89.98 252 561 813 92.07 
5%≥10% 6 3 9 3.28 14 35 49 8.05 20 38 58 6.57 
10%+ 0 0 0 0 1 11 12 1.97 1 11 12 1.36 
Total 184 90 274 100 89 520 609 100 273 610 883 100 
α Results are reported for the post-adoption years combined 
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5.3.2 SOBC expenses relative to adjusted pre-tax income and loss 
Table 5 (A) shows the sample banks reporting pre-tax profits in their annual reports during 
the studied period and reveals that 763 and 120 of the sample observations are pre-tax profits 
and losses respectively. Over the studied period, one Irish bank had a pre-tax loss in 2008 
and owing solely to the mandatory recognition of SOBC expense. Two US banks were 
similarly in this position in 2010 and 2011. Means (medians) of SOBC expense represents 
on average 5.13% (2.76%) of pre-tax profit, 3.02% (1.52%) and 6.12% (3.5%) for EU and 
US banks that reported pre-tax profit respectively (see table 4). The result also shows an 
average impact on pre-tax profits that slightly exceed the 5% materiality level for US banks, 
and fall slightly below the materiality level for EU banks. This also suggests that SOBC 
expense relative to pre-tax profit is more than twice in the US compared to that in the EU. 
The result for EU banks is relatively similar to the 4.1% immaterial mean option expense 
relative to pre-tax profit reported by Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010). The result for US 
banks is, however, relatively lower than those of Schroeder and Schauer (2008) who reported 
a reduction of 15.91% in pre-tax profit owing to the FAS123R adoption in the US. 
Furthermore, the result is also different from those of Street and Cereola (2004) who reported 
a material impact over seven countries amounting to 38.95%. That is, the average impact on 
pre-tax profit is to a major extent smaller than that reported or estimated at the launch of 
IFRS2/FAS123R, particularly in the US.  
Table 5 (A) supplements the analysis by presenting distribution of SOBC expenses relative 
to all sample observations that were pre-tax profits over the post implantation period. It 
shows that the recognised expense of SOBC relative the pre-tax profit exceeded the 5% of 
materiality test only for 29.1% of the total sample of banks (35.07% and 16.4% of the US 
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and EU sample respectively). Table 3 also shows that the mean expense of SOBC relative to 
pre-tax loss is 7.98%, (6.22% and 8.57 % for EU and US banks respectively). Table 5 (A) 
presents also the analysis for all of the pre-tax losses in the sample observations over the post 
implementation period. It shows that the recognised expense of SOBC relative the pre-tax 
loss exceeded the 5% materiality test across 40.83% of the total sample of banks (44.44% 
and 30% of the US and EU sample respectively). 
That is, the impact of SOBC expenses on pre-tax profit is relatively higher than the 5% 
materiality threshold used in earlier studies for the US sample but not for the EU sample. In 
terms of the effect of option expenses on pre-tax loss, it is material in both regions (the US 
and EU). This result is similar to what Schroeder and Schauer (2008, p.303) reported that 
‘companies reporting net losses had material amounts of stock compensation costs’. That is, 
the concerns of the opponents of SFAS123R/IFRS2 in terms of the effect on pre-tax loss 
were to some extent valid. Yet the average impact on pre-tax profit due to mandatory 
adoption of SFAS123R/IFRS2 is not as severe as expected and it is slightly above the 5% of 
for US banks (slightly below for EU banks). 
5.3.3 SOBC expenses as a percentage of opening shareholders’ equity 
Table (4) shows that the mean (median) of the recognised expense of SOBC represents 
0.61% (0.42%) relative to banks’ opening shareholders’ equity (0.51% (0.23%), and 0.66% 
(0.49%)) for EU and US banks respectively. The results show an average impact on opening 
shareholders’ equity that slightly exceeds the 0.5% materiality level for US and EU banks. 
Yet the corresponding median 0.42%, (0.23% and 0.49% for EU and US banks respectively) 
shows that the effect falls slightly below the 0.5% materiality threshold used in earlier studies 
for the majority of our sample banks. The finding is relatively different from those reported 
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in earlier studies, such as Street and Cereola (2004) and Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010). 
Table 5 (A) also shows that impact on opening shareholders’ equity exceeded the 0.5% 
materiality threshold across 42.47% of the total sample banks (48.93% and 28.1% of the US 
and EU sample respectively). That is, the recognised expense of SOBC relative to banks’ 
opening shareholders’ equity falls slightly below the 0.5% materiality level for the majority 
of the EU and US sample banks. 
5.4 Impact of SOBC expensing on ROA, ROE, Diluted EPS, and CIR 
Table 6 (A) presents the effect of expensing the fair value of SOBC on the selected 
performance measures, namely the ROA, ROE, Diluted EPS, and CIR, together with the 
magnitude of the recognised expense relative to opening shareholders’ equity. The impact is 
also reported based on average for post implementation years along with individual years to 
investigate the extent in the effect change over the pre and post implementation period. Pre-
adoption period data has been manually extracted from the first year adoption comparative 
figures or the pro-forma disclosure regarding the impact of SOBC expense. The effect is 
ascertained as the difference between the reported and adjusted ratios for SOBC expensing. 
Following earlier literature, the 5% materiality threshold is applied to assess the impact on 
ROA, ROE, DEPS, while the 0.5% materiality level is applied in respect to opening 
shareholders’ equity. A 1% materiality threshold will be employed to assess the materiality 
of the impact on cost to income ratio.  
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Table (6) Panel (A): The effect of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures.     
Financial ratios b 
EU US Total 
N mean median S.D N mean median S.D N mean median S.D 
Return on assets (ROA) 
                        
Difference α 274 0.02 0.01 0.02 609 0.06 0.04 0.05 883 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported ROA 
246 3.76 1.98 5.04 519 9.55 5.06 15.02 765 7.69 3.96 12.98 
Return on equity (ROE)                         
Difference 274 0.42 0.22 0.54 609 0.59 0.47 0.48 883 0.54 0.40 0.50 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported ROE 
246 3.76 1.98 5.04 519 9.55 5.06 15.02 765 7.69 3.96 12.98 
Eearnings per share (Diluted)                         
Difference 274 7.93 2.01 16.7 609 9.96 6.27 10.07 883 9.33 5.26 12.57 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported EPS (Diluted) 
244 4.23 2.14 5.84 508 9.32 5.31 12.63 752 7.67 4.06 11.15 
Cost to income ratio                         
Difference 274 0.64 0.38 0.75 609 1.30 0.97 1.12 883 1.10 0.77 1.06 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported CIR 
274 1.04 0.61 1.20 609 2.12 1.61 1.77 883 1.79 1.24 1.69 
                          
Option expense as a percentage 
of opening shareholders’ equity 
274 0.51 0.23 0.75 609 0.66 0.49 0.64 883 0.61 0.42 0.68 
α Difference is calculated as an absolute difference between used ratios adjusted for SOBC expenses and those reported in the annual financial reporting. The difference is measured in 
cents while other differences are measured in percentages. However, differences as a percentage is calculated as follow: ratios adjusted for SOBC expenses minus reported ratio and the 
difference is divided by reported ratio. The impact of stock option expense on ROE in percentage mirrors the impact observed on ROA. Botosan and Plumlee (2001) reported that the 
impact of stock option expense on total net income, basic EPS, and E/P ratios in parentage mirrors the impact observed on diluted EPS and ROA. 
b All reported figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined and winsorised at 2%. Return on assets (ROA) is profit after tax and extraordinary items to average total assets. 
Diluted earning per share (DEPS) is measured by profit attributable to equity shareholders to the weighted average numbers of shares on issue plus dilution shares. Return on equity 
(ROE) is calculated as net profit after tax divided by average shareholders’ equity excluding non-controlling interests. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is a bank’s operating costs relative to 
its total net interest and non-interest income (Christian, et al., 2008). 
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  Table (6): Panel (B): The individual yearly impact of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures in the EU sample. 
Financial ratios 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D 
Return on assets (ROA)                                                                 
Difference 34 0.02 0.01 0.02 36 0.02 0.01 0.02 38 0.03 0.02 0.02 41 0.02 0.01 0.02 41 0.01 0.01 0.01 42 0.01 0.01 0.02 39 0.02 0.01 0.02 37 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported ROA 
33 2.83 1.83 3.30 35 2.71 1.96 2.53 38 3.19 1.84 4.02 41 2.83 1.40 3.90 33 3.56 2.06 4.61 34 5.09 2.29 5.69 36 3.63 1.52 4.97 29 5.96 2.58 8.25 
Return on equity (ROE)                                                                 
Difference 34 0.54 0.32 0.73 36 0.50 0.32 0.64 38 0.68 0.40 0.82 41 0.43 0.27 0.43 41 0.25 0.19 0.26 42 0.41 0.18 0.56 39 0.35 0.14 0.53 37 0.33 0.12 0.47 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported ROE  
33 2.83 1.83 3.30 35 271 1.96 2.53 38 3.19 1.84 4.02 41 2.83 1.40 3.90 33 3.56 2.06 4.61 34 5.09 2.29 5.69 36 3.63 1.52 4.97 29 5.96 2.58 8.25 
Earnings per share (Diluted)                                                                 
Difference 34 3.91 2.70 3.85 36 8.26 3.17 15.11 38 11.09 3.82 19.12 41 6.36 3.02 6.32 41 3.75 1.49 5.39 42 9.87 1.12 23.91 39 8.92 1.08 20.53 37 7.49 1.39 17.06 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported EPS (Diluted) 
33 3.71 2.16 4.70 35 2.99 2.23 2.72 38 3.51 2.07 4.22 41 3.00 1.68 3.99 33 3.59 2.06 4.62 34 6.60 2.83 7.53 35 4.15 1.35 6.17 28 6.58 2.71 9.40 
Cost to income ratio (CIR)                                                                 
Difference 34 0.66 0.29 0.95 36 0.65 0.53 0.56 38 0.81 0.53 0.79 41 0.65 0.37 0.65 41 0.46 0.36 0.46 42 0.57 0.38 0.65 39 0.71 0.27 1.02 37 0.68 0.28 0.97 
Differences as a percentage of 
reported CIR 
34 1.06 0.51 1.45 36 1.09 0.82 0.99 38 1.43 0.97 1.38 41 1.13 0.68 1.14 41 0.66 0.54 0.67 42 0.87 0.55 0.96 39 1.10 0.48 1.52 37 1.04 0.46 1.47 
                                                                  
Option expense as a percentage 
of opening shareholders’ equity 
34 0.63 0.34 0.98 36 0.58 0.32 0.73 38 0.82 0.49 1.00 41 0.58 0.37 0.77 41 0.30 0.18 0.55 42 0.55 0.22 0.80 39 0.39 0.15 0.68 37 0.34 0.12 0.57 
Table (6): Panel (C): The individual yearly impact of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures in the US sample 
Financial ratios 
2004 α 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D n mean median S.D 
Return on assets (ROA)                                                                 
Difference         93 0.11 0.09 0.07 99 0.06 0.05 0.05 102 0.07 0.05 0.05 102 0.06 0.05 0.05 102 0.06 0.04 0.04 102 0.05 0.04 0.04 102 0.05 0.04 0.03 
Differences as a percentage 
of reported ROA 
        92 8.76 5.35 9.41 97 5.24 3.98 4.98 98 11.02 4.74 18.19 80 13.11 6.19 16.43 69 14.14 5.32 26.56 82 8.62 5.92 8.37 93 6.83 5.72 4.97 
Return on equity (ROE)                                                                 
Difference         93 0.91 0.76 0.61 99 0.61 0.53 0.50 102 0.64 0.51 0.48 120 0.64 0.48 0.52 102 0.59 0.44 0.51 102 0.55 0.43 0.43 102 0.53 0.43 0.39 
Differences as a percentage 
of reported ROE  
        92 8.76 5.35 9.41 97 5.24 3.98 4.98 98 11.02 4.74 18.19 80 13.11 6.19 16.43 69 14.14 5.32 26.56 82 8.62 5.92 8.37 93 6.83 5.72 4.97 
Eearning per share (Diluted)                                                                 
Difference         93 13.12 10.21 10.23 99 10.22 5.82 11.82 102 10.89 6.50 10.85 102 10.93 6.72 10.44 102 9.46 6.23 9.08 102 8.78 5.91 8.47 102 9.50 6.52 9.52 
Differences as a percentage 
of reported EPS (Diluted) 
        92 8.74 5.35 9.43 97 5.21 3.80 4.97 98 11.13 4.71 18.28 79 12.70 6.04 15.69 65 11.79 5.41 14.98 78 9.25 6.04 9.09 91 7.12 5.72 5.23 
Cost to income ratio (CIR)                                                                 
Difference         93 1.93 1.31 1.71 99 1.26 1.05 1.02 102 1.53 1.08 1.37 102 1.56 1.00 1.45 102 1.18 0.86 0.96 102 1.13 0.85 0.86 102 1.16 0.95 0.81 
Differences as a percentage 
of reported CIR 
        93 3.84 2.64 3.57 99 2.23 1.73 1.84 102 2.48 1.79 2.06 102 2.36 1.60 2.04 102 1.97 1.41 1.69 102 1.84 1.29 1.46 102 1.87 1.42 1.37 
                                                                  
Option expense as a 
percentage of opening 
shareholders’ equity 
        93 1.01 0.81 0.83 99 0.71 0.57 0.67 102 0.68 0.55 0.58 102 0.70 0.50 0.67 102 0.66 0.47 0.66 102 0.63 0.47 0.79 102 0.56 0.45 0.44 
α The pre-adoption year for the US sample is 2005, whereas it is 2004 for the EU sample because the mandatory IFRS2 was first applied to accounting periods starting 1st January 
2005, whereas FAS123 commenced on reporting periods beginning after June 15, 2005, which implies that financial reporting statements for 2006 is the first adoption year. 
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Table 6 (A) shows that the average impact of IFRS2 on the selected performance measures 
in the EU sample falls a little below the 5 % materiality thresholds for ROA, ROE and DEPS, 
while this impact is around the materiality thresholds for rest of the selected variables. It also 
shows that the effect in the US sample falls above the materiality thresholds for all the 
selected performance measures, and it is more than twice of that in the EU sample.  
Table 6 (B) (C) shows that the impact of the standards on the selected performance measures 
in the pre-adoption period (2004 for the EU sample and 2005 for the US sample) is more 
than that in the first adoption year (2005 for the EU sample and 2006 for the US sample). 
This may be due to the fact that banks accelerated the vesting condition of SOBC grants to 
avoid recognising standing unvested grants using the fair value approach in the first-year 
adoption in their financial reporting (Choudhary et al., 2009). Table 6 (B) also shows that 
until 2008, all differences’ percentages in the EU banks are less than their related materiality 
thresholds, indicating immaterial effects on the studied performance indicators. On the other 
hand, the majority of differences’ percentages in 2009 slightly exceed the materiality level 
in the EU sample, indicating a modest effect over this year on the selected performance 
indicators.  
In the US sample, the mean effect on the majority of differences’ percentages is also higher 
in 2009 compared to that in previous years. This position (with a gradually increasing effect) 
can be due to the settlement that took place at the end period of the payment cycle which 
usually takes from three to five years if a bank granted a fixed level of SOBC annually 
(Botosan and Plumlee, 2001). However, the effect of SOBC expenses did not stabilise 
afterwards. Rather, it decreased dramatically in 2010 compared to that in 2009 in both 
samples. 
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This situation might also raise another possible reason given the negative effect of the 2008 
global financial crisis on performance measures of the majority of the banks. The mean 
(median) of some measures (ROA, ROE, DEPS) that are usually used along with the market 
performance measures, such as the share price, as mixed targets to exercise SOBC grants 
noticeably drop down in 2008 and 2009 compared to those reported in 20071. Vesting 
conditions of performance SOBC grants that are issued previous years had also been 
consequently influenced by this reduction in performance indicators in 2008. Banks, 
therefore, might had decided to defer the decision to cancel (or more probably to modify) the 
early specified onerous vesting conditions to new ones that are more realistic which reflect 
the negative impact of the crisis and may be easier to attain in the near future, more likely 
2009. Such a deferral helps banks to delay the incremental cost (from 2008 to 2009) incurred 
under the FAS123R/IFRS2 accounting requirements in the case of modifying performance 
vesting conditions or cancelling the earlier issued grants. The current standards require firms 
to accelerate the expense of these grants and immediately recognise the remaining amount 
that it otherwise would have recognised over the remaining period in the case of cancellation. 
In the case of modifying the vesting conditions of earlier issued grants, firms are also required 
to recognise, as a minimum, the cost of the original grant if it were not modified. However, 
if the modification of SOBC vesting conditions increases the fair value of the grants (more 
probably to happen when releasing the vesting conditions), firms are required to spread the 
additional cost over the period from the modification to the new vesting date. Furthermore, 
the management of banks may introduce a decision to delay the exercise date of modified 
                                                          
1 In 2008 the reported ROA, ROA, and DEPS in the EU sample, drop down by 92% (61%), 99% (58%), and 83% (64%) 
respectively compared 2007. In 2009 these measures also drop down by 75% (70%), 72% (69%) and 64 (49%) compared 
to 2007 reported measures 
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awards, consequently the incremental cost, to the next year(s) and allow employees to 
exercise these awards instead of cancelling them. This decision helps banks to increase the 
reported earnings or lessen the reported loss in 2008 and also stand behinds the increase of 
the options expense impact in 2009. Both accounting and market based measures that are 
mainly used as option vesting conditions increased in 2009 compared to 2008 and may have 
potentially caused the increase of the SOBC expense and its impact on the selected 
performance measures. The same explanations can be applied to the US sample as well, 
where average effect of FAS123R on the selected performance measures is relatively high 
in 20092 (see table 6 (C)).  
In 2010, the impact returned to its normal level for the EU and the US sample respectively. 
In 2011, the impact of SOBC expenses grew up in the EU sample again compared with that 
in the other years. This also could be owing to the same scenarios mentioned above given 
the reported figures in 2011 are less than those reported in 2010 and 2009. In the US, all 
differences’ percentages in 2010 and 2011 slightly went down compared to the average 
impact over the studied period. Such a decline might imply the effect of earlier cautions that 
firms would curtail using SOBC grants and use different means to compensate their 
employees starts to appear after completing the first options cycle in the post-adoption 
period. This matter is also apparent from the slight decline 2010 and 2011 for both samples 
in the percentage of SOBC expense to opening shareholders’ equity from the average 
percentage over the studies period. This issue is investigated more in section 5.5 and using 
statistical tests.  
                                                          
2 In the US, a similar situation took place. In 2008 the reported measures in the US sample, drop down by 88% (38%), 96% 
(36%), and 95% (33%) respectively compared 2007. In 2009 these measures also drop down by 92% (55%), 98% (55%) 
and 76 (46%) compared to 2007 reported measures (results not reported). 
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All together, the overall and average impact on the studied performance measures in the EU 
sample is slightly below the materiality threshold for ROA, ROE and DEPS and around the 
materiality threshold for the other selected indicators. The results suggest a modest impact 
on EU banks in comparison to that in the US sample which is more than twice for the majority 
of the selected measures compared to those in the EU-counterpart. They also suggest that the 
overall impact in both the EU and the US sample is less than the predicted impact prior to 
the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R or even to that reported by earlier studies.  
5.5 Assessing the statistical impact of SOBC expenses on selected measures 
This section explores the significance of the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R using statistical tests 
instead of utilising a materiality threshold. As an additional and supplementary analysis, the 
difference in the change of the selected performance measures exclusively due to the 
introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R is also reported. Table 7 (A) shows the significance of the 
mean (median) differences between the selected reported and adjusted ratios for SOBC 
expensing using statistical tests over the post implantation years combined in both US and 
EU banks. Both WSR and T tests suggest that all differences between reported and adjusted 
ratios are statistically significant, indicating a material influence on the selected performance 
measures. The findings support the IASB/FASB argument that if SOBC expenses are not 
recognised in the income statement, the financial statements will be less transparent. 
Generally, these findings support the view of the IASB that recognition and disclosure cannot 
be viewed as equivalents or surrogates for one another. 
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Table 7 (A): The effect on selected measures with and without adjustment for SOBC expenses over post and pre adoption period. 
  EU Banks over the post adoption period US Banks over the post adoption period 
Descriptions ROA α ROE α Diluted EPS α CIR  PBT  ROA α ROE α Diluted EPS α CIR  PBT 
Mean Adjusted 0.56 10.78 191.44 63.86 3446.14 0.67 5.83 110.57 65.34 796.72 
Mean Not Adjusted 0.54 10.36 183.51 63.21 3280.05 0.61 5.23 100.61 64.04 709.61 
T test for mean differences 
b
  14.74*** 11.36*** 5.1*** 11.2*** 7.27*** 24.5*** 26.9*** 20.7*** 20.4*** 5.14*** 
                      
Median Adjusted 0.55 11.86 105.5 61.7 996.65 0.87 8.89 107.37 63.47 82.7 
Median Not Adjusted 0.54 11.64 103.49 61.06 979.25 0.83 8.42 101.1 62.17 77.47 
WSR test for mean differences
 b
  14.06*** 13.85*** 13.67*** 13.91*** 13.75*** 21.37*** 21.38*** 21.36*** 21.37*** 21.37*** 
  EU Banks over the pre adoption period US Banks over the pre adoption period 
Mean Adjusted 0.68 20.38 229.49 64.33 4134.35 1.76 14.65 213.9 56.28 1337.66 
Mean Not Adjusted 0.66 19.84 225.58 63.75 4013.85 1.65 13.74 200.78 54.35 1272.23 
T test for mean differences
 b
 4.47*** 3.78*** 1.59* 3.98*** 2.31** 8.58*** 11.39*** 10.11*** 10.52*** 2.36** 
                 
Median Adjusted 0.7 16.68 103.12 61.59 1435.31 1.58 14.01 183.58 57.72 107.54 
Median Not Adjusted 0.69 16.36 100.42 61.01 1423.66 1.49 13.25 173.37 56.41 105.99 
WSR test for mean differences
 b
 5.08*** 5.08*** 5.86*** 5.1*** 5.08*** 8.37*** 8.38*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 
                      
Table 7 (B): The difference in the change of the selected performance measures exclusively due to the introduction of 
IFRS2/FAS123R 
EU Banks (2004-2005) US Banks (2005-2006) 
Descriptions ∆ROA% ∆ROE% ∆DEPS% ∆CIR% ∆PBT% ∆ROA% ∆ROE% ∆DEPS% ∆CIR% ∆PBT% 
Mean Difference in the change
 c
 3.51 3.49 5.61 1.08 5.59 4.89 5.62 5.85 2.61 5.45 
T test for mean differences 
b
 3.54*** 3.47*** 3.19*** 5.63*** 1.89* 6.71*** 6.76*** 7.51*** 9.04*** 4.31*** 
                      
Median Difference in the change 2.02 2.02 3.21 0.75 1.73 3.19 3.8 4.13 1.82 3.09 
WSR test for median difference
 b
 5.08*** 5.08*** 5.86*** 5.1*** 5.08*** 8.37*** 8.38*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 8.37*** 
a
 :ROA, ROE and DEPS are in cents. 
b
: *, ** and *** signify signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively 
c 
: The difference in change reflects the difference in the change of the reported ratios without and with adjusting for SOBC expense in the first adoption year.  
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Table 7 (B) also highlights that the average difference in the change (∆) of the selected 
performance measures over the period, 2004-2005 for EU banks and 2005-2006 for US 
banks, exclusively due to the mandatory introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R. It shows a 
reduction in the change of these measures that falls around their related traditional materiality 
thresholds, used in earlier studies. Also both the T and WSR tests indicate that this reduction 
was statistically significantly material. Again, the impact is still modest compared to that 
predicted by the majority of related existing literature. To further investigate whether the 
adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R has reduced the use of SOBC grants over the studied period, 
the sample has been divided into four distinctive periods: i) Pre-adoption period 2004 and 
2005 for EU and US banks respectively ii) pre-global financial crisis period: from the first 
adoption of the IFRS2/FAS123R until 2007; iii) the global financial crisis in 2008; iv) the 
post global financial crisis years from 2009 until 2011. A comparison between the pre-
adoption and post-adoption period, the pre-crisis and pre-adoption period, and over the three 
phases of the post-adoption period has been also conducted to enhance the analysis and 
control for the effect financial crisis in 2008. The SOBC expense in both absolute values and 
relative to total staff expense is compared over these periods in table (8).  
The results indicate that the mean (median) SOBC expense in absolute values did not vary 
significantly over the pre and the post adoption period in both samples. Table (8) also shows 
that there had been increase in the mean (median) SOBC expense in absolute values over the 
pre-adoption and the pre-crisis period, yet such an increase is insignificant at the 5% level. 
The change is also redundant and insignificant over the studied period using the absolute 
values.  
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Table 8: Comparison of SOBC expense and SOBC expense relative to staff expense over the studied period using T and U test. 
Year / Description 
SOBC Exp (EU)  SOBC Exp/ Staff Exp
 b
 (EU)  SOBC Exp (US)  SOBC Exp/ Staff Exp (US)  
Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median Mean  Median 
pre-adoption 120.5 16.35 1.6 0.96 65.43 4.56 6.25 4.59 
post-adoption 166.1 13.87 1.89 1.26 87.11 3.6 4.52 3.18 
A-pre-crisis 147.9 25.24 2.07 1.52 81.94 2.95 4.63 3.29 
B-2008 122.37 8.89 1.47 1.03 83.8 3.79 4.91 3.39 
C- post-crisis 199.02 9.13 1.87 1.08 91.61 3.89 4.31 3.07 
                  
T (U) test for median (mean) differences 
(post vs pre-adoption)
 a
 
0.81 -0.01 0.87 0.61 0.67 -1.73* -2.83*** -3.81*** 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences 
(pre-crisis vs pre-adoption) 
0.45 0.76 1.91* 1.95* 1.01 2.04** -2.47** -2.93*** 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences 
(2008 vs pre-crisis) 
-0.41 -1.73* -3.31*** -2.63*** 0.48 0.7 0.69 0.36 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences 
(post-crisis vs 2008) 
1.18 0.8 0.98 0.59 0.16 0.13 -1.11 1.25 
T (U) test for median (mean) differences 
(post-crisis vs pre-crisis) 
1.02 -1.63 -0.71 -2.5** 0.26 1.09 -1.48 -0.99 
a
 *, ** and *** signify signiﬁcant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
b 
Staff expenses include employees’ salaries, benefits and compensations. 
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However, relative to total staff expense, SOBC expense had significantly decreased in the 
US bank over the pre-adoption and post-adoption period, and the pre-crisis and pre-adoption 
period, respectively at the 5% level. This result potentially indicates that accelerating the 
vesting condition of SOBC grants, to avoid recognising standing unvested grants using the 
fair value approach in the first-year adoption is more significant in the US sample compared 
with EU banks.  
Table (8) also shows that another common decrease, yet insignificant, in SOBC expenses 
relative to total staff expense started to appear in the post crisis period (2009-2011) in both 
samples. This indicates that the full impact of the early predicted reduction in using SOBC 
grants due to the compulsory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R came to light after the first option 
cycle in the post-adoption period is over. That is, employees fears that companies would 
reduce SOBC programs due to the mandatorily adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R started to 
reflect its effect on the SOBC expense after finishing the first post-adoption option cycle. 
Finally, table (8) shows that SOBC expense relative to total staff expense significantly 
decreases in 2008 compared to pre-crisis period in the EU sample. Interestingly, the main 
reason standing behind this significant decrease in SOBC expense in 2008, particularly in 
the EU sample is the cash-settled based expense. 
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Figure (1) shows that in 2008, cash-settled expense dropped down dramatically, particularly 
in the EU sample. Given the negative effect of the crisis on the majority of accounting and 
market performance indicators, this reduction suggests that bank management exploited the 
opportunity to obtain advantages from the accounting requirement of the standard for cash-
based payment. Both IFRS2 and FAS123R allow companies to modify the fair value 
determined at grant date for cash-settled grants at each reporting period date and on 
settlement. Therefore, companies can even reverse the expense when option vesting 
conditions in a particular year (particularly accounting and market performance measures) 
could influence firms’ estimates of expenses in previous periods. Indeed, the stated expenses, 
particularly cash-settled based in a specific year could even become negative. This case does 
exist in the sample of this study where there are 11 observations with negative SOBC 
expenses. This accounting deficiency in the standard along with the negative effect of the 
crisis on the given performance vesting conditions helped managers to increase the reported 
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earnings or lessen the reported loss in 2008. More pointedly, banks’ management might also 
at the same time have reduced the earlier specified onerous vesting conditions to a new more 
realistic basis that is easier to attain in the near future, more likely 2009. This could be 
explained by the dramatic increase in cash-settled based expenses in 2009, particularly in the 
EU sample.  
Finally, figure (1) also shows that banks in both samples have gradually moved towards 
using cash-settled based compensation over the studied period. The mean of cash-settled 
based compensation in US banks rose from $1 million in 2005 to $9 million in 2011, whereas 
in EU banks it increased from $9.55 million in 2004 to $18 million in 2011. The main reason 
for such a movement towards cash-settled based compensation, again, could be that banks 
can modify the fair value of options granted at each reporting period date and on settlement. 
However, for equity-settled based compensation, companies are allowed to modify the fair 
value calculated at the grant date, only if the vesting conditions of option grants are non-
performance-based and they are more likely to forfeit3.51This seems to give banks an 
opportunity to obtain advantages from the accounting requirement of the standard for cash-
settled based compensation. Such an issue, therefore, should be given more consideration by 
the standard-setters to control management’s scope to modify the fair value of cash-settled 
based grants or reverse the expense in order to smooth their earnings.  
5.5.1 Size effect and the impact of SOBC expenses 
To control for banks’ size effect on the materiality of the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on 
selected performance measures, each of the EU and US samples has been divided into four 
                                                          
3 For example, if, vesting conditions are non-market performance based, banks are allowed to adjust their estimates of 
equity-based awards that will vest at every year-end, such that on the vesting date, the expense should be equal to the grant-
date fair value. 
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separate sub-samples, based on the quartiles of banks’ average total assets. The impact of 
mandatory IFRS2/FAS123R on selected performance measures according to banks’ sizes 
within each of the EU and US banks is shown in Table (9). The results indicate that the 
material effect of mandatory recognition regime of IFRS2/FAS123R in both samples is 
noticeably confined to larger banks; the larger the bank, the more the impact. The Kruskal-
Wallis test and its comparative one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) also indicates that 
the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption on the selected measures varies significantly 
between banks according to their size within each of EU and US samples. On one hand, this 
might intuitively be due to the fact that the larger the banks, the more heavily they adopt 
SOBC grants where the number of issued grants is a major factor that plays a key role in 
determining the recognised expense and therefore on its effect on the selected measures. 
Earlier studies, such as Melissa (2004) and Core and Guay, (2005) have found evidence that 
firm size has a positive and significant relationship with the use of SOBC. 
On the other hand, vesting terms and conditions also play a key role in determining the SOBC 
expense. Avraham, et al. (2012) documented evidence that the level of operational 
complexity of large banks is far more than that of small ones. This might mean that these 
conditions could also be more relaxed in larger banks due to their greater complexity, and 
therefore the expense and its effect on their selected measure are more material. This raises 
an interesting issue to be investigated by future research interested in the structure and 
motivational aspects of SOBC contracts and other related corporate governance issues. 
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Table 9: The impact of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures (size and growth effect). 
Financial ratios 
a
 Size 
EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
Growth 
EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
mean median SD mean median SD Z T mean median SD mean median SD Z T 
Earnings per share (Diluted)
 b
                                     
Differences as a percentage of reported DEPS  
Q1 3.51 1.68 5.30 11.13 3.03 17.61 -4.39*** -4.22*** Q1 3.72 2.16 4.48 6.28 3.36 9.19 -2.15** -2.01** 
Q2 2.60 2.01 4.08 7.95 5.21 10.76 -6.70*** -5.23*** Q2 3.28 2.06 5.15 8.70 4.95 10.38 -6.11*** -4.66*** 
Q3 3.52 2.18 3.54 8.84 5.61 11.23 -5.07*** -4.99*** Q3 4.49 2.33 6.15 8.37 5.47 11.12 -4.51*** -3.18*** 
Q4 7.88 4.57 8.33 9.86 6.99 10.35 -2.4..2** -1.34 Q4 5.19 2.30 6.91 15.65 8.11 18.05 -7.53*** -6.29*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  21.61*** 21.37***      7.88** 44.09***     
ANOVA, F-value  10.75*** 4.21***      1.42** 12.64***     
Return on assets (ROA)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported ROA 
Q1 2.91 1.69 4.02 11.87 3.05 21.36 -4.48*** -4.30*** Q1 3.21 2.06 3.74 6.67 3.26 14.26 -3.78*** -3.28*** 
Q2 2.49 1.54 4.30 7.81 4.97 10.70 -7.40*** -5.18*** Q2 3.29 1.48 5.68 9.26 4.82 13.81 -6.58*** -4.16*** 
Q3 3.36 2.09 3.31 8.58 5.50 12.80 -5.20*** -4.50*** Q3 3.74 2.22 4.51 8.53 5.46 13.15 -5.01*** -3.79*** 
Q4 6.78 4.12 7.02 10.57 6.87 14.57 -2.97*** -2.33** Q4 4.65 2.10 5.89 15.02 7.44 18.06 -8.14*** -4.56*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  22.30*** 24.34***      9.09** 44.30***     
ANOVA, F-value  9.70*** 4.22***      1.72** 7.08***     
Return on equity (ROE)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported ROE 
Q1 2.91 1.69 4.02 11.87 3.05 21.36 -4.48*** -4.30*** Q1 3.21 2.06 3.74 6.67 3.26 14.26 -3.78*** -3.28*** 
Q2 2.49 1.54 4.30 7.81 4.97 10.70 -7.40*** -5.18*** Q2 3.29 1.48 5.68 9.26 4.82 13.81 -6.58*** -4.16*** 
Q3 3.36 2.09 3.31 8.58 5.50 12.80 -5.20*** -4.50*** Q3 3.74 2.22 4.51 8.53 5.46 13.15 -5.01*** -3.79*** 
Q4 6.78 4.12 7.02 10.57 6.87 14.57 -2.97*** -2.33** Q4 4.65 2.10 5.89 15.02 7.44 18.06 -8.14*** -4.56*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  22.30*** 24.34***      9.09** 44.30***     
ANOVA, F-value  9.70*** 4.22***      1.72** 7.08***     
Cost to income ratio (CIR)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported CIR 
Q1 0.70 0.47 0.74 2.04 1.04 2.13 -5.45*** -6.79*** Q1 0.85 0.61 0.76 1.74 1.25 1.40 -5.80*** -1.88** 
Q2 0.53 0.42 0.49 2.11 1.63 1.72 -9.32*** -10.8*** Q2 0.64 0.48 0.78 2.16 1.72 1.59 -7.80*** -9.25*** 
Q3 1.12 0.77 1.24 2.04 1.68 1.56 -5.35*** -4.66*** Q3 1.22 0.78 1.40 2.33 1.65 2.03 -5.09*** -4.81*** 
Q4 1.94 1.42 1.58 2.30 1.72 1.64 -2.04** -1.52 Q4 1.35 0.84 1.44 2.27 1.69 1.95 -4.90*** -3.81*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  42.46*** 16.60***      13.74*** 9.03**     
ANOVA, F-value  22.97*** 0.55      5.10*** 3.48**     
                                     
Option expense as a percentage of opening shareholders’ equity 
Q1 0.29 0.17 0.34 0.57 0.37 0.73 -4.29*** -3.78*** Q1 0.31 0.23 0.37 0.66 0.47 0.64 -2.84*** -5.74*** 
Q2 0.31 0.17 0.53 0.59 0.45 0.47 -6.45*** -3.98*** Q2 0.39 0.20 0.67 0.58 0.49 0.47 -5.13*** -2.02** 
Q3 0.48 0.24 0.65 0.65 0.52 0.66 -3.76*** -1.73* Q3 0.55 0.27 0.77 0.70 0.50 0.82 -3.26*** -1.35 
Q4 1.01 0.50 1.09 0.82 0.60 0.66 -0.91 1.28 Q4 0.76 0.30 0.98 0.68 0.53 0.60 -5.03*** 0.94 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  35.35*** 32.85***      15.09*** 1.27     
ANOVA, F-value  15.15*** 4.96***      5.02*** 0.95     
α
 All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined 
b
 :ROA, ROE and DEPS are reported in cents 
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Furthermore, the mean (median) impact of FAS123R on the selected measures is material in 
the majority of US banks with the effect becoming higher in larger banks41. Whereas in the 
EU, the average impact of IFRS2 is around the materiality threshold, particularly for the 
largest sample banks (the fourth quarter). This might due to the fact that use of SOBC grants 
in US banks is relatively higher compared to that in EU banks. The Mann–Whitney U test 
and its comparative T test also shows that the impact of the expensing regime to account for 
SOBC after controlling for banks size is also significantly higher in the US banks for the 
large majority of selected performance measures compared to its EU counterpart. This might 
intuitively imply that the effect of international adoption for a highly converged treatment 
for SOBC varies significantly from one context to another based on the size and the tendency 
to use SOBC grants.  
5.5.2 Growth characteristics and the impact of SOBC expenses 
To also control for banks’ potential growth rate effect on the materiality of the impact of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on selected performance measures, each of the EU and US samples has 
been divided into four separate sub-samples, based on the quartiles of banks’ average market 
to book value. Table (9) suggest that the material effect of mandatory recognition regime of 
IFRS2/FAS123R in each of the EU and US samples is higher in more rapid growth banks 
(the 3rd and 4th Q). The Kruskal-Wallis test and its comparative one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) also suggests that the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption on the selected 
measures varies significantly between banks according to their size within each of EU and 
US samples. Chalmers and Godfrey (2005) and Dhar and De (2011) reported that the effect 
of SOBC expensing is not necessarily more significant for companies with higher potential 
                                                          
4 The means effect of FAS123R on 1st quartile in US banks is relatively the highest. However this is due to some extreme 
observations initiated by the sample division. The median effect also suggest the larger the bank, the higher the effect.  
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growth rates. Our result suggest the effect of SOBC expensing in each of the US and EU 
bank-sample varies significantly among banks according to their potential growth rates, yet 
the mean (median) impact is significantly higher in higher potential growth rates’ banks. 
That is, in both regions, banks that are more rapidly growing recognising marginally higher 
expensing. The result is in line with those of earlier studies conducted in the US by Botosan 
and Plumlee (2001), and in the UK by Shiwakoti and Rutherford (2010). The U test and its 
comparative T test also show that the impact of expensing regime of SOBC grants after 
controlling for banks’ potential growth rate is also significantly higher in the US banks 
compared with EU banks.  
5.5.3 Variation in traditional banking activities and the impact of SOBC expenses 
This section investigates whether the materiality level of the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on 
selected performance measures varies according to the difference in banks’ organisational 
structure and diversity in traditional banking activities between US and EU banks. Stiroh 
(2004) and Avraham et al. (2012) documented a notable movement of banks’ activities 
towards engaging more in non-traditional banking activities such as securities underwriting 
and trading and selling insurance products. Changes in the regulatory environment is one of 
the main reasons, such that banks registered as Bank holding companies (BHCs) are allowed 
to expand their traditional banking activities, to a certain limit, and engage whether directly 
or indirectly in other related banking activities (Aharony and Swary 1981, Avraham et al., 
2012). Therefore, it would be relevant to investigate whether the impact on IFRS2/FAS123R 
on the selected measures also varies, as a result of difference in the organisational structure 
(classification to commercial and bank-holding companies) and as a result of the movement 
toward diversifying the traditional banking activities. Table (10) presents that effect of 
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IFRS2/FAS123R after controlling for the difference in banks’ classification for commercial 
and bank-holding banks5.2It shows that the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected 
measure varies significantly between BHCs and commercial banks (CBs) in each block 
separately6.3It also shows that the impact of the mandatorily expensing regime of SOBC, and 
after controlling for banks’ organizational structure is also significantly higher in the US 
banks compared to its EU counterpart for the majority of the selected performance measures. 
Furthermore, in the EU sample, the effect appears to be around the materiality threshold used 
in earlier studies in both BHCs and CBs. Yet the impact is more likely to be higher in BHCs 
compared to that in CBs. By contrast, the effect on US banks is slightly higher than the 
materiality threshold used in earlier studies irrespective to their organizational structure, 
BHCs and CBs. Having said that, The T and U tests’ results indicate that the impact is still 
more likely to be higher in CBs. This suggests that the effect of SOBC expensing 
significantly varies in the US and EU samples according to banks organizational structures. 
Interestingly, the effect in the EU sample is higher in banks that are classified as BHCs and 
more engaged in non-traditional commercial banking activities. To investigate this issue 
more, each of the EU and US BHCs has been divided into two separate sub-samples, based 
on the median of banks’ average net loan to total assets as a proxy for the variation in 
traditional banking activities where loan and interest income play a key role. 
                                                          
5 The classification of banks to commercial bank and bank-holding companies is adopted from the BankScope Database. 
6 Both the T and U test indicate that impact is higher in BHCs. The U test shows that the effect is significantly higher in 
BHCs. T test also indicate that the effect is higher in BHCs, yet it is insignificant using on some performance measure 
measures.  
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Table 10: The impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on selected financial measures (Specialisation and variation of traditional banking activities’ 
effect). 
Financial ratios
 α
 Classification 
EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
(BHCs) Net Loan/TA 
EU Banks US banks U Test T Test 
mean median SD mean median SD Z T mean median SD mean median SD Z T 
Eearning per share 
(Diluted)
 b
 
                                   
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
DEPS  
BHCs 4.81 2.83 5.31 8.34 5.01 10.8 -3.73*** -4.42*** Less loans activities 6.14 4.16 6.56 7.81 4.69 10.35 0.99 0.22 
CBs 3.98 1.64 6.05 16.8 6.89 20.73 -6.84*** -4.66*** More loans activities 3.47 2.66 3.24 8.89 5.46 11.24 -7.01*** -6.49*** 
U test, (Z)   3.35*** -2.92**       1.63* -1.63     
T test, (T)   1.06 -3.07***       2.22** -1.06     
Return on assets (ROA)                                    
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
ROA 
BHCs 4.08 2.43 4.37 8.74 4.91 14.02 -4.82*** -5.64*** Less loans activities 5.42 3.94 5.16 8.31 4.69 13.82 0.49 -1.01 
CBs 3.62 1.64 5.32 15.69 6.99 20.33 -6.89*** -4.54*** More loans activities 2.71 2.02 2.83 9.20 5.29 14.24 -7.13*** -5.45*** 
U test, (Z)   2.65*** -2.54**       2.51** -1.39     
T test, (T)   0.71 -2.57**       2.82*** -0.68     
Return on equity (ROE)                                    
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
ROE 
BHCs 4.08 2.43 4.37 8.74 4.91 14.02 -4.82*** -5.64*** Less loans activities 5.42 3.94 5.16 8.31 4.69 13.82 0.49 -1.01 
CBs 3.62 1.64 5.32 15.69 6.99 20.33 -6.89*** -4.54*** More loans activities 2.71 2.02 2.83 9.20 5.29 14.24 -7.13*** -5.45*** 
U test, (Z)   2.65*** -2.54**       2.51** -1.39     
T test, (T)   0.71 -2.57**       2.82*** -0.68     
Cost to income ratio 
(CIR) 
                                   
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
CIR 
BHCs 1.43 0.82 1.49 2.05 1.58 1.7 -4.60*** -3.54*** Less loans activities 2.03 1.41 1.68 1.97 1.41 1.73 -0.96 -1.44 
CBs 0.85 0.53 0.97 2.57 1.92 2.12 -7.75*** -7.25*** More loans activities 0.75 0.55 0.84 2.13 1.65 1.66 -6.18*** -4.52*** 
U test, (Z)   2.92*** -1.53*       3.75*** -1.84*     
T test, (T)   3.38*** -2.18**       4.66*** -1.12     
                                      
SOBC expense as a 
percentage of opening 
shareholders’ equity 
BHCs 0.72 0.40 0.87 0.64 0.48 0.65 -1.31 0.80 Less loans activities 0.88 0.46 0.90 0.64 0.48 0.61 1.73* 2.41** 
CBs 0.41 0.20 0.66 0.75 0.57 0.61 -6.96*** -4.30*** More loans activities 0.53 0.27 0.81 0.64 0.48 0.68 -6.57*** -2.96*** 
U test, (Z)   3.75*** -1.94*       2.17** 0.02     
T test, (T)   2.97*** -1.66*       1.91** 0.11     
α
 All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined.  
b
 :ROA, ROE and DEPS are reported in cents 
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The U and the T tests’ results indicate that the effect of FAS123R on the selected 
performance measures in US BHCs does not vary significantly after controlling for variation 
in traditional banking activities. For example, SOBC expense relative to opening 
shareholders’ equity does not vary significantly between all US sub-groups, yet it is still 
around its traditional materiality threshold in all sub-groups. This suggests that effect of 
SOBC expensing in the US sample is material in all sub-groups, irrespective to their 
organizational structure and the degree of variation in traditional banking activities. By 
contrast, the effect of IFRS2 on the selected measure is significantly higher in EU’s BHCs 
that engage more in other diversified banking activities. Diversified banking activities also 
imply more complex banking portfolio (Pendleton et al., 2002), and therefore more tendency 
to use SOBC packages. 
5.6 Additional analysis 
This section provides an additional and supplementary analysis for the previous section on 
the impact of the mandatory expensing of SOBC on selected financial performance measures 
of EU and US sample banks. The analysis is extended to control for the legal tradition under 
which the sample-banks operate. It compares and evaluates the impact on the financial 
performance measures of banks domiciled in codified-law countries versus those domiciled 
in common law countries. The total impact is also reported after controlling for different 
characteristics of banks, banks’ size and banks’ potential growth, along with banks’ 
operational structure or differences in banking activities. 
Table (11, A) shows that average impact of the mandatory adoption of expensing SOBC on 
the selected performance measures in banks that operate in codified-law countries falls a 
little below the 5 % materiality thresholds for ROA, ROE and DEPS. For the rest of the 
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selected financial indicators, the average impact is around the materiality thresholds. Table 
(11, A) also shows that the average effect falls above the materiality thresholds for all the 
selected performance measures of banks that operate on common-law countries, and it is 
more than twice of that in those operate in codified law countries. Earlier studies suggested 
that the agency problem and information asymmetry is more apparent in reporting 
environment whose corporate governance typically focuses on firm’s shareholders as a result 
of the lack in the shareholder-manager direct contact (See Ball et al., 2000). As such, to 
alleviate the agency cost, agents, particularly top managements, in common-law countries 
such as the US, UK, and Ireland tend to be monitored often by means of SOBC. Whereas, in 
countries with codified legal tradition such as Germany, agents such as employees and 
managers are influential stakeholders whose pay-out is internalized to a certain extent with 
other stakeholders. Furthermore, the advantages of closer shareholder-manager contact in 
code-law countries also making it less likely to heavily depend on SOBC since the managers’ 
payout packages are less likely to be focused on current or future profitability. In consistent 
with view, the findings suggest that the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on financial performance 
measures of banks that operate in common law countries is noticeably larger than that in 
banks operate in codified-law countries. 
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Table 11 Panel (A) The effect of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures in codified versus common law countries 
Financial ratios b 
Codified law countries Common law countries Total 
N mean median S.D N mean median S.D N mean median S.D 
Return on assets (ROA) 
                        
Difference α 228 0.01 0.01 0.02 655 0.06 0.04 0.04 883 0.04 0.03 0.04 
Differences as a percentage of reported 
ROA 
209 3.32 1.69 4.82 556 9.35 4.97 14.56 765 7.69 3.96 12.98 
Return on equity (ROE)                         
Difference 228 0.31 0.19 0.39 655 0.61 0.48 0.49 883 0.54 0.40 0.50 
Differences as a percentage of reported 
ROE 
209 3.32 1.69 4.82 556 9.35 4.97 14.56 765 7.69 3.96 12.98 
Eearnings per share (Diluted)                         
Difference 228 9.52 1.59 22.6 655 9.76 6.21 9.87 883 9.33 5.26 12.57 
Differences as a percentage of reported 
EPS (Diluted) 
207 3.81 1.94 5.56 545 9.06 5.25 12.02 752 7.67 4.06 11.15 
Cost to income ratio                         
Difference 228 0.46 0.32 0.49 655 1.32 0.99 1.12 883 1.10 0.77 1.06 
Differences as a percentage of reported 
CIR 
228 0.73 0.52 0.73 655 2.15 1.63 1.78 883 1.79 1.24 1.69 
                          
SOBC expense as a percentage of 
opening shareholders’ equity 
228 0.40 0.20 0.66 655 0.68 0.50 0.67 883 0.61 0.42 0.68 
α Difference is calculated as an absolute difference between used ratios adjusted for SOBC expenses and those reported in the annual financial reporting. The difference is 
measured in cents while other differences are measured in percentages. However, differences as a percentage is calculated as follow: ratios adjusted for SOBC expenses minus 
reported ratio and the difference is divided by reported ratio. 
b All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined and winsorised at 2%. Return on assets (ROA) is profit after tax and extraordinary items to average total assets. 
Diluted earnings per share (DEPS) is measured by profit attributable to equity shareholders to the weighted average numbers of shares on issue plus dilution shares. Return on 
equity (ROE) is calculated as net profit after tax divided by average shareholders’ equity excluding non-controlling interests. Cost to income ratio (CIR) is a bank’s operating 
costs relative to its total net interest and non-interest income (Christian, et al., 2008). 
144 
 
Table (11): Panel (B) The impact of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures according to banks’ size and earnings 
growth opportunities in codified versus common law countries. 
Financial ratios 
a
 Size 
Codified law Banks Common law banks U Test T Test 
Growth 
Codified law Banks Common law banks U Test T Test 
Mean 50%  SD Mean 50%  SD Z T Mean 50%  SD Mean 50%  SD Z T 
Earnings per share (Diluted)
 b
                                     
Differences as a percentage of reported DEPS  
Q1 3.66 1.95 5.44 10.24 3.01 16.37 -3.55*** -3.92*** Q1 3.88 2.58 4.55 6.17 3.51 8.78 -3.42** -1.80* 
Q2 3.03 1.63 4.80 8.31 5.37 10.53 -6.54*** -4.99*** Q2 3.51 1.08 5.46 7.39 4.47 9.05 -5.06*** -3.41*** 
Q3 2.57 2.03 2.91 8.38 5.47 10.53 -6.36*** -6.02*** Q3 2.58 81.6  4.37 8.45 5.61 10.37 -6.68*** -5.35*** 
Q4 6.17 2.13 7.62 9.59 6.80 10.28 -3.68*** -2.41** Q4 4.93 2.11 6.99 15.50 8.87 17.22 -6.25*** -6.76*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  6.13* 20.77***      6.82* 47.88***     
ANOVA, F -value  4.39** 0.82      1.61* 16.30***     
Return on assets (ROA)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported ROA 
Q1 3.01 1.95 5.44 11.15 3.01 20.50 -3.58*** -4.20*** Q1 3.34 2.15 4.55 6.54 3.41 13.77 -3.23** -1.62** 
Q2 2.63 1.22 4.57 8.10 5.27 10.40 -7.41*** -5.32*** Q2 3.22 1.03 5.71 8.42 4.55 13.27 -7.05*** -3.60*** 
Q3 2.44 1.74 2.73 8.32 5.59 12.31 -6.65*** -5.46*** Q3 2.07 1.65 2.45 8.48 5.55 12.40 -6.05*** -6.03*** 
Q4 5.40 2.05 6.69 10.26 6.67 14.27 -4.20*** -3.10** Q4 4.36 1.95 5.93 15.03 7.65 17.65 -6.55*** -6.95*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  6.97* 23.71***      8.21** 46.59***     
ANOVA, F -value  4.28** 1.41      1.98* 8.86***     
Return on equity (ROE)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported ROE 
Q1 3.01 1.95 5.44 11.15 3.01 20.50 -3.58*** -4.20*** Q1 3.34 2.15 4.55 6.54 3.41 13.77 -3.23** -1.62** 
Q2 2.63 1.22 4.57 8.10 5.27 10.40 -7.41*** -5.32*** Q2 3.22 1.03 5.71 8.42 4.55 13.27 -7.05*** -3.60*** 
Q3 2.44 1.74 2.73 8.32 5.59 12.31 -6.65*** -5.46*** Q3 2.07 1.65 2.45 8.48 5.55 12.40 -6.05*** -6.03*** 
Q4 5.40 2.05 6.69 10.26 6.67 14.27 -4.20*** -3.10** Q4 4.36 1.95 5.93 15.03 7.65 17.65 -6.55*** -6.95*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  6.97* 23.71***      8.21** 46.59***     
ANOVA, F -value  4.28** 1.41      1.98* 8.86***     
Cost to income ratio (CIR)                                    
Differences as a percentage of reported CIR 
Q1 0.71 0.46 0.73 1.95 1.01 2.10 -4.62*** -6.31*** Q1 0.82 0.61 0.77 1.83 1.27 1.49 -5.40*** -8.19*** 
Q2 0.51 0.38 0.51 2.16 1.66 1.66 -9.57*** -11.6*** Q2 0.64 0.25 0.80 2.29 1.69 1.98 -7.21*** -8.33*** 
Q3 0.60 0.54 0.46 2.05 1.69 1.56 -7.80*** -10.6*** Q3 0.46 0.38 0.41 2.43 1.74 1.99 -8.25*** -12.1*** 
Q4 1.13 0.80 0.99 2.47 1.81 1.72 -5.77*** -7.04*** Q4 0.91 0.77 0.78 2.29 1.69 1.98 -6.31*** -6.07*** 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  13.73** 29.29***      15.91** 7.38*     
ANOVA, F -value  9.15*** 2.61*      4.30*** 3.86**     
                                     
Option expense as a percentage of opening shareholders’ 
equity 
Q1 0.31 0.18 0.36 0.54 0.35 0.71 -3.47*** -3.02** Q1 0.31 0.23 0.38 0.70 0.47 0.66 -3.19** -5.84*** 
Q2 0.31 0.12 0.57 0.61 0.50 0.45 -7.04*** -3.89*** Q2 0.41 0.08 0.70 0.52 0.48 0.38 -4.33*** -1.09 
Q3 0.23 0.19 0.21 0.63 0.48 0.64 -6.30*** -6.98*** Q3 0.18 0.12 0.18 0.79 0.55 0.87 -7.43*** -8.50*** 
Q4 0.75 0.27 1.04 0.96 0.65 0.77 -4.22*** -1.38 Q4 0.65 0.26 0.96 0.70 0.53 0.63 -5.85*** -0.37 
Kruskal- Wallis, Chi squared (X²)  11.49** 59.92***      16.44*** 6.70*     
ANOVA, F -value  7.93*** 13.5***      5.62*** 4.53**     
α
 All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined 
b
 :ROA, ROE and DEPS are reported in cents 
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Table (11): Panel (C) The impact of SOBC expensing on selected financial measures in codified versus common law countries 
according to banks’ specialisation and variation of their traditional banking activities  
Financial ratios
 α
 Classification 
Codified law Banks Common law banks U Test T Test 
(BHCs) Net Loan/TA 
Codified law Banks Common law banks U Test T Test 
Mean 50%  SD Mean 50%  SD Z T Mean 05%  SD Mean 50%  SD Z T 
Eearning per share 
(Diluted)
 b
 
                                   
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
DEPS  
BHCs 2.81 2.21 2.68 8.29 5.12 10.5 -5.66*** -8.79*** Less loans activities 2.16 2.05 1.12 7.73 4.59 10.11 -4.72*** -8.20*** 
CBs 4.09 1.64 6.10 14.54 5.92 19.10 -6.04*** -4.38*** More loans activities 3.70 2.75 3.79 8.90 5.53 10.83 -3.12*** -4.62*** 
U test, (Z)   0.97 -1.52       -1.49 -1.97**     
T test, (T)   -2.05** -2.61**       -1.72* -1.22*     
Return on assets (ROA)                                    
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
ROA 
BHCs 2.28 1.79 2.30 8.63 4.93 13.62 -6.79*** -9.03*** Less loans activities 2.18 1.75 1.58 8.06 4.62 13.33 -4.88*** -6.58*** 
CBs 3.61 1.63 5.28 14.51 6.64 19.43 -6.36*** -4.55*** More loans activities 2.41 1.84 3.09 9.24 5.47 13.92 -4.58*** -5.94*** 
U test, (Z)   0.16 -1.56       -0.46 -1.83*     
T test, (T)   -2.50** -2.41**       -0.30 -0.95     
Return on equity (ROE)                                    
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
ROE 
BHCs 2.28 1.79 2.30 8.63 4.93 13.62 -6.79*** -9.03*** Less loans activities 2.18 1.75 1.58 8.06 4.62 13.33 -4.88*** -6.58*** 
CBs 3.61 1.63 5.28 14.51 6.64 19.43 -6.36*** -4.55*** More loans activities 2.41 1.84 3.09 9.24 5.47 13.92 -4.58*** -5.94*** 
U test, (Z)   0.16 -1.56       -0.46 --1.83*     
T test, (T)   -2.50** -2.41**       -0.30 -0.95     
Cost to income ratio 
(CIR) 
                                   
Differences as a 
percentage of reported 
CIR 
BHCs 0.55 0.49 0.49 2.11 1.63 1.71 -8.76*** -15.9*** Less loans activities 0.51 0.45 0.44 2.04 1.46 1.72 -6.95*** -12.0*** 
CBs 0.78 0.53 0.79 2.40 1.64 2.09 -7.60*** -7.44*** More loans activities 0.63 0.60 0.55 2.18 1.69 1.71 -5.28*** -9.83*** 
U test, (Z)   -1.28 -0.38       -0.56 -1.57     
T test, (T)   -2.58** -1.29       -0.86 -0.96     
                                      
Option expense as a 
percentage of opening 
shareholders’ equity 
BHCs 0.35 0.24 0.61 0.68 0.50 0.68 -5.91*** -3.80*** Less loans activities 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.72 0.50 0.70 -5.6*** -9.87*** 
CBs 0.41 0.19 0.68 0.71 0.52 0.60 -6.13*** -3.69*** More loans activities 0.59 0.28 0.92 0.64 0.50 0.66 -1.87* -0.26 
U test, (Z)   0.11 -0.64       -1.54 0.65     
T test, (T)   -0.65 -0.39       -1.88* 1.37     
α
 All figures are reported for the post-adoption years combined 
b
 :ROA, ROE and DEPS are reported in cents 
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Table (11, B) also indicates that the material effect of mandatory recognition regime of 
IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected performance measures of banks is noticeably confined to 
larger and higher potential growth banks across all the legal traditions under which banks 
operate. The Kruskal-Wallis test and its comparative one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) indicates that the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R adoption on the selected measures 
varies significantly between banks according to their size and potential growth opportunity 
and after controlling for the legal tradition under which they operate. That is, the larger or 
the higher potential growth is the bank, the more is the impact on its financial performance 
indicators. Earlier studies, (such as Core and Guay, 2005; Melissa, 2004) have found 
evidence that firm size has a positive and significant relationship with the use of SOBC 
grants. Again, this might intuitively be due to the fact that the larger or the higher earnings 
growth the bank is, the more heavily it adopts SOBC grants where the number of issued 
grants is a major factor that plays a key role in determining the recognised expense and 
therefore on its effect on the selected measures.  
The T test and its comparative U test also indicates that the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption on the selected measures varies significantly between banks according to the legal 
tradition under which they operate and after controlling for their size and potential growth 
opportunity separately. The findings suggest that the impact of IFRS2/FAS123R on financial 
performance measures of banks that operate in common law countries is significantly higher 
than that in banks that operate in codified law countries, and after controlling for each of 
banks’ size and earnings growth opportunities.  
Finally, table (11, C) shows that the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected financial 
performance measures appears to be slightly below the utilised materiality threshold in both 
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BHCs and CBs that operate in a codified-law countries. By contrast, the effect on the selected 
performance measures of banks that operate in common-law countries is slightly higher than 
the materiality threshold used in earlier studies across all banks’ organizational structures, 
BHCs and CBs. The T and U tests show that the impact of expensing the fair value of SOBC 
and after controlling for banks’ organizational structure is also significantly higher in banks 
that operate in common law countries compared to those operating in codified law countries. 
Table (11, C) shows that the effect of IFRS2/FAS123R on the selected financial performance 
measures is more likely to be higher in CBs. Yet the results of T and U tests indicates that 
this effect does not seem to vary significantly among banks according to their operational 
structure and variation in banking activities and after controlling for the legal tradition under 
which they operate7.1This result is also confirmed using the loan activities criteria used to 
partition the sample according to the traditional banking activities. 
5.7 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the findings of identifying, comparing, and evaluating 
the total effect of mandatory expensing of SOBC on selected performance measures for an 
international sample of US and EU banks. The impact is also analysed and evaluated over a 
warranted longer period (2004-2011) to reflect the influence of factors, such as option life 
cycle, management discretion, and structure of the recognised SOBC expense, on the yearly 
individual effect behaviour. Overall, the findings show that the expensing of SOBC has 
resulted in statistically significant negative and modest effects on both US and EU banks’ 
selected financial performance measures with the impact is more likely to be higher in the 
US banking sector. The findings do not reflect earlier research estimations indicating that 
                                                          
7 The T test indicates that the effect is higher in CBs compared to BHCs for the majority of the selected financial 
performance measures, yet this difference is insignificant using the U test. 
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concerns and criticism of the implementation of this standard are largely unsubstantiated. 
The results also show that banks in both samples, but particularly in the US, had significantly 
accelerated the vesting condition of SOBC grants to avoid recognising standing unvested 
grants using the fair value approach in the first-year adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R 
(Choudhary et al., 2009). There is also evidence of a modest reduction in the changes of the 
selected performance measures over the period, 2004-2005 for EU banks and 2005-2006 for 
US banks, due exclusively to the mandatory introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R.  
Option life cycle, management discretion and structure of the recognised SOBC expense are 
also found to have their influence on the trend of this effect. The findings also show a 
considerable movement towards using cash-settled payments, possibly due to their 
manipulative accounting treatment. In addition, the findings show that the earlier predictions 
and employees’ fears that firms would curtail these SOBC grants to avoid or reduce the 
mandatorily associated expense came to light after the first option cycle in the post-adoption 
period was over. Yet the decrease is insignificant, indicating that both the US and EU banks 
are still using SOBC grants extensively to compensate their employees. 
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Chapter Six: Findings on the information content, value relevance and reliability of 
expensing the fair value of SOBC 
6.1 Introduction  
The second aim of this thesis is to assess whether the recognition approach to expensing 
SOBC is more value relevant for investors’ valuation than the disclosure approach. It also 
assesses whether the recognition approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC better reflects 
the intangible value attributable to SOBC relative to that under the disclosure approach. The 
accounting information is considered value relevant when it has a statistical association with 
equity return (Barth el al., 2001). Furthermore, SOBC schemes are usually designed to 
motivate employees and manager and drive companies’ future performance over the long-
term. The willingness of those talented managers and employees to be compensated based 
on the long-term future performance and service is associated with an extra market risk 
factor. Market participants are expected to compensate the associated expense of SOBC 
compared to other operating expenses such as salaries or bonuses which are paid based on 
the past services or performance. That is, SOBC expense is expected to be viewed as an 
intangible asset that contributes to a better future value of companies. The extent to which 
differences in the financial reporting environment significantly influence the value relevance 
and the intangible value attributable to SOBC, prior versus after IFRS2/FAS123R adoption, 
is also assessed in this chapter.  
The next section presents the descriptive statistics for the sample banks. The selected banks 
operate in a wider international setting that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R, and heavily use or 
recently increased the utilisation of SOBC in their reward schemes. The third section presents 
the findings, using prior IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data. The discussion mainly highlights 
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the direction and magnitude of market valuation to the accounting treatment and 
measurement of the cost associated with SOBC grants, and across different institutional 
environments. The fourth section presents and discusses the findings of whether the 
recognition approach to expensing SOBC is incrementally useful to market participants 
compared to that under the disclosure approach. The discussion also highlights whether the 
recognition approach to expensing SOBC better reflects the intangible value attributable to 
SOBC schemes than that under the disclosure approach. This section also presents the results 
of the extent to which differences in the institutional reporting settings influence the value 
relevance and intangible feature attributable of SOBC prior versus after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. The fifth section of this chapter presents the findings using 
post IFRS2/FAS123R adoption data. The analysis highlights the direction and magnitude of 
market valuation to the accounting treatment and measurement of the cost of SOBC schemes 
under the recognition approach, and across different institutional environments. The sixth 
section presents the findings of the impact of bank characteristics on the relationship between 
the recognised expense of SOBC and market returns. The characteristics of banks include 
size of banks, potential growth rate of investment opportunities and the level of bank risk 
taking measured by market risk (stock price volatility). The section also presents the findings 
of whether such an impact varies across banks that operate in different institution reporting 
settings. Finally, the last section of this chapter concludes.  
6.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table (12) presents the descriptive statistics for the sample divided into three groups, the pre-
adoption period, the post-adoption period and the full sample.  
 
151 
 
Table 12 (A): Descriptive Statistics for selected variables of the sample-banks (In millions $) 
Description 
Pre adoption Post adoption Full sample 
Mean Median SD Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
𝐸𝑖𝑡 1,321.81 145.89 3,027.03 1,056.67 94.78 3,773.91 1,089.99 101.76 3,687.95 
𝑅𝑖𝑡% 13.28 12.14 12.83 4.91 -2.24 57.63 5.76 1.51 53.79 
∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡% 12.43 10.91 13.01 9.63 5.05 26.86 9.98 5.90 25.54 
Total Assets 158,38 13,365.4 321,911 297,509 17,440 644,751 280,024 17,065.7 615,187 
Market Value 16,051.3 2,347.59 35,577.2 17,233.7 1,993.79 36,239.9 17,085.1 2,005.77 36,140.2 
Total SOBC Exp 87.77 7.13 289.94 122.62 5.86 426.74 118.24 5.95 412.09 
Rec_it 45.94 0.30 240.536 122.62 5.86 426.74 - - - 
Dis_it 41.83 3.04 173.347 - - - - - - 
N 115 800 915 
𝐸𝑖𝑡: The total net income before extraordinary items. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends 
and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share. Rec_it: recognised expense 
of SOBC. Dis_it: disclosed expense of SOBC. Pre-adoption period data has been manually extracted from the first year 
adoption comparative figures or the pro-forma disclosure regarding the impact of options expense.  
The table shows that total expense of SOBC schemes that would have been recognised over 
the pre-adoption period if the recognition approach was mandated over that period is $87.77 
million. 52% of this amount was voluntarily recognised as an expense in the financial 
statement of 23 US banks. The rest of the amount was reported under the disclosure approach 
in the financial statements of 92 banks of which 32 are EU banks. 
Table (12) also shows that over the post adoption period, the sample banks, on average, 
mandatorily recognised $122.62 million of SOBC expense. Yet this is only an absolute 
number and it does not imply increasing the use of SOBC over the post-adoption period. 
Chapter 5 (section 5.5) shows that, in response to the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R, there were two apparent reductions in the magnitude of SOBC expense 
relative to the selected variable. The first reduction appeared in the first-year adoption, 
mainly to avoid recognising SOBC expense related to standing unvested grants and through 
accelerating the vesting condition of SOBC grants. The second reduction appeared after the 
first option cycle (3-5 years) in the post-adoption period is over. Table (12) also presents the 
average of the net income before extraordinary items [NI], the year-to-year change in 
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earnings per share, the total assets [TA], the market value [MV], and the annual buy-and-
hold stock return inclusive of dividends for the sample banks.  
The correlations among main variables in equation (2) are reported in table 12 panel (B). 
Table 12, (B): Correlation Matrix    
Variable Rit Eit ∆ EPS SOBC  Exp   
Rit 1 0.064*** 0.227*** 0.243***   
Eit 0.094** 1 0.155*** 0.111**   
∆ EPS 0.27 0.132** 1 0.147***   
SOBC  Exp 0.161*** 0.014 0.079** 1   
  
Notes: 
 
Data are reported for the Post IFRS2/FAS123R sample. 
Pearson correlations are presented in the upper diagonal and Spearman correlations are presented in 
the lower diagonal. 
*, **, *** significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level (two-tailed), respectively. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡:The annual buy-and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed after three month of 
a bank’s fiscal year-end.  
𝐸𝑖𝑡: Net incomes before extraordinary items per share over the fiscal year adjusted for the recognised 
share-based compensation expenses per share. 
𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡: refers to the mandatorily recognised share-option based compensations expense per share.  
∆ 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in EPS. 
   
The results of table 12 (B) indicate low levels of collinearity between variables which suggest 
an absences of multicollinearity. Gujarati (2009) suggests if the correlation coefficient 
exceeds 0.8 or 0.9, it would be considered as a serious problem. Collinearity analytics suggest 
that no variables have a correlation greater than 0.25, indicating that multicollinearity is not 
a concern56. Finally, as expected, there is a significant positive association between returns 
and earnings recognised by banks.  
                                                          
56 The multicollinearity is also tested using the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerances for all regressions 
run in this chapter. The VIF and tolerance value (not reported) confirm that there is no multicollinearity between 
variables before adding the interaction terms.  
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6.3 Information content of SOBC expenses under the disclosure approach 
Table (13) presents the regression results of equation (2) that tests the value relevance and 
information content of disclosed and voluntarily recognised expense of SOBC over the pre-
IFRS/FAS123R adoption period. Barth et al. (2001) point out that the accounting information 
is considered value relevant when it has a statistical association with equity return. The first 
column R_it (1) presents the regression results of equation (1). It shows that stock return is 
significantly associated with earnings from operations and is also significantly associated 
with a firm’s earning growth (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1996). This finding is 
consistent across all model variations and clearly implies that investors use these accounting 
information numbers in their valuation of the company. This finding is also consistent with 
that of similar studies such as Aboody et al. (2004a), Rees and Stott (2001) and Niu and Xu 
(2009). 
The regression results of equation (2) are presented in column (2). Across all model 
variations from columns (2) to (7), the (voluntarily) recognised expense of SOBC is entered 
in the models as one of the earnings components. If banks did not voluntarily recognise any 
SOBC expense, a zero value is assigned. Furthermore, the disclosed SOBC expense is 
entered into the regressions across column (2) to (7) as a negative value (expense). The 
finding from the model in column (2) suggests that while market participants assigned 
positive value to the voluntarily recognised expense of SOBC, they perceived the disclosed 
expense of SOBC as an expense that negatively affect the stock return.  
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Table 13: The information content of SOBC expense using pre-adoption data: 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼2 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (3) 
Description 𝑅𝑖𝑡(1) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(2) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(3) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(4) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(5) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(6) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(7) 
        
E_it  1.45*** 
(0.51) 
1.53*** 
(0.50) 
1.38** 
(0.54) 
1.56*** 
(0.57) 
1.42** 
(0.55) 
1.52*** 
(0.53) 
1.44** 
(0.55) 
∆ E_it 0.325*** 
(0.105) 
0.317*** 
(0.108) 
0.320*** 
(0.110) 
0.309*** 
(0.0846) 
0.320*** 
(0.108) 
0.312*** 
(0.109) 
0.311*** 
(0.109) 
Rec_it  
 
4.40 
(6.81) 
6.10 
(6.95) 
6.90 
(7.36) 
5.27 
(6.85) 
6.71 
(7.07) 
6.25 
(6.99) 
C_Dis_it1  
 
-3.70 
(3.80) 
 
-5.88 
(4.47) 
-6.80 
(5.74) 
-4.33 
(3.64) 
-5.06 
(3.74) 
-4.75 
(3.68) 
LT * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
-13.56** 
(6.30) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USA * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
-16.31** 
(7.13) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASD * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-29.10** 
(14.37) 
 
 
 
 
DRI * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.37*** 
(12.31) 
 
 
SOIP * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.62** 
(1.93) 
Constant -0.024 
(0.056) 
0.0461 
(0.058) 
0.003 
(0.065) 
-0.029 
(0.063) 
-0.053 
(0.062) 
-0.133** 
(0.06) 
-0.078 
(0.064) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 21% 21% 23.3% 23.4% 24.1% 27.4% 24.5% 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-
hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled 
by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Rec_it: recognised expense of SOBC scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Dis_it: disclosed expense of SOBC scaled by the stock price at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. C_Dis_it: disclosed expense of SOBC centered by the average mean of disclosed expense and scaled by 
the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Pre-adoption period data has been manually extracted from the first year 
adoption comparative figures or the pro-forma disclosure regarding the impact of options expense. All market and 
accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in 
the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0 = code 
law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the remaining countries =(0); (3) 
[ASD]the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure 
requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean 
of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World 
Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values 
are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year.* shows the interaction effects 
between two variables. 
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Zhang (2005) suggests that one potential reason for such a difference in investor valuation 
could be the differential informational efficiency in the presence of information costs (See 
also Barth et al., 2003).  
Consistent with Niu and Xu (2009), this implies that voluntarily recognition of SOBC 
expense in the income statement mitigates the negative impact of SOBC on stock returns. 
This evidence is, however, inconsistent with that of Balsam et al. (2006) who suggested that 
market participants value the cost associated with SOBC as an expense whether it is 
recognised in the income statements or disclosed in the footnotes. 
Furthermore, both coefficients on recognised and disclosed SOBC expense are insignificant. 
The insignificant reaction of market participants to both amounts, suggest concrete evidence 
about the self-selective incentive of these banks to voluntarily recognise or to disclose this 
cost. The self-selective incentive to disclose or to recognise, also might affected the value 
relevance and reliability of the information content of SOBC expense. 
The regression results of equation (3) are presented in column (3-7) and using different 
proxies for country-level institutional variables. The results show that the coefficients of the 
interaction term between the disclosed expense of SOBC and these proxies is significantly 
negative. For example, the interaction term LT * C_ Dis_it column (3) suggests that the 
degree to which investors perceive the disclosed amount of SOBC as an expense is 
significantly higher in banks that operate in countries with legal tradition classified as 
common law compared to that in code-law countries. The interaction term US * C_ Dis_it is 
also significantly negative (column 4). This indicates that disclosed expense of SOBC is 
generally perceived by market participants in the sample banks as an expense. Yet the degree 
to which market participants perceive this cost as an expense is significantly more apparent 
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in the US market (Aboody, 1996; Chamberlain and Hsieh, 1999; Li, 2003; Aboody et al., 
2004a). Finally, the results are also robust across all the rest of the variables used as proxies 
to the level of investor protection (ASD, DRI, and SOIP). That is, the negative association 
between the disclosed expense of SOBC and stock returns was significantly more apparent 
in a reporting environment characterized by a higher level of investor protection. One 
possible reason for such findings is that SOBC grants issued in reporting environment 
characterized by a relatively high level of investor protection or a higher demand for 
disclosure, are used more effectively to reduce agency costs and are more likely to be subject 
to a lower level of management discretion. 
Overall, the findings show that over the pre adoption period, valuation coefficients on 
voluntarily recognised SOBC expenses were insignificantly positive (asset), whereas the 
valuation coefficients on disclosed SOBC were insignificantly negative (expense). The 
variation in the country-level institutional variables also significantly influences investor 
valuation for the disclosed expense of SOBC. The valuation coefficients on the disclosed fair 
value amount of SOBC were significantly more negative (expense) in banks that operate in 
financial reporting environment characterized by a relatively high level of investor protection 
or a higher demand for disclosure.  
6.4 Information content of SOBC expenses: Pre- versus Post-IFRS2/FAS 123R Analysis 
Table (14) presents the results of to what extent mandating SOBC expensing under IFRS2/ 
FAS123R has resulted in providing more relevant and reliable information to market 
participants.  
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Table 14: The information content of SOBC expense: pre vs post IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption: 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +  𝛼9𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (4)  
Description R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) R_it (7) R_it (8) 
E_it 0.34** 
(0.155) 
0.41*** 
(15.10) 
0.36** 
(14.93) 
0.37** 
(15.09) 
0.37** 
(15.09) 
0.42*** 
(15.22) 
0.37** 
(15.25) 
0.39*** 
(15.16) 
∆ E_it 0.239*** 
(0.049) 
0.164*** 
(0.048) 
0.173*** 
(0.048) 
0.157*** 
(0.048) 
0.150*** 
(0.048) 
0.156*** 
(0.049) 
0.159*** 
(0.049) 
0.155*** 
(0.049) 
SOBC  22.19*** 
(2.840) 
-2.519 
(8.123) 
-2.733 
(9.100) 
-4.565 
(15.97) 
2.734 
(12.03) 
0.153 
(16.37) 
8.814 
(15.19) 
Post * SOBC   29.04*** 
(8.788) 
26.18*** 
(9.703) 
39.32** 
(17.23) 
22.70** 
(12.94) 
33.07** 
(17.74) 
15.49** 
(15.79) 
Post * SOBC * LT    -10.06 
(21.94) 
    
Post * SOBC * US     -15.50 
(20.01) 
   
Post * SOBC * ASD      34.53 
(54.24) 
  
Post * SOBC * DRI       -13.83 
(43.51) 
 
Post * SOBC * SOIP        4.003 
(6.872) 
Constant 0.0794 
(0.0687) 
0.149 
(0.0680) 
0.0651 
(0.0891) 
0.0246 
(0.151) 
0.0450 
(0.133) 
0.0866 
(0.205) 
0.0568 
(0.305) 
0.193 
(0.126) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 57.9% 60.6% 61.1% 60.5% 61.1% 60.8% 60.9% 60.3% 
N 915 915 915 915 915 915 915 915 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-
hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled 
by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before extraordinary 
items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by 
the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based compensation 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, this expense is centered by the average 
mean for the ease of interpretation. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. Post: a dummy variable = (1) 
post-adoption = (0) pre-adoption period. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in the 
cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protection: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) 
based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the remaining countries =(0); (3) [ASD]the 
anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against 
insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in 
securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries 
in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the 
period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using 
the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction effects between two variables 
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The results also provide evidence on whether the recognition approach to SOBC better 
reflects the intangible value attributable to SOBC than that under the disclosure approach. 
SOBC schemes are usually designed to motivate employees and managers and to drive 
companies’ future performance over the long-term. The willingness of those talented 
managers and employees to be compensated based on the long-term future performance and 
service is associated with extra market risk factor.  
Market participants are, therefore, expected to compensate the risk factor of the associated 
expense of SOBC and to incorporate the recognised expense into price positively. This also 
implies that SOBC expense is perceived by market participants as an intangible asset that 
contributes to a better future value of companies in comparison to other operating expenses 
such as salaries which are paid based on the past services or performance. The extent to 
which the variation in the institutional factors significantly influences the value relevance 
and the intangible feature of SOBC, prior versus after IFRS2/FAS123R adoption, is also 
shown in table (14).  
The first column R_it (1) presents the regression results of equation (1). It shows that stock 
return is significantly associated with earnings from operations and is also significantly 
associated with a firm’s earning growth (Ohlson, 1995; Feltham and Ohlson, 1996). This 
finding is also consistent across all model variations implying that market participants 
incorporate accounting information numbers as reliable inputs in their valuation of the 
company. This finding is also consistent with that reported in similar studies such as Aboody 
et al. (2004a), Rees and Stott (2001) and Niu and Xu (2009). 
The regression results of equation (2) are presented in column (2). Across all model 
variations from columns (2) to (8), the (voluntarily) recognised expense of SOBC in the pre-
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adoption period along with mandatory expense of SOBC in the post-adoption period is 
entered in the models as one of the earnings components. If a bank disclosed any SOBC 
expense in the pre-adoption period, it is entered into the regressions across column (2) to (8) 
as a negative value (expense). The finding from the model in column (2) suggests that market 
participants perceive the cost associated with the SOBC as relevant and reliable amount. 
They also assign a significant positive value to the fair-value expense of SOBC rewards 
which are believed to align the incentives of employees with those of shareholders [i.e. as an 
asset]. 
Column (3) presents the regression results of equation (2) but after permitting the coefﬁcients 
on the explanatory variable [𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] to differ across the IFRS2/FAS123R 
periods [𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡]. The coefficient on the interaction term in the third model [R_it (3)] between 
the cost associated with SOBC [SOBC] and the dummy variable [Post] is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This indicates that the recognised expense of SOBC in the post-
IFRS2/FASB123R periods is significantly more value relevant than that disclosed or 
voluntarily recognised in the pre-adoption period. Unlike if it is disclosed in the footnote, the 
recognised expense of SOBC would be under further scrutiny of external auditors. As such, 
investors’ perception to future cash flow might be revised upward to reflect the intangible 
feature of SOBC on a firm’s value. Column (3, table 14) also shows that the coefficient of 
[SOBC] is negative, yet insignificant. This result suggests that over the pre-adoption period, 
disclosed and (voluntarily) recognised expense of SOBC is perceived by market participants 
as an expense, yet not reliably enough to significantly affect the bank’s equity value. 
Consistent with Niu and Xu (2009), the results suggest that mandatory recognitions of SOBC 
expense significantly mitigate the negative relationship between the fair value expense of 
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SOBC and stock returns. The recognised expense under the IFRS2/FAS123R is perceived 
by investors as relevant and reliable amount that reflects the underlying incentives of such 
rewards and positively affects the banks’ equity value. This evidence is, however, 
inconsistent with that of Balsam et al. (2006) who found that market participants value the 
cost associated with stock options as an expense whether it is recognised in the income 
statements or disclosed in the footnotes. 
The regression results of equation (4) are presented in column (4-8). This equation tests the 
information content and the value relevance of expensing the fair value of SOBC in the post 
adoption period compared to that in the pre-adoption period [(𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] and using 
different proxies for country-level institutional variables. The results show that across all the 
model variations (4 to 8), the coefficients of the interaction term between the recognised 
expense of SOBC and the post-adoption dummy variable is positive and significant at the 
5% level. A caution should be given when interpreting these coefficients where the three-
way interaction term is used in these models. For example, the negative coefficients of 
(SOBC) in columns (4) and (5) indicate that prior to the mandatory adopton of 
IFRS2/FAS123R, there is a negaitve relationship, yet insignificant, between SOBC expense 
and market return of banks that operate in coldified law cuntries (-2.73) or in the EU (-4.56). 
The two-way interaction terms ( SOBC * Post) in columns (4) and (5) are positve and 
significant. This result sugests that the recognised expense of SOBC in the post 
IFRS2/FASB123R adoption period is significantly more value relevant than that disclosed 
in the pre-adoption period when the sample banks operate in codified law countries (-
2.73+26.18) or in the EU (-4.56+39.32) respectively. This finding aslo indicates that the 
intangible value attributable to SOBC packages, as value-increasing assets, is significantly 
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more accentuated (apparent) in the presence of the mandatory recognition relative to 
disclosure approach, and in banks that operate in codified law countries or in the EU 
respectively. That is, over the recognition regime, investors assign higher weightings to the 
incentive features of SOBC grants versus their dilutive associated cost. This finding might 
also implicitly suggest that the disclosure regime fails to reflect the long-term “intangible” 
effect of SOBC on the financial statements. Simmilary, the coefficient of (Post * SOBC) in 
columns (8) is positve (15.49) and significant at the 5% level. This result sugessts that the 
recognised expense of SOBC in the post IFRS2/FASB123R adoption period is significantly 
more value relevant than that disclosed in the pre-adoption period when the level of investor 
protection is moderate. This finding also could suggest that the intangible feature attributable 
to SOBC schems, as value-increasing assets, is significantly more accentuated (apparent) in 
the presence of the mandatory recognition relative to disclosure approach, and in banks that 
operate in a reporting environment with a moderate level of investor protection. This finding 
is consistent with that of Niu and Xu (2009) who found that the mandatory recognition of 
expensing SOBC within the Canadian context significantly mitigate the negative relationship 
between the fair value expense of SOBC and stock returns. 
More importantly, the coefficients of the three-way interaction terms across all model 
variations from columns (4) to (8) are insignificant. This finding suggests that the 
incremental usefulness of the recognised fair value amount of SOBC and reported under 
IFRS2/FAS123R is neither confined to the US environment, nor it is significantly affected 
by differences among the sample countries that adopted this standard. Indeed, mandating the 
recognition regime to expense the fair value of SOBC has enhanced the perceived value 
relevance of the accounting information revealed under IFRS2/FAS123R. It has also 
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mitigated the perception that managers use SOBC opportunistically. The differences in 
valuation and measurement issues related to the fair value amount of SOBC across countries 
still exists, yet it is insignificant. One of the important critics of mandating the 
IFRS2/FAS123R is that using the fair value approach for SOBC valuation might not be 
reliably enough for investors valuation across different countries. Such a concern does not 
seem to significantly affect the desired impact of IFRS2/FAS123R in providing more reliable 
and useful information to international investors. Finally, the intangible feature attributable 
to SOBC schemes, as value-increasing assets is significantly more accentuated in the 
presence of the mandatory recognition relative to disclosure. This inference is also robust 
across all the sample institutional settings that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R.  
6.5 Post-IFRS2/FAS 123R Analysis 
6.5.1 The effects of the differences in the institutional settings on the information 
content of the recognised expense of SOBC 
This section investigates the influence of the differences in the institutional settings on the 
value relevance, and on the intangible features attributable to the recognised fair value 
expense of SOBC for the post IFRS2/FAS123R adoption period. The empirical results are 
shown in table (15). The estimates of the initial models (equation 1 and 2) are shown in 
column (1) and (2), whereas the estimates obtained from running the complete model of 
equation (5) are shown in columns (3–7), using different proxies for the institutional settings 
that adopted IFRS2/FAS123.  
Again, across all model variations from columns (2) to (7), the mandatorily recognised 
expense of SOBC is entered in the models as one of the earnings components. Consistent 
with the finding in the previous section, the model in columns (2) shows that there is a positive 
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and significant relationship between stock returns and the fair-value expense of SOBC 
recognised consequent to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. Furthermore, across 
all conditional models variations from columns (3) to (7), the coefficient on the recognised 
expense of SOBC expenses is still positive and significant. More importantly, the coefficients 
on the interaction terms between the recognised expense of SOBC on the one hand, and each 
of the proxies used to reflect the variation in the intuitional contexts of the selected sample 
on the other hand are positive, yet insignificant.  
For example, the coefficient of the interaction term (LT * SOBC) in model (3) is poitive 
(0.70), yet insignificant. The insignificant positive value implies that investors assign higher 
weighting to the intangible feature of SOBC in banks that recognise the sample mean of 
SOBC expenses, across all the selected levels of legal traditions. The coefficient on the 
interaction term in the model (4) also has the same scenario mentioned above within the US 
context compared to that in the EU. The insignificant and the positive value of the coefficients 
of the interaction terms are also robust across the rest of models variations from (3) to (7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
164 
 
Table 15: The effects of the differences in the institutional settings on the information 
content of the recognised expense of SOBC (post IFRS2/FAS123R adoption analysis): 
 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (5) 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) R_it (7) 
E_it 0.359** 
(0.168) 
0.380** 
(0.162) 
0.382** 
(0.165) 
0.340** 
(0.161) 
0.390** 
(0.164) 
0.382** 
(0.165) 
0.386** 
(0.165) 
∆ E_it 0.234*** 
(0.0543) 
0.166*** 
(0.0528) 
0.166*** 
(0.0529) 
0.163*** 
(0.0527) 
0.159*** 
(0.0533) 
0.165*** 
(0.0529) 
0.166*** 
(0.0529) 
SOBC_it  
 
26.44*** 
(3.336) 
26.60*** 
(3.746) 
24.41*** 
(4.346) 
23.72*** 
(4.515) 
23.61*** 
(7.730) 
25.53*** 
(5.302) 
LT * SOBC  
 
 
 
0.703 
(7.747) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
USA * SOBC    2.847 
(5.904) 
   
ASD * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
 14.41 
(15.92) 
 
 
 
 
DRI * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
3.460 
(8.431) 
 
 
SOIP * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
0.518 
(2.348) 
Constant 0.142 
(0.088) 
-0.058 
(0.089) 
0.049 
(0.087) 
0.238*** 
(0.064) 
0.466 
(0.502) 
0.198 
(0.190) 
0.048 
(0.087) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 57.6% 60.8% 60.7% 60.1% 60.8% 60.7% 60.7% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-
and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, the recognised expense 
of SOBC is centered by the average mean, for the ease of interpretation. All market and accounting measures are winsorised 
at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy 
for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), 
Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the remaining countries =(0); (3) [ASD]the anti-self-dealing index from 
Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from 
La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: 
The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective 
exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year.* shows the interaction effects between two variables. 
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The results emphasise the same scenario mentioned above, but within a context characterised 
by higher level of anti-self-dealing procedures, higher disclosure requirements and higher 
level of investor protection respectively. 
Prior studies highlighted the effect of management opportunism on the recognised expense 
of SOBC scheme. For example, Aboody et al. (2006), and Johnston (2006) provided 
empirical evidence indicating that managers tend to understate the disclosed and the 
voluntarily recognised expense of SOBC under FAS 123. Market participants; however, are 
expected to react according to the relative level of the exercised discretion by managers over 
the option pricing model input assumptions. The reaction would be also reflected on the 
weighting assigned to the intangible feature of SOBC relative to their recognised cost. The 
magnitude of the positive relationship between the recognised expense of SOBC and market 
returns would therefore be lessened. Prior studies such as La. Porta et al. (1997) and Ball et 
al. (2000; 2003) also pointed out that management opportunism is more likely to be higher 
in an environment characterised by lower level of investor protection (La. Porta et al., 1997; 
Ball et al., 2000; 2003). As such, the differences in level of management opportunism are 
also expected to influence the magnitude of the positive relationship between the recognised 
expense of SOBC and market returns. Indeed, the positive values of the interaction terms 
reported in table (15) suggest that it is more likely that market participants assign higher 
weightings to the incentive features of SOBC of banks that operate in a context characterised 
by a higher level of investor protection or a lower level of management opportunism. 
However, the differences in the level of management opportunism, and the level of investor 
protections across countries that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R do not seem to significantly 
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influence the desired impact of this international standard.  
Altogether, the results support the stance of the FASB/IASB and indicate that the recognised 
expense of SOBC in the post-IFRS2/FASB123R periods is significantly more value relevant 
than that disclosed in the pre-period (Niu and Xu, 2009). As stated earlier in this chapter, 
SOBC schemes are usually designed to motivate employees and managers and to drive 
companies’ future performance over the long-term. The willingness of those talented 
managers and employees to be compensated based on the long-term future performance and 
service is associated with extra market risk factor. Market participants are, therefore, 
expected to compensate the risk factor associated with SOBC. Market participants 
incorporate the recognised SOBC expense into price positively as a value-increasing 
intangible asset. Indeed, the intangible value attributable to the recognised expense of SOBC 
schemes, as value-increasing assets, is also significantly more accentuated (apparent) in the 
presence of the mandatory recognition relative to disclosure. Finally, the influence of the 
differences in the financial reporting contexts on investors’ perception to the intangible 
feature (value-increasing assets) of SOBC is less burdensome after the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS2/FAS123R.  
6.5.2 The effect of firms’ characteristics on the information content of the recognised 
expense of SOBC 
6.5.2.1 The effect of banks’ size 
Table (16) presents the results of investigating the influence of banks’ size on the magnitude 
of the value relevance and the intangible value attributable to the recognised expense of 
SOBC over the post adoption period.  
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Table 16: The effect of banks’ size on investors’ perception to the recognised expense 
of SOBC, and across different reporting contexts. 
 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6) 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
E_it 
0.374** 
(0.162) 
0.344** 
(0.164) 
0.309* 
(0.164) 
0.333** 
(0.164) 
0.357** 
(0.165) 
0.357** 
(0.164) 
SOBC 
22.11*** 
(4.785) 
42.11*** 
(10.10) 
43.86*** 
(10.10) 
31.26*** 
(6.695) 
34.85*** 
(10.62) 
31.58*** 
(7.330) 
∆ E_it 
0.164*** 
(0.0530) 
0.170*** 
(0.0529) 
0.172*** 
(0.0533) 
0.161*** 
(0.0532) 
0.169*** 
(0.0530) 
0.169*** 
(0.0529) 
Size*SOBC 
7.85** 
(6.27) 
-26.27** 
(12.54) 
-12.31* 
(11.30) 
-8.27 
(8.52) 
-19.53 
(14.18) 
-11.71* 
(9.49) 
Size*SOBC*LT 
 
 
44.83*** 
(14.50) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size*SOBC*USA 
 
 
 
 
24.55* 
(14.08) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size*SOBC*ASD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
93.45*** 
(35.42) 
 
 
 
 
Size*SOBC*DRI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34.03** 
(15.80) 
 
 
Size*SOBC*SOIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11.58*** 
(4.338) 
Constant 
-0.0570 
(0.0931) 
-0.0652 
(0.0949) 
-0.0740 
(0.117) 
0.375 
(0.504) 
0.157 
(0.216) 
-0.0645 
(0.0937) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 60.8% 61.1% 60.9% 61% 60.9% 61% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock 
returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based compensation scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, The recognised expense of share-option based compensation is centered by 
the average mean for the ease of interpretation. Size: a proxy for banks’ size (1= if market value of a bank> median of the sample market 
value, 0= otherwise) [the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ size as robustness check to the median criterion, the results do not 
change considerably]. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to 
partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0= 
code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000). (2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] 
the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider 
expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from 
La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average 
of the strength of shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected 
countries in the sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows 
the interaction effects between two variables 
168 
 
It also highlights whether such an effect is confined to banks that operate within a context 
characterised by a higher level of investor protection such the US context, or it similarly 
prevails over all the sample contexts that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. 
Column (1) presents the regression results of equation (2) but after permitting the coefﬁcients 
on the explanatory variable [𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] to differ across banks’ size. Across all model variations 
from columns (1) to (6), the mandatorily recognised expense of SOBC is entered in the 
models as one of the earnings components. Table (16) column (1) shows that the coefficient 
on the recognised expense of SOBC is positive and significant at the 1% level for small banks 
in the selected sample. The coefficient on the recognise expense of SOBC in the large sample 
banks is significantly larger compared to that in the small sample banks (22.11 + 7.85) as 
indicated by the significant positive coefficient of the interaction term (Size *SOBC_it). This 
finding is consistent with that reported by Niu and Xu (2009). 
The estimates obtained from running the complete model of equation (6) are shown in 
columns (2-6), using different proxies for various institutional factors across the sample 
countries that adopted IFRS2/FAS123. In column (2), the coefficient on the recognised 
expense of SOBC for small banks that operate in codified law countries remains positive and 
significant. The coefficient on the recognised expense of SOBC in the large sample banks 
that operates in the same context is significantly smaller, yet still positive [= 42.11 – 26.27], 
compared to that in the small sample banks, as indicated by the value and the significance of 
the coefficient on (Size *SOBC_it).  
More importantly, the influnce of bank’s size on the intangible value attributable to the 
recognised expense of SOBC is significantly more confined to banks that operate in 
common-law countries, which are to large extent subject to lower level of management 
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opportunism. That is, the positive effect of banks’ size on the value relevance and on the 
intangible features of the recognised expense of SOBC is more apparent or confined to banks 
that operate in a context that is characterised by a low level of management opportunism or 
by a high level of investor protection. This finding is also supported across the rest of the 
models variations from column (3) to (6). For example, the difference in the intangible value 
assigned to SOBC expense between large and small banks (Size *SOBC*USA), as indicted in 
column (3), is significantly larger in those banks that operate in the US context. That is, the 
positive effect of banks’ size on the value relevance and on the intangible incentives of the 
recognised expense of SOBC is more apparent or confined to banks that operate in the US 
context. Niu and Xu (2009) also found that firms’ size has a positive impact on the value 
relevance and reliability of the recognised SOBC expenses in the Canadian context. 
Furthermore, the coefficient on the recognised expense of SOBC in the large sample banks 
that operates in the EU context is smaller, yet still positive [=43.86- 12.31] but only 
significance at 10% level, compared that in the small sample banks as indicated by the value 
and the significance of the coefficient on (Size*SOBC). 
The same finding is derived from the rest of the estimations, from column (4) to (6), that 
utilises many proxies to levels of investor protection [ASD, DRI and SOIP respectively] 
among countries that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. Again, this suggests that the effect of banks’ 
size on the value relevance and on the intangible features attributable to the recognised 
expense of SOBC, is positive and more apparent in banks that operate in the US context or 
similar contexts that are characterised by high level of investor protection. In other words, 
large banks that operate in the US context or similar contexts characterised by a high level 
of investor protection receive more benefits from issuing SOBC grants to their employees 
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compared to those large EU banks or those banks that operate in a context with lower level 
of investor protection, respectively. One possible reason for this finding is that larger banks 
in the US or in other similar contexts have more complex activities (Pendleton et al., 2002) 
or/and better access to international investment opportunities. As such, investors place more 
weighting to the incentive features derived from SOBC grants issued in these banks. This 
issue can also be a potentially interesting area to be investigated in future research.    
6.5.2.2 The effect of banks’ potential growth and risk-taking 
The results of investigating the influence of banks’ potential growth opportunity on the value 
relevance and on the incentive properties of the recognised expense of SOBC and over the 
post adoption period is presented in table (17). This table also highlights whether such an 
effect is confined to banks that operate within a context characterised by a higher level of 
investor protection such the US context, or it similarly prevails over all the sample contexts 
that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. 
Column (1) presents the regression results of equation (2) but after permitting the coefﬁcients 
on the explanatory variable [𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] to differ across banks’ potential growth. Across all 
model variations from columns (1) to (6), the mandatorily recognised expense of SOBC is 
entered in the models as one of the earnings components. Table (17) column (1) shows that 
the coefficient on the recognised expense of SOBC is positive and significant at the 1% level 
for low potential growth banks in the selected sample. The direction of this coefficient does 
not also change significantly for the high potential growth sample banks (30.63 -10.12), 
compared to that in low potential growth banks as indicated by the insignificant coefficient 
of the interaction term (Growth rate *SOBC).  
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Table 17: The effect of banks’ potential growth rate on investors’ perception to the 
recognised expense of SOBC, and across different reporting contexts. 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 +
𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +
 𝑒𝑖𝑡  (6) 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
E_it 0.359** 
(0.162) 
0.372** 
(0.165) 
0.356** 
(0.163) 
0.375** 
(0.164) 
0.369** 
(0.165) 
0.371** 
(0.165) 
SOBC 30.63*** 
(4.037) 
31.42*** 
(4.839) 
34.17*** 
(6.168) 
27.79*** 
(5.178) 
28.59*** 
(8.549) 
27.51*** 
(5.701) 
∆ E_it 0.178*** 
(0.0535) 
0.177*** 
(0.0537) 
0.163*** 
(0.0536) 
0.170*** 
(0.0542) 
0.175*** 
(0.0537) 
0.178*** 
(0.0536) 
Growth rate*SOBC -10.12 
(6.280) 
-10.94 
(7.147) 
2.097 
(9.189) 
-13.59 
(9.990) 
-23.89 
(19.84) 
-2.863 
(13.41) 
Growth rate*SOBC*LT  
 
9.859 
(18.28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*USA  
 
 
 
-21.37* 
(12.48) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*ASD  
 
 
 
 
 
5.600 
(31.15) 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*DRI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.57 
(21.01) 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*SOIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 -3.810 
(5.908) 
_cons -0.086 
(0.091) 
-0.088 
(0.095) 
-0.169* 
(0.100) 
0.392 
(0.559) 
0.110 
(0.219) 
-0.097 
(0.093) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 60.9% 60.8% 61.1% 60.8% 60.7% 60.8% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock 
return inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised SOBC expense scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. In the case of interaction, SOBC expense is centered by the average mean of recognised expense for the ease of interpretation. 
Growth_rate_it: a proxy for banks’ growth opportunity (1= if the Market to book value ratio> median, 0= otherwise) [the mean criterion 
is also used to partition banks’ growth opportunity as robustness check to the median criterion, the results do not change considerably]. 
All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in 
the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) based on 
La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000)(2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered 
by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) 
to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of 
shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the 
sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction 
effects between two variables 
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The estimates obtained from running the complete model of equation (6) are shown in 
columns (2-6), using different proxies for various institutional factors across the sample 
countries that adopted IFRS2/FAS123.  
In column (2), the coeficient on the recognised expense of SOBC for low potenial growth 
banks that operate in common law countries remains positive and significant. This inference 
does not also change significantly for high potential growth sample banks that operates in the 
same context (31.42 -10.94), compared to that for low growth banks, as indicated by 
insignificant coefficient on (Growth rate*SOBC). 
More importantly, the coefficient on the three-way interaction terms (Growth rate 
*SOBC*LT) is insignificant. This suggests that the variation in the level of bank’ potential 
growth does not significantly influence the positive and significant relationship between the 
recognised expense of SOBC and market returns. This inference is also valid across different 
reporting settings and supported across the rest of the models variations that use different 
proxies to the level of investor protection, from column (3) to (6), at the 5% significance 
level.  
That is, the variation in the level of banks’ growth seems to have no significant effect on the 
value relevance and the accretive features of the recognised expense of SOBC. Market 
particpants precive the recognised expense of SOBC as a value-increasing asset that 
contributes positively to both low and high potenial grwoth bank valuation. This finding is 
also robust across all level of investor protection of the context under which the smaple banks 
operate. This finding is consistent with that of Niu and Xu’ (2009) who also found that 
variation in firms’ potential growth did not significantly affect the positive market valuation 
to the recognised expense of SOBC in the Canadian context. In the US context, Rees and 
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Stott (2001) suggested that the disclosed expense of SOBC in smaller firms with higher 
potential growth significantly attract a higher positive weighting from market participants 
compared to that in larger and more mature firms. They suggested the higher demand of cash 
at the firms’ growth stage as a possible reason for this relationship.  
Prior studies have also highlighted that the difference in the business and regulatory 
environment under which banks operate compared to nonbank counterparts can affect the 
incentives created by the compensation contract (Chen et al., 2006; Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Mayers and Smith, 1992). Chen et al. (2006) found that inducing a higher risk taking is one 
of the unique influences of using SOBC in the banking industry. The finding of whether 
market valuation of the recognised expense of SOBC as a value-increasing asset changes 
significantly with the level of the market risk of sample banks is presented in table (18). This 
table also shows the finding of whether such a relationsip prevails or significntly varies 
across different reporting contexts. 
Column (1) presents the regression results of equation (2) but after permitting the coefﬁcients 
on the explanatory variable [𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡] to differ across banks’ risk-taking. Across all model 
variations from columns (1) to (6), the mandatorily recognised expense of SOBC is entered 
in the models as one of the earnings components. Table (18) column (1) shows that the 
coefficient on the recognised expense of SOBC is positive and significant at the 1% level for 
low risk banks in the selected sample. More importantly, the significant positive coefficient 
of the interaction term (Risk*SOBC) is positive and significant at the 1% level  
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Table 18: The influence of banks’ risk taking on investors’ perception to the recognised 
expense of SOBC, and across different reporting environments 
 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +
𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (6) 
 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
Earning before E/D 0.405** 
(0.166) 
0.411** 
(0.168) 
0.379** 
(0.166) 
0.414** 
(0.167) 
0.403** 
(0.169) 
0.408** 
(0.168) 
SOBC 15.26*** 
(5.42) 
15.96*** 
(5.88) 
12.14* 
(6.39) 
3.61* 
(8.66) 
 7.82* 
(15.70) 
5.68 
(9.79) 
∆ E_it 0.159*** 
(0.053) 
0.147*** 
(0.053) 
0.152*** 
(0.053) 
0.146*** 
(0.053) 
0.153*** 
(0.053) 
0.149*** 
(0.053) 
Risk *SOBC 17.00*** 
(6.437) 
19.07*** 
(7.304) 
17.99** 
(8.443) 
28.82*** 
(9.938) 
40.81** 
(17.94) 
27.36** 
(11.46) 
Risk *SOBC*LT  
 
14.22 
(17.87) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk *SOBC* USA  
 
 
 
-5.642 
(13.66) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk *SOBC* ASD  
 
 
 
 
 
-28.78 
(34.39) 
 
 
 
 
Risk *SOBC* DRI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-25.83 
(19.25) 
 
 
Risk *SOBC* SOIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.682 
(5.065) 
Const -0.008 
(0.092) 
0.004 
(0.094) 
-0.105 
(0.108) 
0.256 
(0.504) 
0.089 
(0.212) 
-0.003 
(0.092) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 61% 61.2% 61.1% 61.3% 61% 61.2% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock 
return inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of SOBC scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. In the case of interaction, SOBC expense is centered by the average mean of recognised expense for the ease of interpretation. 
Market risk: (1= if monthly volatility of stock price> median, 0= otherwise) [the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ risk as 
robustness check to the median criterion, the results (not reported) do not change considerably. Weekly’s and daily’s volatility are also 
used as a robustness check for Monthly volatility. The results (not reported) do not change considerably]. All market and accounting 
measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses 
as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et 
al. (2000)(2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) 
as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries 
in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World 
Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated 
into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction effects between two variables. 
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. Given the positive and significant market valuation to the recognised expense of SOBC in 
low risk-taking banks, this positive relationship becomes more accentuated (apparent) in 
more risk-taking banks. That is, the vairaition in the level of bank risk taking seems to 
significantly effect on the value relevance and the intangible features of the recognised 
expense of SOBC.  
Market values the recognised expense of SOBC of all banks, calclulated using the fair value 
approach, as a value-increasing asset. The magnitude of this positve relationship become 
significantly larger in more risk-taking banks. One possible reason for this finding is that 
market participants convey a positive signal to the market and encourage the risk-taking 
behavior of management through placing a higher weighting to the incentive features of 
SOBC issued in risky banks. In the case of banks, shareholders may be inclined to 
compensate more risk-taking behaviour that increasingly maximises wealth transformation 
from debt-holders to shareholders. 
The estimates obtained from running the complete model of equation (6) are shown in 
columns (2-6), using different proxies for various institutional factors across the sample 
countries that adopted IFRS2/FAS123. In column (2), the response coefficient on the 
recognised expense of SOBC in low risk-taking banks that operate in codified law countries 
remains positive and significant. The coefficient on the recognised expense of SOBC in high 
risk taking sample banks that operate in the same context is significantly higher compared to 
less risk taking banks as indicated by the value and the significance of the coefficient on the 
interaction term (Risk*SOBC). That is, market values the recognised expense of SOBC as a 
value increasing asset that contributes to value of low risk-taking banks that operate in 
codified countries. The positive intangible value attributable to the recognised expense of 
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SOBC rewards is significantly more accentuated in high risk-taking banks that operate in the 
same legal setting. 
More importantly, the coefficient on the three-way interaction terms in column 2 (Risk 
*SOBC*LT) is insignificant. This suggests that the variation in the legal tradition under which 
the sample-banks operate, do not significantly change the pervious inference. That is, the 
intangible feature of SOBC rewards is significantly more accentuated in high risk-taking 
banks, and across all the institutional settings under which the sample-banks operate. 
This inference is also supported by the rest of the models variations that use different proxies 
to the level of investor protection, from column (3) to (6), at the 5% significance level. For 
example, column (3) shows that the coefficient on recognised expense of SOBC of low risk-
taking banks that operate in the EU is positive, yet significant only at the 10% level. 
However, this positive relationship is significantly more accentuated in high risk-taking 
banks that operate in the EU (SOBC = 12.14+17.99). The coefficient of the three-way 
interaction term (Size*SOBC*USA), as indicated in column (3), is also insignificant. That 
is, the positive intangible value attributable to the recognised expense of SOBC rewards is 
significantly more accentuated in high risk-taking banks, and across the US and the EU 
sample-banks. The same finding is derived from the rest of the estimations, from column (4) 
to (6), that utilise many proxies to the differences in the levels of investor protection [ASD, 
DRI and SOIP respectively] among countries that adopted this standard. Finally, banks’ daily 
and weekly stock volatility are also used as a robustness check of the reported results that 
utilise banks’ monthly stock volatility to proxy banks’ risk [the results are reported in 
appendix C]. The results do not considerably change across all the model variations. 
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The positive relationship between the level of risk-taking and investors appreciation to the 
intangible feature of SOBC expense has implications for risk-taking and for the agency 
problem, particularly in banking sector. There have been many renewed calls for a response 
from financial institutions and banking sectors’ regulators to monitor banks’ use of SOBC 
given their tendency to induce short-term risk taking incentives (Mehran and Rosenberg, 
2009). Walker (2009), who later reviewed corporate governance in UK banks, pointed out 
that their culture of granting share-based incentives is viewed as excessive and it significantly 
induces short-term risk taking. Similarly, the US Congressional Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act in 2008 aimed to limit companies tendency to offer share-based incentives 
to reduce the probability of “unnecessary and excessive risks that threaten the value of the 
financial institution” during the period that Treasury holds a debt or equity interest1. 
However, there is no clear and comprehensive definition that provides any clarity of what 
would entail “unnecessary and excessive risk”. Furthermore, not all companies in the US are 
obliged to apply the provisions of this Act. Only a few banks have been benefited from this 
Act2. Story and Dashed (2009) also documented that banks quickly repaid the received funds 
to overcome the Act’s restrictions, in particular before the 2009 year-end bonuses were 
determined. That is, the Act fell short of gaining its full advantage where banks withdrew 
from participating under the Act’s restrictions. 
6.6 Additional analysis  
This thesis covers the period from 2004 to 2011. To ensure that the reported results are not 
driven by the effect of 2008 financial crisis, the main value relevance adopted models (4 and 
                                                          
1(See section 11(B) (2/a)) 
2 This provision applies only to “financial institutions participating in the Act’s Troubled Assets Relief Program (‘TARP’) 
if (i) the institution has sold assets under TARP in sales that are not solely direct purchases, and (ii) the amount sold 
(including direct purchases) exceeds $300 million in aggregate”.  
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5) are also run excluding the 2008 financial crisis period. The reported results do not change 
considerably (See Appendix B). Furthermore, all the reported results from the all used 
models in this chapter do not change considerably using the annual buy-and-hold stock 
returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year as a proxy for the 
market returns (See Appendix A). Indeed, mandating the recognition regime of expensing 
the fair value of SOBC has enhanced the value relevance and reliability of the accounting 
information across all the financial reporting contexts that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. The 
intangible feature attributable to SOBC expense is also significantly more accentuated in the 
presence of the mandatory recognition relative to disclosure. Finally, the influence of the 
differences in the financial reporting contexts on investors’ perceptions to the intangible 
feature of SOBC expense is less burdensome after the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R. 
6.7 Summary 
This chapter presented and discussed the empirical findings of whether the recognition 
approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC provides more value relevant information that 
better reflects the intangible value attributable to such rewards than the disclosure approach. 
The accounting information is considered value relevant when it has a statistical association 
with equity return (Barth el al., 2001). Furthermore, SOBC schemes are usually designed to 
motivate employees and managers and to drive companies’ future performance over the 
long-term. The willingness of those talented managers and employees to be compensated 
based on the long-term future performance and service is associated with extra market risk 
factor. Market participants are, therefore, expected to compensate the risk factor of the 
associated expense of SOBC. The findings of whether market participants perceive the 
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recognised expense of SOBC as an intangible asset that contributes to a better future value 
of companies is presented and discussed in this chapter. Finally, the chapter presents and 
discusses the empirical findings of whether the variation in the financial reporting 
environment significantly influences the value relevance and the intangible value attributable 
to SOBC expense, prior vs after IFRS2/FAS123R. 
The findings of this chapter show that the over the pre adoption period, valuation coefficient 
on the voluntarily recognised expense of SOBC was insignificantly positive (asset), whereas 
the valuation coefficient on the disclosed expense was insignificantly negative (expense). 
The differences in the financial reporting settings had also a significant impact on investor 
valuation to the disclosed expense of SOBC, calculated using the grant-date fair value 
approach. The negative relationship between market valuation and the disclosed expense of 
SOBC was significantly more accentuated in banks that operate in financial reporting 
environment characterised by a relatively high level of investor protection. Furthermore, the 
findings show that while the valuation coefficients on the disclosed and the voluntarily 
recognised expense of SOBC are redundant and insignificant in the pre adoption period, 
possibly due the self-selection problem, the valuation coefficient on the recognised expense 
over the post adoption period is positive and significant. This inference is also consistent 
across all the contexts that adopted this standard, and support the view that recognition versus 
disclosure matters to market participants worldwide. The findings also support the stance of 
the FASB/IASB and indicate that the recognised expense of SOBC in the post-
IFRS2/FASB123R periods is significantly more value relevant than that disclosed in the pre-
period. The intangible value attributable to SOBC expense as a value-increasing asset is 
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significantly more accentuated (apparent) in the presence of the mandatory recognition 
relative to disclosure. 
Indeed, FAS123R/IFRS2 has achieved the desired aims and increased the reliability and 
comparability of the fair value of SOBC as important incentive instruments and across all 
the sample settings that adopted this standard. The influence of the differences in the 
financial reporting environment on investors’ perceptions to the intangible value to SOBC 
expense is less burdensome consequent to the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. This 
might also suggest an increased integration across the sample countries over time. 
Banks’ size was found also to positively increase the value relevant and the intangible value 
attributable to the recognised expense of SOBC, but only in banks that operate in the US 
context or other similar contexts that have a relatively high level of investor protection. That 
is, larger sized banks that operate in the US context or similar contexts characterised by a 
high level of investor protection receive more benefits from issuing SOBC to their employees 
compared to those large EU banks or those banks that operate in a context with lower level 
of investor protection, respectively. This could be due to the complex activities and/or the 
access for more international investment opportunities, in large banks that operate in the US 
or other similar contexts. Furthermore, the variation in the level of banks’ potential growth 
seems to have no significant effect on the value relevance and the positive intangible value 
attributable to the recognised expense of SOBC. Market particpants percieve the recognised 
expense of SOBC schemes as a value-increasing asset that contributes positively to both low 
and high potenial grwoth bank valuation. This finding was also found to be valid across all 
the financial reporting contexts underwhich the sample-banks operate. Finally, investors 
generally assign an increasing value to the intangible incentives derived from SOBC issued 
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in high risk-taking banks. That is, the positive intangible value attributable to the recognised 
expense of SOBC rewards is significantly more accentuated in high risk-taking banks. This 
inference is also consistent across all the financial reporting contexts under which the sample 
banks operate. Again, a possible reason that can explain this finding is that market 
participants convey a positive signal to the market and encourage the risk-taking behavior of 
management through placing a higher weighting to the incentive features of SOBC issued in 
riskier banks. This is of a particular importance in the banking sector where shareholders 
may be inclined to compensate more risk-taking behaviour that increasingly maximises 
wealth transformation from debt-holders to shareholders. 
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Chapter 7: Synopsis and Conclusion 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the synopsis and the conclusion of the thesis. As we saw in what 
preceded, this thesis highlights the major financial reporting implications of alternative 
reporting methods of accounting for SOBC by utilising pre and post adoption data of 
IFRS2/FAS123R for a single industry, and across a wider global setting, the EU and US 
banking sectors. The period of the study covers eight years (2004-2011), one year pre 
IFRS2/FS123R adoption and the rest cover the post mandatorily IFRS2/FAS123R 
adoption. The thesis predominantly deals with two major streams of accounting research: 
i) the economic consequences from the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R, and ii) 
the information content and the value relevance of the recognition versus the disclosure 
approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC. 
Firstly, the research objective of the economic consequences part aims to identify, 
analyse, compare, and evaluate the materiality of the total impact of expensing SOBC on 
reported earnings and other selected performance measures. A sample of banks that 
operate across a wider international setting, the US and EU market, and different periods 
of investigation, pre and post IFRS2/FAS123R adoption, is selected for this research 
objective.  
The second research objective of this thesis is to explore the value relevance and the 
information content of the recognition versus the disclosure approach to expensing the 
grant-date fair value of SOBC from the perspective of agency and equity valuation 
theories. Evidence is provided on the value relevance and the intangible value attributable 
to the cost associated with SOBC under alternative reporting methods and mainly by 
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utilising pre and post adoption data of IFRS2/FAS123R for a single industry, the EU and 
US banking sectors.  
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. The following section summarises the 
first four Chapters of this thesis. The third section summarises the main findings, reported 
in Chapters 5 and 6. The fourth section of this chapter reflects on the limitations of the 
study; the fifth section suggests possible areas and recommendations for future research. 
The final section of this chapter draws conclusions and inferences by summarising this 
thesis’ contribution to knowledge and its theoretical and practical implications. 
7.2 Main findings and implications  
The empirical findings of this thesis are reported in Chapters 5 and 6 along with their 
implications. This section is separated into two sections: i) Economic consequences of 
expensing SOBC; and ii) the value relevance and the information content of the 
recognition versus the disclosure approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC. 
7.2.1 Economic consequences of expensing SOBC 
The findings on economic consequences of the mandatory adoption of expensing SOBC 
through time resulted in modest and statistically significant negative impact on both US 
and EU banks’ selected financial performance measures. The impact is more likely to be 
higher in the US banking sector. The findings also suggest that this impact is only 
materially confined to the largest and the highest growth banks in the EU; and for the 
majority of US banks, the larger is the bank, the greater is the impact. There is also 
evidence of a modest reduction in the changes of the selected performance measures over 
the period 2004-2005 for EU banks and 2005-2006 for US banks, due exclusively to the 
mandatory introduction of IFRS2/FAS123R.  
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These findings do not reflect earlier research estimations indicating that concerns and 
criticism of the implementation of this standard are largely unsubstantiated. These 
findings have implications for financial analysts and other financial reporting users in 
explaining how the compulsory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R has through time resulted 
in prevalent possibility of modest but unnecessarily immaterial changes in selected 
financial performance measures of banks. This is a matter of importance given that these 
selected financial indicators are widely used in different contractual specifications, such 
as variable compensation contracts1, and also in estimating a firm’s value. 
The results also show that banks in both samples, but particularly in the US, had 
significantly accelerated the vesting condition of SOBC grants to avoid recognising 
standing unvested grants using the fair value approach in the first-year adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R. Option life cycle, management discretion and structure of the 
recognised expense of SOBC are also found to have their influence on the trend of the 
negative effect of IFRS2/FAS123 on the selected performance measures. The findings 
also show a remarkably pronounced movement towards using cash-settled based 
payments, possibly due to their manipulative accounting treatment. Such issues, 
therefore, should be given more consideration by the standard-setters to influence or 
control management’s tendency towards using cash-settled grants given the flexible 
scope allowed under the current standard to modify and sometimes reverse the recognised 
expense in order to ‘smooth’ their companies’ earnings. These findings also have value 
and implications for users interested in the structure of share-based compensation 
contracts in the EU and the US banking sectors, and for other motivational aspects of 
these contracts and related corporate governance issues. 
                                                          
1 Accounting performance indicators such as ROA, ROE, EPS, are one of the basic motivation aspects used to 
determine the amount of compensation in the variable compensation contracts.  
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In addition, the findings show that the earlier predictions and employees’ fears that firms 
would curtail SOBC grants to avoid or reduce the mandatorily associated expense came 
to light after the first option cycle in the post-adoption period is over. Yet the decrease is 
insignificant, indicating that both US and EU banks are still using SOBC grants 
extensively to compensate their employees. That is, the enhanced transparency associated 
with mandatory IFRS2/FAS123R adoption did not significantly decrease the level of 
SOBC by banks and it remains relatively very high. Such an issue might have an 
implication for financial institutions and banking sectors’ regulators in responding to the 
renewed calls to monitor banks’ use of SOBC grants given their tendency to induce short-
term risk taking incentives (Mehran and Rosenberg, 2009; Walker, 2009). 
7.2.2 The value relevance and the information content of the recognition versus the 
disclosure approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC 
The findings show that FAS123R/IFRS2 has achieved the desired aims and increased the 
value relevance and the comparability of the fair value of SOBC and across all the sample 
settings that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. More specifically, the findings show that over the 
pre adoption period, the valuation coefficient on the voluntarily recognised expense of 
SOBC was insignificantly positive (asset), whereas the valuation coefficient on the 
disclosed expense was insignificantly negative (expense). The variation in the financial 
reporting settings also had a significant impact on investor valuation to the disclosed 
expense of SOBC, calculated using the grant-date fair value approach. The negative 
relationship between market valuation and the disclosed expense of SOBC was 
significantly more accentuated in banks that operate in financial reporting environment 
characterised by a relatively high level of investor protection. Furthermore, the findings 
show that while the valuation coefficients on the disclosed and the voluntarily recognised 
expense of SOBC are redundant and insignificant in the pre adoption period, possibly due 
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to the self-selection problem, the valuation coefficient on the recognised expense of 
SOBC over the post adoption period is positive and significant. This inference is also 
consistent across all the contexts that adopted IFRS2/FAS123R. SOBC schemes are 
usually designed to motivate employees and managers and to drive companies’ future 
performance over the long-term. The willingness of those talented managers and 
employees to be compensated based on the long-term future performance and service is 
associated with extra market risk factor. As such, the recognised expense of SOBC 
expected to be perceived by market participants as an intangible asset that contributes to 
a better future value of companies compared to that of other operating expenses such as 
salaries which are paid based on the past services or performance. Indeed, across all 
markets, invertors reliably and favorably appreciate the incentive impact of SOBC on the 
issuance bank performance and they react positively to the incurred expense consequent 
to the adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R. The findings support the view that recognition versus 
disclosure matters to market participants worldwide. The findings also support the stance 
of the FASB/IASB and indicate that the recognised expense of SOBC in the post-
IFRS2/FASB123R periods is significantly more value relevant than that disclosed in the 
pre-period. SOBC aims to drive companies’ future performance over the long-term and 
it is associated with extra market risk factor. Market participants are expected to 
compensate the associated expense of SOBC in comparison to pricing other operating 
expenses such as salaries or bonuses which are paid based on the past services or 
performance. Unlike if it is disclosed in the footnote, the recognised expense of SOBC 
would also be under the scrutiny of external auditors. As such, investor’ perception to 
future cash flow might be revised upward to reflect the intangible feature of SOBC on 
firm’s value. Indeed, the findings indicate that the intangible value attributable to SOBC 
schemes as value-increasing assets is significantly more accentuated (apparent) in the 
187 
 
presence of the mandatory recognition relative to disclosure. The influence of the 
differences in the financial reporting environment on investors’ perceptions to the 
intangible value to SOBC is less burdensome consequent to the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R. This might also suggest an increased integration across the sample 
countries over time. Findings of this study provide further international insights and input 
to standard setting regulators and other interested parties in both recognition and 
measurement issues of SOBC on an international scale, and at a level of a sole standard. 
Finally, the findings show that banks’ size was also found to positively increase the value 
relevant and the intangible value attributable to the recognised expense of SOBC, but 
only in banks that operate in the US context or other similar contexts that have a relatively 
high level of investor protection. Furthermore, the findings show that market particpants 
perceive the recognised expense of SOBC schemes as a value-increasing asset that 
contributes positively to both low and high potenial grwoth bank valuation. This finding 
was also found to be consistent across all the financial reporting contexts under which 
the sample-banks operate. Furthermore, the finding shows that the positive intangible 
value attributable to the recognised expense of SOBC rewards is significantly more 
accentuated in high risk-taking banks. This inference is also consistent across all the 
financial reporting contexts under which the sample banks operate. Inverstors across all 
markets favouribly appreciate the incentive features of SOBC in higher risk taking banks. 
Given the recent calls in the UK (Walker, 2009), and in the US (Chen et al., 2006; 
Congressional Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 2008) to alleviate the 
unnecessary and excessive risks driven by using SOBC, that SOBC induces higher risk 
taking in the banking industry worldwide remains a matter of both interest and 
significance. 
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Overall, the findings provide some evidence on the value relevance and the incentive 
features attributable to SOBC under alternative reporting methods and across different 
institutional settings. These findings have value and implications for academics and other 
financial reporting users and stakeholders who are interested in some comparative issue 
of international financial reporting quality in general and the measurement issue in 
particular. The findings also may be of interest to users interested in the motivational 
aspects and related corporate governance issues of SOBC contracts in the EU and the US 
banking sectors. 
7.3 Limitations and recommendations for future research  
As with other studies in this area, this thesis is subject to potential limitations. This section 
outlines some of these limitations, and suggests possible areas for future research. Firstly, 
this study is limited by the nature of the sample requirements. The sample only considers 
the economic consequences and the value relevance of the recognition versus the 
disclosure approach to expensing the fair value of SOBC on an international sample of 
publicly listed US and EU banks. Other countries adopted IFRS2 or its equivalent 
FAS123R, so the opportunity to increase the sample of banks may exist. Furthermore, 
the conclusion of this thesis may not be reflective of the situation that might prevail in 
some other sectors or other countries. Future research, therefore, can be conducted in this 
area, and using a wider data set from different sectors and more countries, particularly 
emerging economies. Secondly, the first research question of this study examines the 
overall impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS2/FAS123R on a set of selected 
financial performance measures as a proxy to the economic consequences. Future 
research may use different proxies to the economic consequences such as the cost of 
capital. Thirdly, the study considers SOBC granted for total employees. Future studies 
that analyse the overall impact of expensing SOBC of executives and other employees 
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separately would be another interesting area to be explored by future research. Fourth, 
since only a few statistical inferences and control variables were used in this study to 
examine the economic consequences, future research may use more statistical inference 
and control, for example, using the continuous growth and over an extended period of 
time.  
This study also raises other interesting issues to be considered by future research. First, 
this study reported evidence about banks gradual movement toward increasing the use of 
cash-settled based compensation. Therefore, examining the market valuation differences 
between equity and cash settled based compensation schemes, particularly in the US and 
the UK would be a potentially interesting area for future research. Secondly, the 
relationship between option vesting condition and banks operations complexity is to be 
investigated by future research interested in the structure and motivational aspects of 
SOBC contracts and other related corporate governance issues. Analysing the impact of 
firm-level corporate governance on the interrelation between expensing SOBC, and each 
of market and accounting variables, prior and during the recent financial crisis would also 
be another interesting area for future research. Investigating the response of companies 
in restructuring the compensation arrangements as a result of the adoption of 
IFRS2/FAS123R could also provide a worthwhile basis for future research. Finally, using 
other proxies to bank risk taking and investigating its impact on the interrelation between 
expensing SOBC, and each of market and accounting variables, would also be another 
interesting area for future research, particularly in the banking industries due to the risk 
sensitivity in this industry. 
Nevertheless, despite these limitations, this study’s key contribution adds to our 
understanding of the financial reporting implications of alternative reporting methods of 
accounting for SOBC across wider global settings and time periods of investigation. The 
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study utilises pre and post adoption data, 2004-2011, of a new regulation, 
IFRS2/FAS123R, for an international sample of US and EU banks. Most of the existing 
studies on the economic consequences of expensing SOBC, and on the value relevance 
and the information content of the mandatory expensing of the estimated fair value of 
SOBC relate to a single context, the US. However, studies on the IFRS2, and specifically 
on a wider international scale do not exist. This is a matter of importance given the 
convergence process between the IASB and FASB, where IFRS2 and its US equivalent 
FAS123R have been one of the earliest standards that have been converged. This thesis, 
therefore, addresses this gap in the current literature. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A 
Table (1): The information content of SOBC expense: pre adoption: 
The annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼2 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼4𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼6𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
Description 𝑅𝑖𝑡(1) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(2) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(3) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(4) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(5) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(6) 𝑅𝑖𝑡(7) 
E_it  1.26*** 
(0.51) 
1.34*** 
(0.50) 
1.24** 
(0.54) 
1.30*** 
(0.57) 
1.26** 
(0.56) 
1.36*** 
(0.52) 
1.30** 
(0.54) 
∆ E_it 0.348*** 
(0.096) 
0.343*** 
(0.102) 
0.344*** 
(0.103) 
0.343*** 
(0.08) 
0.356*** 
(0.101) 
0.358*** 
(0.102) 
0.346*** 
(0.103) 
Rec_it  
 
4.45 
(6.77) 
6.32 
(6.91) 
6.71 
(7.34) 
5.14 
(6.81) 
6.20 
(7.03) 
5.95 
(6.95) 
C_Dis_it1  
 
-4.00 
(3.58) 
-6.31 
(4.19) 
-7.55 
(5.42) 
-4.82 
(3.39) 
-5.81 
(3.51) 
-5.29 
(3.46) 
LT * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
-8.49** 
(6.26) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USA * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
-10.34** 
(7.11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ASD * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-33.65** 
(14.28) 
 
 
 
 
DRI * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-16.15*** 
(12.81) 
 
 
SOIP * C_Dis_it  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.17** 
(1.91) 
Constant -0.018 
(0.057) 
-0.043 
(0.055) 
-0.015 
(0.063) 
-0.024 
(0.062) 
-0.051 
(0.063) 
-0.111** 
(0.064) 
-0.037 
(0.064) 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 21% 21% 23.3% 23.3% 24.1% 27.4% 24.5% 
N 115 115 115 115 115 115 115 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-
and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Rec_it: recognised expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Dis_it: disclosed expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. C_Dis_it: disclosed expense of share-option 
based compensation centered by the average mean of disclosed expense and scaled by the stock price at the beginning of 
the fiscal year. Pre-adoption period data has been manually extracted from the first year adoption comparative figures or 
the pro-forma disclosure regarding the impact of options expense. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 
2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy 
for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), 
Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the remaining countries =(0); (3) [ASD]the anti-self-dealing index from 
Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from 
La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: 
The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective 
exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year.* shows the interaction effects between two variables. 
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Table (2): The information content of SOBC expense: pre vs post adoption: 
The annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
Description R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) R_it (7) R_it (8) 
E_it 0.398** 
(0.156) 
0.364** 
(0.150) 
0.415*** 
(0.150) 
0.320** 
(0.150) 
0.328** 
(0.150) 
0.373** 
(0.151) 
0.331** 
(0.152) 
0.340** 
(0.151) 
∆ E_it 0.226*** 
(0.0494) 
0.177*** 
(0.0481) 
0.157*** 
(0.0484) 
0.172*** 
(0.0483) 
0.166*** 
(0.0481) 
0.170*** 
(0.0486) 
0.174*** 
(0.0482) 
0.170*** 
(0.0483) 
SOBC  22.28*** 
(2.823) 
-2.572 
(8.178) 
-2.729 
(9.064) 
-4.031 
(15.88) 
3.072 
(11.95) 
0.920 
(16.28) 
8.776 
(15.12) 
Post * SOBC   28.69*** 
(8.847) 
26.87*** 
(9.664) 
38.23** 
(17.13) 
22.04** 
(12.85) 
30.95** 
(17.63) 
13.87** 
(15.72) 
Post * SOBC * LT    -12.71 
(21.85) 
    
Post * SOBC * US     -13.45 
(19.88) 
   
Post * SOBC * 
ASD 
     40.37 
(53.87) 
  
Post * SOBC * DRI       -6.53 
(43.24) 
 
Post * SOBC * 
SOIP 
       4.99 
(6.84) 
Constant 0.050 
(0.069) 
0.179*** 
(0.068) 
0.043 
(0.090) 
0.029 
(0.151) 
0.069 
(0.133) 
0.106 
(0.204) 
0.073 
(0.303) 
0.198 
(0.125) 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 57.8% 60.7% 60.9% 60.4% 61.2% 60.9% 61.0% 60.3% 
N 915 915 915 915 915 915 915 915 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-
and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, this expense is centered 
by the average mean for the ease of interpretation. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. Post: a 
dummy variable = (1) post-adoption = (0) pre-adoption period. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to 
partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protection: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= 
common law; 1 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the 
remaining countries =(0); (3) [ASD]the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal 
protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. 
(4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection 
from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. 
The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the 
interaction effects between two variables 
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Table (3): The effects of the differences in the institutional settings on the information content 
of the recognised expense of SOBC (post adoption analysis): 
The annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) R_it (7) 
E_it 0.414** 
(0.169) 
0.433*** 
(0.163) 
0.425** 
(0.165) 
0.408** 
(0.162) 
0.437*** 
(0.165) 
0.426** 
(0.166) 
0.433*** 
(0.163) 
∆ E_it 0.215*** 
(0.055) 
0.148*** 
(0.053) 
0.149*** 
(0.053) 
0.144*** 
(0.053) 
0.144*** 
(0.054) 
0.148*** 
(0.053) 
0.149*** 
(0.053) 
SOBC_it  
 
26.12*** 
(3.355) 
25.65*** 
(3.768) 
25.10*** 
(4.360) 
24.31*** 
(4.543) 
25.55*** 
(7.777) 
25.65*** 
(3.768) 
LT * SOBC  
 
 
 
2.118 
(7.792) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
USA * SOBC    4.488 
(5.923) 
   
ASD * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
 9.605 
(16.02) 
 
 
 
 
DRI * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
0.723 
(8.482) 
 
 
SOIP * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
0.366 
(2.361) 
Constant 0.191** 
(0.089) 
-0.006 
(0.089) 
0.104 
(0.087) 
0.293*** 
(0.065) 
0.489 
(0.506) 
0.237 
(0.191) 
0.102 
(0.087) 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 57.6% 60.7% 60.7% 60.2% 60.7% 60.7% 60.7% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-
and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, the recognised expense 
of share-option based compensation is centered by the average mean, for the ease of interpretation. All market and 
accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in 
the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0 = code 
law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the remaining countries =(0); (3) 
[ASD] the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure 
requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean 
of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World 
Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values 
are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year.* shows the interaction effects 
between two variables. 
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Table (4): The effect of banks’ size on investors’ perception to the recognised expense 
of SOBC, and across different reporting environments. 
The annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
E_it 
0.428*** 
(0.163) 
0.383** 
(0.165) 
0.352** 
(0.164) 
0.375** 
(0.165) 
0.400** 
(0.166) 
0.397** 
(0.165) 
SOBC 
22.02*** 
(4.813) 
45.77*** 
(10.15) 
47.44*** 
(10.15) 
33.00*** 
(6.730) 
38.40*** 
(10.68) 
33.90*** 
(7.367) 
∆ E_it 
0.147*** 
(0.0533) 
0.155*** 
(0.0532) 
0.155*** 
(0.0535) 
0.146*** 
(0.0535) 
0.153*** 
(0.0533) 
0.153*** 
(0.0532) 
Size*SOBC 
7.345** 
(6.308) 
-29.24** 
(12.60) 
-16.00 
(11.35) 
-10.02 
(8.566) 
-22.68 
(14.27) 
-13.80 
(9.546) 
Size*SOBC*LT 
 
 
47.85*** 
(14.57) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size*SOBC*USA 
 
 
 
 
28.12** 
(14.15) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Size*SOBC*ASD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
102.9*** 
(35.60) 
 
 
 
 
Size*SOBC*DRI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37.42** 
(15.88) 
 
 
Size*SOBC*SOIP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.46*** 
(4.360) 
Constant 
-0.008 
(0.094) 
-0.012 
(0.095) 
-0.025 
(0.117) 
0.394 
(0.506) 
0.183 
(0.217) 
-0.011 
(0.094) 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 60.7% 61.2% 61.0% 61% 60.9% 61% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock 
returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based compensation scaled by the stock price 
at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, The recognised expense of share-option based compensation is centered by 
the average mean for the ease of interpretation. Size: a proxy for banks’ size (1= if market value of a bank> median of the sample market 
value, 0= otherwise) [the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ size as robustness check to the median criterion, the results do not 
change considerably]. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to 
partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0= 
code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000). (2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] 
the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider 
expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from 
La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average 
of the strength of shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected 
countries in the sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows 
the interaction effects between two variables 
 
195 
 
Table (5): The effect of banks’ potential growth rate on investors’ perception to the 
recognised expense of SOBC, and across different reporting environments. 
The annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 +
𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +
 𝑒𝑖𝑡  
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
E_it 0.409** 
(0.163) 
0.415** 
(0.166) 
0.401** 
(0.164) 
0.420** 
(0.165) 
0.412** 
(0.166) 
0.414** 
(0.166) 
SOBC 30.94*** 
(4.058) 
30.91*** 
(4.865) 
35.87*** 
(6.198) 
28.98*** 
(5.207) 
31.03*** 
(8.595) 
29.34*** 
(5.732) 
∆ E_it 0.162*** 
(0.0537) 
0.162*** 
(0.0540) 
0.147*** 
(0.0539) 
0.155*** 
(0.0545) 
0.160*** 
(0.0540) 
0.163*** 
(0.0539) 
Growth rate*SOBC -11.81* 
(6.312) 
-11.88* 
(7.186) 
-0.658 
(9.235) 
-15.87 
(10.05) 
-26.89 
(19.95) 
-6.573 
(13.48) 
Growth rate*SOBC*LT  
 
6.439 
(18.38) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*USA  
 
 
 
-19.36 
(12.54) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*ASD  
 
 
 
 
 
8.309 
(31.33) 
 
 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*DRI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.17 
(21.13) 
 
 
Growth rate*SOBC*SOIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.646 
(5.940) 
_cons -0.037 
(0.092) 
-0.032 
(0.095) 
-0.127 
(0.100) 
0.444 
(0.563) 
0.153 
(0.220) 
-0.043 
(0.094) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 60.9% 60.7% 61.1% 60.8% 60.7% 60.7% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock 
return exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of SOBC scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. In the case of interaction, SOBC expense is centered by the average mean of recognised expense for the ease of interpretation. 
Growth_rate_it: a proxy for banks’ growth opportunity (1= if the Market to book value ratio> median, 0= otherwise) [the mean criterion 
is also used to partition banks’ growth opportunity as robustness check to the median criterion, the results do not change considerably]. 
All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in 
the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) based on 
La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000)(2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered 
by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) 
to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of 
shareholders protection from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the 
sample. The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction 
effects between two variables 
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Table (6): The influence of banks’ risk taking on investors’ perception to the recognised 
expense of SOBC, and across different reporting environments 
The annual buy-and-hold stock returns exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
Earning before E/D 0.448*** 
(0.167) 
0.447*** 
(0.169) 
0.417** 
(0.167) 
0.452*** 
(0.168) 
0.439*** 
(0.170) 
0.444*** 
(0.169) 
SOBC 15.71*** 
(5.454) 
14.94** 
(5.931) 
11.47* 
(6.435) 
8.006* 
(8.736) 
0.288 
(15.81) 
11.28 
(9.869) 
∆ E_it 0.142*** 
(0.0531) 
0.133** 
(0.0533) 
0.135** 
(0.0533) 
0.131** 
(0.0535) 
0.138*** 
(0.0532) 
0.134** 
(0.0532) 
Risk*SOBC 16.14** 
(6.477) 
19.34*** 
(7.359) 
17.92** 
(8.490) 
24.10** 
(10.02) 
32.92** 
(18.07) 
21.47** 
(11.54) 
Risk*SOBC*LT  
 
3.836 
(18.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* USA  
 
 
 
-8.754 
(13.74) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* ASD  
 
 
 
 
 
-13.00 
(34.66) 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* DRI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-18.02 
(19.39) 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* SOIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.187 
(5.101) 
Const 0.045 
(0.092) 
0.065 
(0.094) 
-0.070 
(0.109) 
0.289 
(0.508) 
0.122 
(0.214) 
0.054 
(0.093) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 61% 61.1% 61.0% 61.1% 60.9% 61.0% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock 
return exclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the 
beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of 
common shares outstanding adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock 
price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of SOBC scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. In the case of interaction, SOBC expense is centered by the average mean of recognised expense for the ease of interpretation. 
Market risk: (1= if monthly volatility of stock price> median, 0= otherwise) [the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ risk as 
robustness check to the median criterion, the results (not reported) do not change considerably. Weekly’s and daily’s volatility are also 
used as a robustness check for Monthly volatility. The results (not reported) do not change considerably]. All market and accounting 
measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses 
as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et 
al. (2000)(2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) 
as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries 
in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World 
Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated 
into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction effects between two variables. 
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Appendix B 
Table (1): The information content of stock option expense: pre vs post adoption: 
The sample years exclude the financial crisis of 2008. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 𝛼5𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +
𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡  
Description R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) R_it (7) R_it (8) 
E_it 0.346** 
(0.166) 
0.411** 
(0.161) 
0.357** 
(0.159) 
0.365** 
(0.161) 
0.377** 
(0.161) 
0.419*** 
(0.162) 
0.411** 
(0.161) 
0.357** 
(0.159) 
∆ E_it 0.256*** 
(0.0536) 
0.179*** 
(0.0526) 
0.187*** 
(0.0524) 
0.172*** 
(0.0528) 
0.166*** 
(0.0528) 
0.171*** 
(0.0532) 
0.256*** 
(0.0536) 
0.179*** 
(0.0526) 
SOBC  23.26*** 
(3.095) 
-2.751 
(8.605) 
-2.743 
(9.643) 
-4.774 
(16.99) 
3.163 
(12.76) 
0.702 
(17.42) 
8.767 
(16.11) 
Post * SOBC   30.95*** 
(9.361) 
28.46*** 
(10.33) 
39.41** 
(18.44) 
23.59* 
(13.79) 
32.52* 
(18.97) 
16.52 
(16.76) 
Post * SOBC * LT    -11.54 
(23.30) 
 
 
   
Post * SOBC * US     -12.79 
(21.39) 
 
 
  
Post * SOBC * 
ASD 
     40.64 
(57.75) 
 
 
 
Post * SOBC * 
DRI 
      -6.628 
(46.47) 
 
 
Post * SOBC * 
SOIP 
       4.443 
(7.302) 
Constant 0.057 
(0.074) 
0.137* 
(0.073) 
0.042 
(0.095) 
0.024 
(0.160) 
0.0228 
(0.142) 
0.027 
(0.228) 
-0.033 
(0.341) 
0.193 
(0.134) 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 0.569 0.600 0.605 0.597 0.605 0.602 0.603 0.595 
N 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 786 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-
and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share are computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, this expense is centered 
by the average mean for the ease of interpretation. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. Post: a 
dummy variable = (1) post-adoption = (0) pre-adoption period. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to 
partition the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protection: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= 
common law; 1 = code law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the 
remaining countries =(0); (3) [ASD]the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal 
protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. 
(4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, 
centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection 
from World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. 
The raw values are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the 
interaction effects between two variables 
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Table (2): The effects of the differences in the institutional settings on the information content 
of the recognised expense of SOBC (post adoption analysis): 
The sample years exclude the financial crisis of 2008 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 + ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗 + 𝛼1 𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) R_it (7) 
E_it 0.36** 
(0.182) 
0.377** 
(0.175) 
0.391** 
(0.178) 
0.333** 
(0.174) 
0.394** 
(0.177) 
0.393** 
(0.178) 
0.398** 
(0.178) 
∆ E_it 0.253*** 
(0.060) 
0.181*** 
(0.058) 
0.180*** 
(0.058) 
0.176*** 
(0.058) 
0.172*** 
(0.059) 
0.179*** 
(0.058) 
0.180*** 
(0.058) 
SOBC_it  
 
28.11*** 
(3.70) 
28.98*** 
(4.17) 
24.71*** 
(4.78) 
24.64*** 
(4.98) 
22.77*** 
(8.49) 
25.35*** 
(5.84) 
LT * SOBC  
 
 
 
-3.89 
(8.58) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
USA * SOBC    -0.34 
(6.57) 
 
 
  
ASD * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
 18.50 
(17.62) 
 
 
 
 
DRI * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
6.53 
(9.29) 
 
 
SOIP * SOBC  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
1.59 
(2.59) 
Constant 0.129 
(0.091) 
-0.094 
(0.093) 
0.014 
(0.097) 
0.235*** 
(0.069) 
0.367 
(0.580) 
0.149 
(0.218) 
0.013 
(0.097) 
Country-year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 0.567 0.603 0.602 0.593 0.603 0.602 0.602 
N 671 671 671 671 671 671 671 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors.*p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-
and-hold stock returns inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share 
scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before 
extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per 
share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. SOBC_it: The recognised expense of share-option based 
compensation scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, the recognised expense 
of share-option based compensation is centered by the average mean, for the ease of interpretation. All market and 
accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition the sample in 
the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (1= common law; 0 = code 
law) based on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy =( 1) versus the remaining countries =(0); (3) 
[ASD] the anti-self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority 
shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure 
requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better disclosure rules, centered by mean 
of the selected countries in the sample.; (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from World 
Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values 
are translated into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year.* shows the interaction effects 
between two variables. 
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Appendix C 
 
Table 1: The influence of banks’ risk taking on investors’ perception to the recognised 
expense of SOBC, and across different reporting environments 
The daily volatility share price is used as a proxy for the market risk of the selected sample banks  
 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
Earning before E/D 0.400** 
(0.164) 
0.375** 
(0.166) 
0.375** 
(0.164) 
0.390** 
(0.165) 
0.337** 
(0.166) 
0.372** 
(0.166) 
SOBC 17.17*** 
(5.317) 
20.20*** 
(6.798) 
19.73*** 
(7.565) 
13.28** 
(5.977) 
6.437 
(9.156) 
14.52** 
(6.550) 
∆ E_it 0.162*** 
(0.0527) 
0.167*** 
(0.0529) 
0.150*** 
(0.0529) 
0.169*** 
(0.0534) 
0.168*** 
(0.0526) 
0.165*** 
(0.0528) 
Risk*SOBC 14.69** 
(6.356) 
9.565 
(7.777) 
25.08*** 
(9.240) 
23.72*** 
(8.538) 
58.01*** 
(15.59) 
28.56*** 
(9.819) 
Risk*SOBC*LT  
 
22.34 
(14.82) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* USA  
 
 
 
-16.97 
(12.86) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* ASD  
 
 
 
 
 
-44.53 
(30.00) 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* DRI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-52.48*** 
(17.29) 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* SOIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-8.379* 
(4.61) 
Const -0.010 
(0.092) 
-0.015 
(0.096) 
-0.039 
(0.106) 
0.747 
(0.543) 
0.204 
(0.194) 
-0.023 
(0.094) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 61% 61% 61.1% 61% 61.3% 61% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock return 
inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding 
adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
SOBC_it: The recognised expense of SOBC scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, SOBC expense 
is centered by the average mean of recognised expense for the ease of interpretation. Market risk: (1= if daily volatility of share price> median, 0= 
otherwise) [the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ risk as robustness check to the median criterion, the results (not reported) do not 
change considerably. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition 
the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) based 
on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing index 
from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of 
the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better 
disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from 
World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated 
into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction effects between two variables. 
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Table 2: The influence of banks’ risk taking on investors’ perception to the recognised 
expense of SOBC, and across different reporting environments 
The weekly volatility share price is used as a proxy for the market risk of the selected sample banks  
 
−𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑𝛼01,𝑖𝑌𝑡 +  ∑𝛼02,𝑖𝐶𝑗+𝛼1𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡+𝛼3𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼4𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼5 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 + 𝛼6 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡
+ 𝛼7 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼9 𝑆𝑂𝐵𝐶𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑣_𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑡𝑗𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
 R_it (1) R_it (2) R_it (3) R_it (4) R_it (5) R_it (6) 
Earning before E/D 0.376** 
(0.164) 
0.380** 
(0.166) 
0.349** 
(0.165) 
0.384** 
(0.166) 
0.370** 
(0.167) 
0.380** 
(0.167) 
SOBC 17.13*** 
(6.226) 
17.47** 
(7.062) 
26.39*** 
(9.976) 
8.450 
(9.005) 
-6.948 
(15.74) 
11.84* 
(9.627) 
∆ E_it 0.164*** 
(0.0528) 
0.160*** 
(0.0530) 
0.158*** 
(0.0531) 
0.156*** 
(0.0532) 
0.159*** 
(0.0529) 
0.159*** 
(0.0530) 
Risk*SOBC 13.49** 
(7.039) 
14.07** 
(8.027) 
10.29 
(10.80) 
21.27** 
(10.27) 
40.21** 
(18.15) 
19.33* 
(11.37) 
Risk*SOBC*LT  
 
4.088 
(17.70) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* USA  
 
 
 
4.034 
(14.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* ASD  
 
 
 
 
 
-20.62 
(34.48) 
 
 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* DRI  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-30.81 
(19.70) 
 
 
Risk*SOBC* SOIP  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.740 
(5.130) 
Const -0.001 
(0.093) 
0.0035 
(0.096) 
-0.074 
(0.111) 
0.312 
(0.507) 
0.0934 
(0.223) 
-0.005 
(0.094) 
Country-fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
adj. R2 60.9% 60.8% 60.9% 61% 60.9% 60.8% 
N 800 800 800 800 800 800 
Standard errors in parentheses are based on robust standard errors. *p< 0.10, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01. 𝑅𝑖𝑡 : The annual buy-and-hold stock return 
inclusive of dividends and computed over a bank’s fiscal year. 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The annual earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the 
fiscal year. Earnings per share is computed as total net income before extraordinary items divided by the number of common shares outstanding 
adjusted for share options expense. ∆ 𝐸𝑖𝑡: The year-to-year change in earnings per share scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
SOBC_it: The recognised expense of SOBC scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year. In the case of interaction, SOBC expense 
is centered by the average mean of recognised expense for the ease of interpretation. Market risk: (1= if weekly volatility of share price> median, 
0= otherwise) [the mean criterion is also used to partition banks’ risk as robustness check to the median criterion, the results (not reported) do not 
change considerably. All market and accounting measures are winsorised at 2%. A set of country-level institutional variables is used to partition 
the sample in the cross-sectional analyses as a proxy for investor protections: (1) a country’s legal tradition (0= common law; 1 = code law) based 
on La Porta et al. (1997), Ball et al. (2000) (2) the US economy = (1) versus the remaining countries = (0). (3) [ASD] the anti-self-dealing index 
from Djankov et al. (2008) as a proxy for the level of legal protection of minority shareholders against insider expropriation centered by mean of 
the selected countries in the sample. (4) the disclosure requirements index in securities offerings from La Porta et al. (2006) to reflect better 
disclosure rules, centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. (5) [SOIP]: The average of the strength of shareholders protection from 
World Economic Forum over the period of (2008-2011) centered by mean of the selected countries in the sample. The raw values are translated 
into US$ using the respective exchange rate at the end of the fiscal year. * shows the interaction effects between two variables. 
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